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Introduction
Discussions about the  democracy of the EU, both on a n  academ ic and  a  political 
level, seem  to  be based on  th e  general assum ption th a t  any "com m unitarization" 
of na tio n al policies, in  particu la r the  transfer of pow ers from th e  M em ber S ta tes 
to  a  Com munity level, lead s to  a  democratic deficit. At the  M aastrich t In te r­
governm ental Conference in  1992, Cooperation in  th e  fields of Ju stice  an d  Hom e 
A ffairs (CJHA) w as form ally integrated into Title V IT E U , establishing th e  new  
"Third Pillar" of th e  E uropean  Union. In  fact, th e  T hird  P illar does n o t im ply 
to ta l "com m unitarization", though i t  does place CJH A  for the  f irs t tim e w ith in  
th e  single institu tional fram ew ork of th e  European Union1. In  th e  ligh t of th e  
above argum ent, th is  form al shift towards Com munity involvem ent ap p ears  to  
h era ld  a  fu rther step aw ay from democracy a t  th e  European level. T he a im  of 
th is  p ap e r is to  prove th a t  quite the  contrary is tru e .
Cooperation among th e  Twelve in  th e  fields of justice and  home affa irs is, 
f irs t of all, the consequence of the earlier agreed objective of estab lish ing  the 
in te rn a l m arket as  an  "area without in ternal frontiers in  which the  free move­
m en t of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured"2. In  particu lar, close 
links exist betw een the concept of free movement o f persons, the  rem oval of 
in te rn a l borders and  th e  n eed  for compensatory m easures such as a uniform  sy­
stem  of external border controls, a  common policy tow ards th ird  country n a tio ­
n a ls  (visa, asylum  and im m igration policy) or police and  judicial cooperation in  
o rder to  avoid free m ovem ent of criminals, etc.3. Once the  objective of estab li­
sh ing  a European common m arket w ithout in te rn a l frontiers is agreed, coo­
p era tion  in  the  fields of justice and home affairs becomes virtually  ind ispensa­
b le4 *. However, questions such as how m uch cooperation and harm onization of 
law s is  needed o r in  what form th is should tak e  place cannot be provided by 
legal reasoning only, i.e. by  in terpretation, in te r  alia, of article 7a EC6. These
1 See article C TEU.
2 Article 7a (2) EC.
1 An impressive inventory of over sixty ''essential" and "desirable" compensatory measures has 
been worked out by the Croup of Coordinators on the Free Movement of I Arsons in Las Palmas 
(therefore called the "F’alma Document") and subsequently adopted by the European Council at 
Madrid in June 1989. See below, Chapter I.B., p. 11.
4 See e.g., the excellent essay by Donner; further De Jong, pp. 183-191.
* Nonetheless, only recently the EP has initiated formal legal action in the European Court of
Justice under article 175 against the European Commission for its failure to act in implementing 
the free movement of persons in accordance with the Parliament’s interpretation of article 7a
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questions rem ain  substan tially  open to political choice* 6. In  spite of th is, an d  th is 
is th e  po int being m ade here, cooperation am ong th e  Twelve in  th e  Helds of 
justice and  home affairs corresponds to th e  alm ost inevitable logic of th e  com­
m on m ark e t and is very likely to increase in  th e  fu tu re7.
In  fact, although th e  public has been largely  unaw are of it, th e  EU 
M em ber S ta tes have been cooperating in  these fields for several years already , 
i.e. long before M aastrich t and  the  introduction of th e  Third P illar. W hereas to 
a large  ex ten t responding to  a Community im perative, they have done so ou tside 
th e  Com munity legal and  institu tional order. As will be described in  C h a p te r  1 
of th is  thesis, th e  governm ents of the M ember S ta te s  have set up  a  v a s t n u m b er 
of institu tions, working groups and agencies to  cover im m igration an d  asy lum  
policy, police, judicial and  customs cooperation, etc. These fora were generally  
estab lished  in  an  ad  hoc fashion, a t  different tim es and  as th e  need arose. The 
practical and  procedural arrangem ents varied from  area to  area, as d id  th e  
repo rting  arrangem ents to  M inisters. Work in  each  of these a reas  was usually  
carried  out independently  of th a t  in  others. The re su lt of all th is  h as  b een  a n  
ever-extended, increasingly complex and opaque patchw ork of groups, o rgan iza ­
tions and  facilities, differing in  term s of th e ir te rr ito ria l rem it (e.g. EC, "Schen­
gen* Group", Council of Europe, United Nations), th e ir  a rea  and  the  quality  and  
in ten s ity  of the cooperation they pursue (e.g. coordination and  developm ent of
EC. See Pandraud (1994b), p. 24, anil O'Keeffe (1994), pp. 150-15].
6 The political sensitivity of the issue at stake, and not only the legal coherence of the system is 
clearly a determinant factor. E.g., the EC Member States accepted the Community procedure in 
the case of the EEC Directive on the control and acquisition of firearms and ammunition 
(9l/4'7fyEEC,GJ No. L256 of 13.09.1991, pp. 51-58), whereas the United States of America, with 
a far more integrated structure of government, finds it much more difficult to achieve federal 
rules on the control and acquisition of firearms. By contrast, common immigration policy for all 
States has been established for a long time in the United States, whereas no such policy exists 
yet in the European Union. It is of interest to add that the harmonisation of the law on the 
acquisition and possession of arms had been tabled as an "essential" (or "sine qua non" for 
frontier abolition) measure in the light of article 8a EEC (now article 7a EC) by the EC Member 
States in the above mentioned Palma Document of 1988! See also Conner, esp. pp. 8 and 21.
7 However, increased cooperation in these fields cannot only be explained as a consequence of the 
common market. Firstly, it is arguable that for many political actors the removal of some aspects 
of interior affairs to the Union level represents a transfer of illegitimacy. As stated by Groenen- 
dijk, p. 399, intergovernmental rule-making provides political actors with "a welcome shield 
against national lobbies and pressure groups in areas that are political minefields. Cautious 
activities on issues such as immigration and asylum policy seldom bring in many voters." Se­
condly, external pressure, especially the mounting financial and social cost of uncontrolled 
immigration into Europe creates a major incentive for harmonizing national immigration and 
asylum laws (likely at the basis of the common denominator of the least generous criteria) and 
closer cooperation, even for States remaining outside the Union. On this point ("fortress Europe”) 
see d'Oliveira (1994). Thirdly, international crime, terrorism or drug trafficking are by no means 
a consequence of the establishment of the internal market only. Thus, provisions on mutual legal 
assistance and cooperation between law enforcement agencies are one which are desireable in 
their own right.
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legal capacities, policy-making, common operations, operational support). In  the  
w ords of van Outrive, governments have operated  "like chess p layers who 
sim ultaneously play on several chessboards and who determ ine specific ru le s  for 
each game"8 9. In  th is  context a  considerable am ount of policy papers a n d  deci­
sions have been produced by relatively small circles of s ta te  officials in  condi­
tions of g reat secrecy m ostly  escaping any parliam entary  supervision, and, 
p a rtia lly  as a consequence of the  la tter, often even escaping m in isterial superv i­
sion. T his is particularly  d isturbing because justice an d  hom e affairs touch  upon 
som e of the  m ost fundam ental hum an rights, both  of Com munity citizens a n d  of 
non-EC nationals®. Also, resolutions, recommendations or conclusions adopted  
by  m in iste rs and  s ta te  officials in the fora m entioned above, a lthough  not 
necessarily  legally binding, de facto have had  fa r  reaching consequences on 
individual righ ts and  freedom s10 1. Consequently, one m ay argue, th e se  acts 
should have resu lted  from a  democratic and legislative procedure ra th e r th a n  a 
diplom atic one.
In  C hapter 2 of th is  thesis the new  legal an d  institu tional fram ew ork for 
cooperation in th e  fields of justice and home affairs provided by Title VI TEU 
will be exam ined, and in  C hapter 3 to w hat ex ten t th is new fram ew ork will 
affect parliam entary  scrutiny in  these policy fields will be analysed a t  th e  n a tio ­
nal level in  p articu la r '1.
The central question dealt w ith in  C hapters 2 and  3 will be  to  w ha t ex ten t
* Van Outrive (1902b), p. 7.
9 So far, in many EC Member States borders have offered the only feasibility to effect (systematic) 
controls even in cases where no grounds for suspecting criminal activity have existed. Conse­
quently, border controls have served as signiff cant filters in the past. E.g., according to Schatten­
berg, pp. 44-45, approximately 60 % of all arrests and seizures by the police in Germany occures 
at borders. I mention this because it should be made clear that a visible gain of freedom at the 
border as a consequence of the abolition of border controls might be outweighed by a loss of 
freedom through less visible and tangible but for more vigorous compensatory measures. Indeed, 
it may be argued that such measures will increasingly be adopted independently of the abolition 
of border controls. In this case the latter will serve only as a convenient pretext for an expanding 
intrusion on people’s rights and privacy. The fact that today internal border controls still exist 
strongly sup|iorts this argument.
10 See, e.g., the Commission's survey on the implementation of the 1991 work programme on 
asylum and immigration, adopted by the European Council in Maastricht 1991, in: Communica­
tion from the Commission to the Council and the European I ’arliament on immigration and 
Asylum Policies, COM (94) 23 final, 23.02. 1994, Annex II.
11 Chapter 3 will focus on the role of the British, French and German parliaments. These parlia­
ments were chosen, in particular, for two reasons: firstly, the role attributed to them within their 
national constitutional system differs distinctively. It may therefore be interesting to compare 
whether European Union affairs are, notwithstanding these constitutional discrepancies, dealt 
with in a similar way. Secondly, the United Kingdom, France and Germany may be considered 
as the politically and economically most important EU Member States.
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th e  estab lishm ent of the  T h ird  P illar will m ake cooperation in  th ese  policy-fields 
"more democratic" th an  u n d er th e  procedures ex isting up to  1993. Of course, 
c rea ting  any new  theory of European democracy falls outside th e  scope of th is  
research . Nor shall there be added a  new  definition of th e  so-called "dem ocratic 
deficit" of the E uropean U nion12. Instead, when discussing democracy I w ill tak e  
tw o basic elem entV criteria as essential for th a t system  of cooperation13: T h e  firs t 
criterion  is openness. T his criterion is fu rther divided into th ree  subcriteria: (a) 
com plexity of th e  institu tional structure; (b) openness of th e  decision-m aking 
process (publication and explanation of votes, records of debates, etc.), (c) access 
to d ra fts  and  final docum ents14. The second criterion is chances of parliamentary 
participation in th e  decision-making process (e.g. formal consu lta tion  during  
negotiations; parliam en tary  approval a fte r decision-taking). !
12 See on this regard Karlheinz Neunreither, The Democratic Deficit of the European Union: 
Towards Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and National Parliaments, 
Government and Opposition 1994, pp, 299-309.
13 Alexander Kreher and I have argued elsewhere that the "traditional" understanding of the demo­
cratic deficit of the Europeon Union as an institutional or parliamentary deficit is too limited 
and incomplete. As shown by Max Weber, e.g., parliamentarism and democracy are not identical, 
and parliamentary procedures by no means guarantee democratic substance. Therefore, the 
"democratic deficit" was defined by the authors more broadly as the lack of public discourse 
accompanying and guiding the integration process. Yet, (formal) parliamentary participation and 
accountability, both at national and European level, does undoubtedly increase the chances of 
public discourse, and the criteria described in the following have to be assessed in this context. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that other criteria may be just as important (e.g. free elections, separa­
tion of jiowers, protection of minorities, freedom of press etc.). See in detail Kreher/Weber-Pana- 
riello, pp. 72-86; see also Max Weber, Parlamentarisierung und Demokratisierung, in: Kurt Kiu- 
xen (Hrsg.), Parlamentarismus, Köln 1969, pp. 27-40.
M See for these three elements of openness Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on 
openness in the Community, Rapporteur Maurice Duverger, 21 March 1994, A3-015JV94 (PE 
207.46iyfin.). The criterion of openness seems to be of particular importance with regard to 
CJHA because, whilst probably the parliamentary system of each Member State provides for the 
possiblity of controlling such activities, the questioning and examining procedures are, in such 
matters, rather theoretical, in practice, MPs must first and foremost be well informed of the 
existence, composition and mandates of the intergovernmental fora, their agenda and their work 
programme.
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Chapter 1. European Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and 
Home Affairs until 1993
A. Com m unity powers an d  th e  "Realpolitik of th e  Commission"
Cooperation among the M em ber S tates in  the fields of justice an d  hom e affairs 
s ta r te d  well before th e 1980s. However, the  Com mission's J u n e  1985 W hite 
P ap er on th e  completion of th e  In ternal M arket an d  th e  adoption of th e  Single 
E uropean  Act one year la te r  provided th e  major im petus for in tensified  coopera­
t ion in  these  fields!6. The W hite Paper inter alia se t ou t a program m e fo r th e  
rem oval of in terna l frontier controls betw een M em ber S ta tes by 199216, a n d  t he 
Annex  to th e  White  Papercon tained  a lis t of m easures (Directives) which, in  the  
Commission's view, were essen tial in  th is respect, in  particu lar on the:
■  coordination of rules concerning the right of asylum and the status of refugees;
• approximation of arms and drugs legislation ;
■  coordination of rules concerning the status of third country nationals;
■  easing of controls at intra-Community Borders and the abolition of police controls when 
leaving one Member State to enter another;
■ coordination of national visa ftolicies;
■  coordination of rules concerning extradition11.
Thus, it  is of in te re s t to note th a t  the au th o rs  of the  W hite P a p e r ap ­
p aren tly  had  little  doubt a s  to  th e  legal possibilities for th e  Com m unity to  draw  
up Com m unity legislation th a t  would b ring  into effect th e  free m ovem ent of p er­
sons, including th e  com pensatory m easures th a t would be needed. Yet, a t  th e  
tim e of th e  adoption of th e  SEA by th e  Heads o f G overnm ents which, in  p a r ­
ticu la r by introducing th e  new  articles 8a  and 100a EEC gave th e  go-ahead to 18
18 Note, however, that the Euro|»enn Council of Fontainebleau o f '25/26 June 1984 had already 
asked the Council and the Member States to put in hand without delay a study of the measures 
which could be taken to bring about in the near future "the abolition of all police and customs 
formalities for people crossing intra-Community frontiers". See Bull. EC 6-1984, point 1.1.9. In 
reaction to slow progress at Community level, France and Germany concluded an agreement at 
Saarbriicken in 1984 on the easing of controls on individuals at the French-German internal 
frontier, followed by the Schengen Agreement between France, Germany and the Benelux States 
in 1985. Hie Commission's White F*aper was thus anticipated by intergovernmental initiatives 
which may have put additional pressure on the Commission.
w "Our objective is not merely to simplify existing procedures, but to do away with internal frontier 
controls in their entirety. In some cases this will be achieved by removing the underlying causes 
which give rise to the controls. In others it will be a matter of finding ways and means other 
than controls at the internal frontiers to achieve comparable levels of protection." Completing the 
Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission io the European Council (Milan, 28 and 29 
June 1985), COM (85) 310 final, 14.6.1986, p. 9 (para. 27).
11 COM (85) 310, 14.6.1985, pp. 14-16 and Annex, pp. 12-13.
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th e  program m e of Com m unity proposals on th e  completion of th e  In tern a l 
M arket, inter alia, two declarations were approved by the Governm ents of the  
M em ber S ta tes and  a ttached  to  th e  SEA'8. The firs t declaration was m ad e  on 
th e  subject of articles 13 to  19 SEA18 9 to  th e  effect th a t:
"Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take such measures as 
they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from third countries and to 
combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works of art and antiques."
The second declaration was sta ted  th e  following term s:
"In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall co-operate, without 
prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as regards the entry, movement and 
residence of nationals of third countries. They shall also co-operate in the combating of terro­
rism, crime, the traffic in drugs und illicit trading in works of art and antiques."
In  addition, p arag raph  2 of the new  article 100a EEC explicitly excluded 
provisions re la ting  to the free m ovement of persons from parag raph  1, th e  la tte r  
providing for qualified m ajority  voting w ithin th e  Council for provisions to 
achieve th e  objectives se t o u t in  article 8a EEC. The two declarations a n d  the 
way artic le 100a EEC was form ulated clearly reflected the  reluctance show n by 
som e M em ber S tates, th e  U nited Kingdom, D anem ark and Ireland  in  particu la r, 
to "communitarize" m atte rs  of justice and  home affairs20. N ational powers w ere 
m ea n t to  prevail in  these fields, and indeed th e  Council of M inisters a n d  th e  
M em ber S tates continued down the intergovernm ental path . Accordingly, th e  
debate on the appropriate legal basis for Com munity action rem ained  m ain ly  
speculative, even though strong argum ents w ere advanced by m any  legal 
scholars for the existence of such (limited) Com m unity powers21.
18 Bull. EC - Supplement ¡^ 86.
19 Articles 13 to 19 SEA introduced, inter alia, articles 8a and 100a into the EEC-TVeaty.
90 See Cioos et.ai., p. 491. On the (limited) interpretative value of these declarations see also 
Ptpkorn, in: Groebei^Thiesinf&'Ehlermann, article 8a, para. 49-51.
21 With regard to the existence of Community competences several questions have to be distin­
guished: first, must the internal market be brought about by the Community institutions or is 
this not obligatory with regard to the movement of persons? Second, does article 7a EC (former 
article 8a EEC) impose an obligation to abolish all internal borders? This is closely related to the 
question of whether article 7 a EC applies to EC-national^resi dents only. The distinction between 
EC and third country nationals means in practice that the free movement of persons (in this case 
of EC nationals) is impossible to achieve since it entails retaining internal frontier controls 
(identity checks). Finally, to what extent does article 8a EC (in conjunction with other articles 
of the TYeaty, e.g., articles 3c, 48, 59, 100 and 235 EC) empower the Community to legislate so 
as to establish the indispensable accompanying measures without which internal border controls 
can still be justified? With regard to these questions see Butt f ’hfflp, pp. 172-175; Donner, pp. 20-
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In  view of the evident reticence shown by som e M em ber S ta tes to  accept 
th e  "Community approach" in  the  sensitive a rea  of im m igration controls, asy­
lum , visa, drugs control, crim e prevention and th e  like, th e  Com mission adopted  
a  p ragm atic  strategy, defined elsewhere as th e  "Realpolitik of th e  Com m is­
sion"* 22, accepting the  preferences of governm ents for th e  in tergovernm ental 
approach* Doubts about th e  competence of the Com m unity to  legislate in  these  
fields were th u s also fed by  th e  attitude tak en  by  th e  Com mission itself**3 24. By 
1988, th e  Commission w rote in  its  Communication to  th e  Council on th e  aboli­
tio n  of controls of persons a t  intra-Com m unity borders:
"Ihe Commission is fully aware of the delicate nature of an exercise of this kind, and it considers 
that attention should be focused on practical effectiveness rather than on matters of legal 
doctrine. Therefore, without prejudging its interpretation of the TVeaty as modified by the Single 
European Act, the commission projtoses that Community legislation in this field be applied only 
to those cases where the legal security and uniformity provided by Community law constitutes 
the best instrument to achieve the desired goal. This would mean therefore that large scope 
would be left, at this stage, to co-operation among Member States notwithstanding the fact that 
the Commission should be ¡>ermitted to participate, even on an informal basis, in this form of co­
operation (...) ."**
Consequently, only one of the above-m entioned directives was subm itted  
to th e  Council and  finally adopted by th e  la tte r25 *. For the rest, th e  possibility of 
settling  th e  free m ovem ent of persons w ith in  th e  fram ew ork of th e  T reaties had , 
in  fact, been lost, and problem s were dealt w ith in  different fora, all of which 
u sed  th e  intergovernm ental formula28. In  th is connection particu lar m ention  can 
be m ade, as  fram eworks for cooperation betw een th e  twelve M em ber S ta te s  of
21; O'Keeffe (1992a), pp. 6-8; ( ‘ipkom, in: Groeber^ffhiesing/Ehlermarm, Article 8a, para. 40-57, 
Timmermans, pp. 354-368.
22 See van den Brink/Vierhout, p. 384.
33 E.g., the above quoted declaration on articles 13 to 19 SEA was commented by Commissioner 
Martin Bangemann as follows: "Our law students are told that to learn the law you need to read 
the statute-book. There we find a general declaration on articles 13 to 19 of the Single Euroi>ean 
Act:« ... [Declaration] *. We are therefore dealing with an area which has been specifically made 
an exception," OJ, Debates of the EP, No 3-401, 21 February 1991, p. 288.
34 Commission of the European Community (1988), p. 43. However, it should be noted that the 
Commission in this communication explicitly excluded any prejudgment of the interpretation of 
the EEC Treaty. Nonetheless, see also the above-quoted remarks of Commissioner Bangemann.
26 Directive 91/478/EEC on control and acquisition of firearms and ammunition.
24 In the words of d'OUveira, p. 170, activities of Member States have been "paracommunitarian;
i.e. independent intergovernmental cooperation between Member States, oriented on the
Community legal order, but outside the Community institutions which normally produce
elements of the Community legal order."
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the Community, of:
■ Trevi
■  Ad Hoc Group on Immigration
■  EPC Group on Judicial Cooperation
■ CELAI)
■  Mutual Assistance Group (MAG)
■  Ad Hoc Group on Data FVocessing
Reference should also be m ade to Schengen as  a  fram ework for coopera­
tion  betw een a  sm aller num ber of M ember S tates. Furtherm ore, some specific 
subjects which are of relevance to the free m ovem ent of persons w ere un d er 
discussion in a still w ider framework, for instance, in the fram ew ork of the  
Council of Europe and  the U nited Nations27.
Because of the num ber of fora in  which aspects of th e  circulation of 
persons were discussed, th e re  was a need for a  coordination of positions to  be 
ta k e n  by the M em ber S ta tes in these talks. The E uropean Council, m eeting  in  
Rhodes, therefore decided in  December 1988 to s e t  up  a Group o f Coordinators 
on the Free Movement of Persons, which had  to rep o rt directly to  the  E uropean  
Council. In  addition, there w as m inisterial supervision in  m eetings of Im m igra­
tion  M inisters, Justice M inisters, ECOFIN (in th e  case of Custom s cooperation), 
and  th e  Foreign Affairs Council (EPC).
W hat follows is a sum m ary of the m ost im p o rtan t fora an d  th e ir principal 
activities. It should be noted, however, th a t  th e  following description is  by no 
m eans complete. The read er should therefore keep  in  m ind th a t  the  fram ew ork 
of institu tions, agencies an d  structures which a im ed to  prom ote cooperation in  
th e  fields of justice and hom e affairs was (and rem ains) far m ore complex th a n  
th a t  m apped ou t below28. Secondly, i t  should be  stressed th a t  much of th e  
cooperation proceeded th rough  informal and  often secret channels. C onsequent­
ly, re liab le  d a ta  only exists to  a very lim ited extent.
B. Co-ordinators' Group o n  th e  F ree M ovement o f Persons
The Co-ordinators' Group w as se t up b y  the  E uropean  Council in  Rhodes in  
1988 to  co-ordinate M em ber S tates' actions re la tin g  to the free m ovem ent of 
persons. I t  was composed of 12 high-ranking officials, a  chairm an and, on behalf
27 See on the role of the Council of Europe Hondius.
28 For a glossary of bodies and organisations dealing with justice and home affairs in 1993 see e.g., 
Bunyan, pp. 173*181; see also Cruz., pp. 15-25
10
1
I
i
of th e  Commission, th e  vice-president. The Council S ecretaria t serviced th e  work 
of th e  Group, which m et four o r five tim es during each Presidency. The G roup 
reported  directly to the E uropean  Council. Its f irs t ta sk  was th e  draw ing u p  of 
a  docum ent which would contain  two categories of m easures, those in d isp en sa ­
ble for the suppression of in te rna l borders and those which were desirable, b u t 
no t indispensable; secondly, th e  document had  to ind icate  the bodies responsible 
for adopting m easures and  se t up  a tim etable29 30. Adopted by th e  Group in  Las 
P alm as and  subsequently by th e  European Council in  M adrid in  J u n e  1989, th e  
rep o rt h as  since been  called th e  "Palma Document". In  fact, to  a  considerable 
ex ten t it froze Com m unity action on the free m ovem ent of people and rep laced  
large sections of th e  Commission's 1985 W hite Paper.
Despite its political im portance th e  Palm a Document rem ained  largely  
unknow n to the public - national MPs included50. T his can be illu stra ted  by  th e  
following example: The P alm a Document was m ade public during a  h ea rin g  of 
th e  Select C om m ittee on th e  European Com m unities of the H ouse of L ords in  
Ju ly  1989 and w as ordered to be prin ted31 32. Several m onths la te r  a  copy of th e  
sam e docum ent w as given to  Dutch M Ps by th e ir  Government. Interestingly, 
some of th e  Dutch M P s considered the docum ent to  be for confidential u se  only, 
even though they could have ordered th e  sam e inform ation from Her Majesty's 
Stationary Office in  London a t  any time. Groenendijk, therefore, concludes:
'"Tbe unclear status of the Palma liocument - is it public or confidential information and what 
is its legal or political status? • did not stimulate public parliamentary debate on the document 
in the Netherlands. Instead, it made it harder for MPs and outsiders to the negotiations to 
recognize the political imi»ortance of the Palma Document."**
It should be added th a t  th e  Group of Coordinators was no t an  ex tra  forum  
for debate. In  particular, i t  w as not responsible for th e  course tak e n  by nego tia ­
tions in  th e  different fora. Therefore, th e  coordination provided by th e  group
19 The document drew a distinction between: action at the external frontiers (competent fora: Ad 
Hoc Group on Immigration; Trevi; MAG); action at the internal frontiers (Ad Hoc Group on 
Immigration; Trevi; EC); action in connection with drug trafficking (EPC Group on Judicial 
Cooperation; TYevi; Council of Europe; UN; MAG); terrorism (Trevi; EPC); action in connection 
with admission to Community territory (Ad Hoc Group on Immigration); action in connection 
with granting of asylum and refugee status (Ad Hoc Group on Immigration; Council of Europe; 
UN); judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters (EPC); goods carried by travellers (EC).
30 Neither national parliaments nor the EP had been informed of the proceedings within the 
Coordinators' Group in general and the drafting of the Palma Document in particular.
31 See Appendix 5 to Select Committee on the European Communities, House of L/trds (UJ8U).
32 Groenendijk, p. 394.
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rem ained  ra th e r fragm entary33. Secondly, th e  Group did very little  to  forw ard its  
second task , which was to give an  im petus to th e  progress or conclusion of the  
proceedings in  th e  various bodies.
C. T rev i34
The Trevi Group was se t u p  in  1975 as an  in tergovernm ental body on  police 
cooperation w ith th e  in itia l aim  of co-ordinating efforts to com bat te rro rism 35. It 
expanded its b rief in  th e  mid-1980s to em brace all the  policing and  security  
aspects of free m ovem ent, including im m igration, visas, asylum -seekers an d  
border controls.
Trevi operated a t th re e  different levels: M inisterial (six-monthly m eetings 
of Trevi M inisters); the Trevi group of "senior officials" (which also m e t six- 
m onthly); and four "working groups": Trevi I (Terrorism )36; Trevi II (Public o rder 
and  Training)37; Trevi III (Drugs and O rganised Crime)38; an d  Trevi 1992 
(Abolition of Borders)33. T revi's m ethods of operation were fairly sim ilar to  th e  
system  used by th e  EC Council of M inisters. The EC Presidency country w as ex 
officio th e  Trevi Presidency country for six  m onths of an  EC Presidency term . 
Trevi had  no perm anen t staff. Prom 1989, the tw o s ta tes  on e ith e r side of th e  
"troika" sequence provided staff help, th u s creating  a staff support netw ork.
!î See de Zwaan, p. 34fi,
M A general overview of international police cooperation in western Europe is presented by fienyon 
et.al.; see also liunyan, pp. 15-36, and Home Affairs Committee, HC (1990).
x  According to Cruz, p. 16, the name of the group comes for the Trevi fountain in Rome where the 
first meeting of the group was held under the chairmanship of Mr Fonteijne.
M Trevi I was established by the Trevi Ministers on 31st May 1977. It was concerned with 
combating terrorism and was the only one with an operational role. It regularly analysed 
information held on known and susj*ected terrorist groups, with particular attention pnid to their 
strategies and tactics. FYocedures had also been developed for the rapid communication of 
information using Trevi's own security communications network. According to llenyon el. a}., p. 
154: "Information from informants suggests that it is in this field that Trevi has made a tangible 
impact, although for obvious reasons of security it is not easy to gauge how extensive this has 
been, nor is ¡t possible to cite any concrete examples."
!7 Trevi II was concerned with j*oHce cooperation and the exchange of information on: i*olice 
equipment, including computerVcommunications; public order and football hooliganism; police 
training; forensic science; other scientific/technical matters.
38 Trevi III was established in Fióme in June 1985 to look at organised crime and drug trafficking. 
This group prepared the way for the European Drugs Unit.
** Between 1988 and 1992 "Trevi 92" dealt with a wide array of more political topics related to the 
policing and national security implications of the reduction for border controls, as well as com­
pensatory measures. In particular, Trevi 92 was responsible for drafting the 1990 Trevi FYo- 
gramme of Action mentioned below.
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Except for Trevi 92, th e  EC Commission was not involved in  the Trevi structu re .
While a  m ajor p art of th e  value of Trevi re s ted  sim ply on its  existence as 
a forum  for developing contracts between represen ta tives of th e  EC m em ber 
states'*0, i t  also m ade a num ber of more tangible contributions to  policing an d  
security  cooperation in  Europe. The Dublin M inisterial m eeting of Trevi in  J u n e  
1990 agreed to a program m e of action for fu ture cooperation*1. T h is program m e 
outlined a  num ber of p rio rities for improved police cooperation. In o rd e r to  
com bat terrorism , drugs trafficking and organised crim e, exchanges of personnel 
and inform ation would be increased and agencies involved would m ee t reg u la rly  
to pool inform ation. Among th e  specific m easures were the  ap p o in tm en t of 
liaison officers, th e  display of "wanted" posters, th e  fu rth e r developm ent of a  
rap id  an d  protected com m unication system, the use  of joint team s w here ap ­
propria te , the promotion of suitable train ing  and  research, and  th e  sh a rin g  of 
inform ation.
T he ideas outlined in  th e  Dublin program m e were given fu rth e r im petus 
a year la te r a t th e  Luxembourg sum m it when Chancellor Kohl of G erm any 
proposed the creation of a  European Crim inal Police Office (Europol). As a  
resu lt, th e  Ad hoc Working1 Group on Europol w as se t up in A ugust 1991. Its  
work h a s  led to th e  estab lishm ent of the  Europol Drugs Unit, which h as  ac ted  
as a  "forerunner" for Europol, and which operates regularly  in  T he H ague since 
1 J a n u a ry  1994*2. Furtherm ore, preparatory work h as  been un d ertak en  by the  
Ad hoc Group to draw  up a  Convention on EuropoV3.
According to  Bunyan, th e  work of the T revi group w as "shrouded in  
secrecy" from th e  tim e of i ts  formation. For instance, i t  was n o t un til 1989 th a t  
th e  f irs t  communiqué for public use was m ade available in  the  U nited  Kingdom. 
Since, a  w ritten  (m inisterial) answ er to B ritish parliam en t followed each of th e  4012
40 Over the two years 1901 and 1992 there were a total of 41 meetings on the three different levels. 
See Bunyan, pp. 185-186,
41 /Vagram me of action relating to the reinforcement of ice co-operation and of the endeavours 
to combat terrorism or other forms of organized crime, 10 June 1990, printed in Home Affairs 
Committee, House of Commons (1990) I, pp. 1-Iiv.
42 At their meeting held in Copenhagen on 2 June 1993 the Trevi ministers signed an agreement 
which provisionally established the functions, arrangements for data protection, staffing, 
accountability and finance of the EDU/Europol. See Bull.EC 6-1993, point 1.4.19. Disagreement 
on where to locate EDU delayed progress during mid-1993 and it was tem|»rnrily based in 
Strasbourg. At the European Council meeting on 29th October 1993 it was agreed to site the 
EDU/Europol jiermanently in The Hague. On the work and prospects of Europol in general and 
EDU in particular see Ernst Levy, Was Europol im Kampf gegen Atomschmuggel leisten kiinnle, 
in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 August 1994, p. 4.
4i See Bunyan, pp. 24-33, and De.utscher Bundestag (1994), p. 87.
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six-m onthly m eetings of th e  Trevi M inisters44. In addition , general observations 
in  th e  EC Bulletin followed meetings of the  T revi M inisters. The negative 
assessm ent w ith regard  to  secrecy m ade by fiunyan  seem s to be confirm ed by 
the fact th a t inform ation on the  structures, w orking m ethods an d  re su lts  of 
Trevi is often incoherent if n o t to say contradictory. In  fact, according to Benyon 
et a l, one respondent to th e ir  survey had  questioned w hether even m in iste rs  
them selves were aw are "of all th a t  goes on in  th e  working groups". O ther 
in form ants had  concluded th a t  working groups h ad  m ade policy decisions 
w ithout m inisterial oversight, which m ight have cum ulatively affected m ajor 
aspects of policing and crim inal justice w ithout any political ag reem ent or 
accountability* 46. Altogether, Benyon et al. concluded:
"Many if not all of these groups and networks apjiear to have virtually no accountability 
whatsoever. They ore rarely held answer able for their activities and few pnrlamentarians, or 
others such as journalists, seem even to be aware of their existence. And yet, through these 
structures of information about individuals is being exchanged and operations against in­
dividuals may indeed be discussed and planned."46
Finally, m ention should be m ade of a considerable overlap betw een th e  
working groups w ith in  the  Trevi-structure47 as well as  betw een Trevi and  o ther 
fora such as the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, th e  EPC Group on Judicial 
Cooperation, MAG, Interpol. W alker even observes a  tendency of the various 
em ergen t international policing and crim inal justice system s and  arrangem ents 
to compete w ith one another. As a result: "Program m es m ay be pursued  which, 
a t  best, are imperfectly coordinated, and a t  worst, h in d er the realisation  of each 
o ther's  full institu tional potential."48
D. A d hoc Group on  Im m igration
The Ad hoc Group on Im m igration em erged from th e  Trevi framework. It was
** See Bunyan, p. 23. On the question of secrecy see also ffenyon et.ai, pp. 167 and 272.
46 Benyon et aJ., pp. 166 and 168.
46 Benyon et.ai., p. 285. I should add that this statement did not only refer to police-cooperation 
under Trevi but also to several other fora dealing with cooperation in the fields of crime 
combating and terrorism such as interpoi, the F\>mpidou Group (Council of Europe), JVfAfl (92), 
GAFI (Gl5), or secret Networks., e.g., Kilowatt, the Vienna Group or the Club of Berne.
41 Referring to criticism made by a number of respondents, Benyon et a!., p. 164, write: "(...) 
working groups were often thought to be unaware of each others' activities, let alone aware of 
the views of the politicians themselves".
48 Walker, pp. 30-31. See also Bigo, pp. 167-169.
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set u p  a t  a  m eeting of m in iste rs  responsible for im m igration m a tte rs  of th e  
M em ber S tates and  th e  V ice-President of th e  Com m ission in  London on  20 Oc­
tober 1986. The m eeting endorsed the objective of providing for free m ovem ent 
in  th e  Community w ithin th e  term s of the SEA49.
Bringing together m in iste rs from th e  departm ents of governm ents dealing 
w ith im m igration issues, th e  ad  hoc group differed from o ther aspects of th e  
Trevi s tructure in  th a t  th e  Commission was allowed to  a tten d  its  m eetings in  
the capacity of observer. T he secretariat was guaran teed  by th e  G eneral Secre­
ta r ia t  of the Council of th e  EC. These facts notw ithstanding, th e  partic ipa ting  
governm ents, the  U nited  Kingdom, Ireland and D anem ark  in  particu la r, reso lu ­
tely m ain tained  th a t  i t  functioned entirely  outside th e  am bit of C om m unity 
in stitu tions and law. The Ad Hoc Group w as stru c tu red  around six  expert su b ­
groups, nam ely on: AdmissioryExpulsion; Visas; Forged Documents; Asylum; 
E xternal Frontiers; Refugees. As in  the Trevi system , th e  subgroups involved 
civil servan ts and represen ta tives from th e  national au thorities responsible for 
enforcing im m igration policy. They also organised th e ir  work to  coincide w ith  
the  six-m onthly m eetings of th e  m inisterial level of th e  Ad hoc Group m eetings, 
which itself coincided w ith th e  m inisterial level of Trevi m eetings.
According to  th e  conclusions of the  m in isterial m eeting in  1986, th e  Group 
was instructed , inter alia, to examine: improved checks a t  the  ex ternal frontiers; 
the contribution which in te rn a l checks can  m ake; th e  role of coordination and 
possible harm onization of th e  visa policies of th e  M em ber S tates; the exchange 
of inform ation about the operation of spot check system s; m easures to achieve 
a common policy on elim inating the abuse of th e  r ig h t of asylum. These "term s 
of reference" were redefined and  expanded by th e  P alm a Document in 1989.
Even though the Ad hoc Group acted in  conditions of secrecy sim ilar to  
those  of Trevi, th e  ou tput h as  been m uch more visible. Also, th e re  w ere con­
siderably  more m eetings. According to Bunyan, a  to ta l of 100 m eetings of im ­
m igration  m inisters, officials, police and im m igration officers w ere held  from 
1991 to  1992 only60. The Ad hoc Group has been  associated w ith efforts to 
prom ote a common list of v isa countries across th e  12 M ember S ta tes an d  the  
in troduction of carriers ' liab ility  legislation. Furtherm ore, it h as  e laborated  the  
Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for 
Asylum lodged in one of the member States of the EC, also known as the  Dublin
50
See Butt Philip, p. 175. 
See Bunyan, pp. 186-187.
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Asylum Convention, signed on  15 Ju n e  199051, and  th e  draft Convention on the 
Crossing of External Border^2. O ther activities, in te r  alia, included53:
* the establishment of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum 
(ClREA), and of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of 
[iorder and Immigration (Cl REF!f4;
* the adoption of countless resolutions, recommendations, conclusions, e.g., on the harmonisa­
tion of national policies on family reunification, on manisfestily unfounded applications for 
asylum, on countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution, etc.“;
* feasibility study of a European Automated Fingerprint Recognition System (EURODACf6;
* production of a joint manual of European asylum practice, and the development of a consular 
manual giving guidance to consular offices on the issuing of visas.
Conventions excluded, th e  form at which was chosen to produce the  re su lts  
of th e  cooperation w as confusing; in  particular, th e  re su lts  were n o t designed in  
a  fo rm at which w as clearly indicative of an  act of public in ternational law 57. 
However, resolutions, recommendations, conclusions, statements, etc. h ad  b een  
approved by the  heads of government, an d  several docum ents even had  dead li­
nes b y  which tim e they should have been implemented in  national law. Several 
au th o rs  have qualified som e of these acts as soft law*8, i.e. '’rules of conduct *467
M Printed in Rull.EC 6-1990, point 2.2.2. Pursuant to article 22(3) the Convention enters into force 
on the first day of the third month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification, ac­
ceptance or approval by the last signatory State to take this step. On let June 1994 only seven 
EU Member States (Danemark, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, United Kingdom, France) 
had ratified the Convention. It is expected to enter into force in 1995. See Ameline, 14.
62 Discussions on most of the text of the draft External Frontiers Convention were concluded in 
1991. Since then further progress on the draft Convention has been blocked ns a result of 
Spanish objections to its application to Gibraltar. The rlrnft Convention is not an officially 
published document. The unpublished version of this draft prepared by the Ad hoc Group on 
Immigration Secretariat is dated 24 June 1991 and referenced as SN 252iV91 WG1 822.
S1 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94)23 final, 23.02.1994, Annex II and III,
44 The Interior Ministers at their meeting on 30 November 1992 approved the establishment of this 
Centre staffed by the General Secretariat of the Council, to monitor the common immigration 
policy of the 12 EC Member States and the crossing of borders.
44 See e.g., Bull.EC 6-1993, point 1.4.18.
46 Such a system already exists in several Member States and helps to avoid multiple asylum 
applications. Tfie Twelve want to set up a European Automated Finger-print Recognition 
System, EURODAC, which will enable them to exchange and to compare their collection of 
finger-prints in order to find out, e.g., if an asylum-seeker has already been turned down in 
another Member State where he used a different identity.
47 The legal status and effect of these acts has to be determined by the applicable rules of interna­
tional law. Accordingly, the question whether a resolution, conclusion or recommendation is 
legally binding depends upon the intention of the parties and the terms of the act itself. See 
Verdros^Simma, pp. 335-345. The form or title chosen is not of itself decisive. See article 2(1) 
(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
68 See e.g. Alain Servantie, in: GroebenAThiesing/Ehiermann, Article 30 EEA, para. 20.
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which, in  principle, have no legally binding force b u t which nevertheless m ay 
have practical effects"*9.
As m entioned above, th e  work of the  Ad Hoc G roup was as secret as th a t  
of T revi. Intergovernm ental cooperation through th e  Ad Hoc G roup therefore 
a ttra c ted  m any of th e  sam e criticism s th a t were d irected  aga inst Trevi. G eneral 
observations in  the  EC-Bulletin followed every six-m onthly m eeting of Im m igra­
tion m in isters. However, inform ation after such m eetings was often  m isleading 
if no t to  say false. For instance, a  declaration adopted a t  the m eeting  of Im m i­
g ration  M inisters in  Dublin on 15 Ju n e  1990 was published in  th e  EC-Bulletin. 
The declaration regarded, inter alia, the Dublin Convention, signed by 11 
M em ber S tates on th e  sam e date , and particularly  re ferred  to previous coopera­
tion betw een the Ad Hoc Group and the U nited N ations High Com missioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). According to the declaration:
"The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was consulted on the terms of the draft 
Convention and welcomed prosj>ect8 for a constructive dialogue in this field.',fiU
In  fact, the UNHCR had  been "consulted" by th e  Ad Hoc Group only a t  
the very las t phase of the negotiations91, which even m ay have constituted a  
breach of the obligations laid  down in article 35 of th e  Geneva Convention of 
1951 on  the S tatus of Refugees to cooperate w ith th e  UNHCR and  to fu rn ish  i t  
w ith inform ation about proposed legal m easures concerning refugees.
Generally, th e  closed negotiations in  the Ad Hoc Group (as well as in  
Trevi an d  other fora) a ttra c ted  criticism for th e  ra th e r  one-sided expertise 
am ong negotiators (officials of im m igration and police departm ents). T h is is 
particu larly  d isturbing for negotiations in  th e  fields of justice and  hom e affairs, 
because, as Weiler points out:
"Bureaucracies tend to suffer from what may be called the bunaiiziition of suffering. Faced with 
large numbers of human problems, these become «cases», the problems become «categories», and 
the solutions become mechanical,"62 *61
69 Snyder (1994b), p. 198. See also Snyder (1993), pp. 31-36, and Da nie] Th iirer, The Role of Soft 
Law in the Actual Process of European Integration, in: Olivier Jacod-GuiUnrmod (éd.), L'avenir 
du libre-échange euro|»éen, Zurich, pp. 129-139.
w Bull. EC 6 1990, point 2.2.1.
61 See Webber, p. 144.
82 Joseph H. H. Weiler, TTiou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger (Ex. 23:9): On the Judicial FVotection 
of the Human Rights of Non-EC Nationals • A critique, in Schermers et. a}., p. 251, It should be 
added, however, that Weiler made this remark to stress the importance of obtaining sufficient 
judicial protection in these fields.
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E. EPC-Groups on Judicial Cooperation
Judicial cooperation took place under the framework for European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) established by the SEA63. Work was divided between crimi­
nal and civil judicial cooperation groups. The groups' main role was to draw up 
a number of international conventions in criminal and civil m atters and to 
promote the ratification by States who had not already done so, of conventions 
concluded in the Council of Europe64. Both groups reported to the European 
Political Committee. This was a somewhat odd structure for members of the 
working groups were typically officials of justice departments, whereas the 
European Political Committee consisted of head officials of national departments 
for foreign affairs65. The Political Committee therefore had to report to the 
meetings of Justice Ministers and not to the European Council. The Commission 
was involved as an observer and the work was supported by the EPC Secretari­
at66. Like EPC in general, judicial cooperation in this forum was carried out in 
great secrecy. Furthermore, due to its complexity, cooperation in these fields 
lacked efficiency. Finally, many subjects had also been discussed in the Council 
of Europe which lead to a duplication of work67.
F. CELAD
The European Committee to Combat Drugs was known by its French acronym 
CELAD ("Comité européen de lutte anti-drogues"). It was set up on a French 
initiative at the European Council in Strasbourg in December 1989. CELAD met 
four or five time during each Presidency with the remit to co-ordinate Member 
States' actions in the fight against drugs: prevention, drug addiction, drug
M See A/a in Servantie, in: Groebety^Thiesing/Ehlermnnn, Article 30 GEA, esp. pure. 15-17,
w See de Zwaan, p. 341, and d'Oiiveira (1994), p. 262.
“ See Aiain Servant/e, in: GroeberyThiesing/Ehlermann, Article 30 EEA, para. 122.
w On the role of the Commission and the Secretariat see Alain Servantie, in: Groel>et)/Thie- 
sing/Ehlermann, Article 30 EEA, para. 55-56 and 127-131.
67 In the civil law field, action had also been taken in pursuance of article 220 EEC. This provides, 
inter alia, that "Member States shall, so far as necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing for the benefit ot their nationals .... the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribuals and of 
arbitration awards". Notable achievements have been the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdic­
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (GJ No. L 299 of 31.12. 
1972) and the Rome Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual Obliations (GJ No. L 266 
of 09.10.1980).
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trafficking and common international action. It was made up of senior officials 
from Member States. The Commission was also present and the Council Se­
cretariat provided support. The work of CELAD was reported directly to the 
European Council68.
G. Mutual Assistance Group (MAG)
MAG was a longstanding group which dealt with activities a t an operational 
level on Customs matters outside Community competence. For example, it  co­
ordinated Community-wide intelligence-gathering exercises to detect discrepan­
cies unlikely to be picked up by one Member State acting alone. Since 1989, the 
focus of work had been centred on MAG (92), set up in 1989. The Group provi­
ded a forum for EC customs services to develop compatible single market plans 
in enforcement matters, e.g. to combat drug smuggling. MAG (92) came together 
in plenary sessions approximately every two months to prepare its recommenda­
tions and reports to the Directors General of the national Customs Services, but 
most of the work was done in  sub-groups. The Commission was involved in the 
work of MAG (92) as an observer69.
H. Horizontal Group on Data Processing
The Horizontal Group on Data Processing was set up to work on a draft Con­
vention on the European Information System (EIS)70. EIS is in real term s a 
Community-wide expansion of the Schengen Information System, which will be 
described further below71.
As for judicial cooperation (see above) some aspects of the fight against drug addiction were also 
subject of action under the EEC Treaty. E.g., on 8 February 1993 the Council adopted under 
article 235 EEC a Regulation establishing a Eurojiean drug monitoring centre (OJ No. L 36 of 
12.02.1993, pp. 1-8). It should be noted that the new article 129 EC now provides that "Commu­
nity action shall be directed towards the prevention of diseases, in particular the major health 
scourges, including drug dependence" (emphasis added by the author). Furthermore, on 22 
October 1990 the Council, on behalf of the EEC, adopted a decision ratifying the 1988 UN 
Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ((VJ No. 
L 326 of 24.11.1990, p. 56); see also the Council regulation of 13 December 1990 laying down 
measures to be taken to discourage the diversion of certain substances to the illicit manufacture 
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances (OJ No. C 357 of 20.12.1990, p. 1). Both, the 
Council decision and the Regulation were based on article 113 EEC.
99 For further details on the work of MAC and MAG (92) see Brown, pp. 112-114.
70 Nanz (1992), p, 130.
71 See footnote 84 and, Bunyan, p. 31-32, and Deutscher Bundestag (1994), p. 87.
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I. The Schengen Group
According to Cruz, the Schengen Group originates from a large protest move­
ment of lorry drivers in the spring of 1984, angry a t the long queues at internal 
European borders* 712. Reacting to this situation, on 13 July 1984 Germany and 
France signed the Saarbriicker Abkommen which provides for the gradual sup­
pression of the control of persons at the Franco-German border. These two 
countries subsequently contacted the Member States of the Benelux, whose 
internal borders for persons have been suppressed since 1960. The Schengen 
Group was thus created and less than twelve months after the Saarbriicker 
Abkommen, these five countries signed, on 14 June 1985, the Schengen Agree­
ment on the gradual abolition of controls at the common borders (hereinafter: 
Schengen I)73.
Schengen I is a  short document and lools like a  work programme contai­
ning the principal measures which the Five will have to put in place to realise 
the suppression of their internal borders74. Only in the Netherlands was it 
subjected to parliamentary approval before it came into force on 2 March 1986. 
As for the others, they considered Schengen I as only a declaration of intent, 
and did not submit it  for parliamentary ratification. In fact, according to Boiten, 
for a long time its existence was known only in select gatherings in the other 
four countries. For example, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had even 
failed to inform the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs75 *.
Immediately after the conclusion of Schengen I, negotiators began work on 
drawing up the supplementary agreement, but their activities remained virtual­
ly unknown to the public78. Four working groups (Police and security; movement 
of people; transport; customs and movement of goods) reported to a Central
n See Crm, p. 3.
71 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their
common borders. The text has been published in Schermers et. a/., pp. 547-551.
77 Schengen I comprises thirty-three articles in two Sections; Section 1 "Measures applicable in the 
short term" (articles 1-16) and Section 2 "Measures applicable in the long term" (articles 17-33).
The Section 1 measures were to be implemented by January 1086, those of Section 2 "if i>ossibIe"
(article 30 Schengen I) by January 1990. Section 1 relates primarily to methods of speeding up
frontier crossings by people, goods and road and rail traffic. Section 2 deals with longer-term
goals such as developing [>olice cooperation, common visa policies and measures against illegal 
immigration.
78 See Boiten, p, 9.
78 For a detailed description of the negotiations see Schutte.
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Negotiation Group (CNG), which prepared decisions for the political level, 
namely meetings of the Ministers and State Secretaries77. The EEC Commission 
has had observer status at meetings of the CNG and meetings a t the political 
level since 1988. The entire negotiating process was serviced by the existing 
Secretariat of the Benelux Economic Union, which was enlarged especially for 
this purpose. After five years of protracted negotiations, the Convention ap­
plying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of 
checks at common borders (hereinafter: Schengen II) was finally signed in 
Schengen on 19 June 199078. Since, it has been ratified by all original con­
tracting parties, i.e. the Benelux, France and Germany. It formally entered into 
force for these states on 1 September 199379. However, the signatory States have 
agreed upon a "two step" implementation procedure. In the first step, the 
Schengen Executive Committee, which is composed of one minister of each 
Member State, was formally established in September 1993 pursuant to article 
139 (2) Schengen II. However, the core of the Convention will not be applied 
until the prior conditions for its implementation are fulfilled in the signatory 
States and checks a t external borders are made effective80. Pursuant to a 
declaration adopted by the Schengen Ministers at their Madrid meeting of 30 
June 1993, this will require an affirmative decision taken by the Executive 
Committee81.
Numerous groups a t the administrative and political levels have been 
working towards the application of Schengen II since signing the Convention in 
1990, coordinating and directing the adaptation of national laws and practices82, 
and, after having adopted a final set of implementing measures, the Executive 
Committee on 14 December 1993 stated tha t the legal and political conditions
TT These Working groups were divided into at least twelve Sub-groups. See Cruz, p. 4.
78 Italy (1990), Spain and {Portugal (1991) and Greece (1992) have since signed conventions to 
acceed to this Convention, as well as to the 1985 Schengen Agreement. The authentic French, 
German and Dutch texts are published in the Netherlands TVeaty Series, Tractatenblud (1990) 
No. 145. For an unofficial English translation see Schermers et. at, pp. 552-605.
79 Deutscher Bundestag (1994), p. 17. Subsequently Schengen 11 has also been ratified by Spain 
and Portugal. It entered into force for Spain and Portugal on 1 March 1994.
80 Joint statement concerning article 139 attached to Schengen II. In addition, according to 
Pundraud (1994b), p. 7, Ministers of the Schengen Group have specified a set of conditions at 
their Luxembourg meeting on 19 Juin 1992. For a list of perequisites to the implementation of 
Schengen II see also Cruz, p. 31.
81 See F'andraud (1994b), pp. 21-25. Agence Euroj« of 2 July 1993 (N* 6013), which reports on the 
Madrid meeting (pp. 7-8), does not mention this declaration.
88 See van Outrive (1993), pp. 14-16, and Butt Fhilip, pp. 179-180.
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for the implementation of Schengen II were now fulfilled83. However, the Com­
mittee made one important reservation: Due to "technical" problems, the Schen­
gen Information System (SIS), often called the "heart" of the compensatory 
measures84 *, was declared not yet operational. In fact, problems with the SIS 
have occurred since 1992 and they have repeatedly led to a postponement of the 
formal deadline for the complete entry into force of Schengen II. It may be 
supposed tha t some governments. Prance for example, are using technical 
problems with SIS as a pretext, whereas it is in fact newly formed political 
opposition to the abolition of internal borders which is the true motive for 
objections86. Therefore, it is far from certain whether Schengen II will come fully 
into force in 1994. In any event, it is very likely that, as a first step, the Con­
vention will only be applicable in some Schengen States, thus creating a kind of 
"three-speed Europe", consisting of some EU Member States completely outside 
Schengen, some fully within Schengen and some in  some kind of "twilight 
zone"86.
Limited to nine Member States, the Schengen II covers most of the above- 
mentioned fields of intergovernmental cooperation in a single legal and institu-
83 At its meeting of 14 December 1993, the Executive Committee, inter alia, agreed upon: a joint 
manual giving guidance to officials carrying out controls at external borders; common instruc­
tions for the consulates of the different Member States; a uniform format for visa valid for the 
entire territory of the Contracting parties pursuant to article 10 Schengen II [note: Germany and 
[Portugal are already producing and using such visas]; a list determining the third countries 
whose nationals must be in ftnsse&sion of a visa in all Schengen States ["negative list"!; a list of 
third countries whose nationals are to be exempted from this requirement in all Schengen States 
["positive list"); and a further list of countries whose nationals are subject to visa requirements 
in some Schengen States ["grey list"]. Only the first list is legally binding. See Bericht des 
Bundesministeriuma des Innern, pp. 17-24, and Pandraud (1994b), pp. 9-25.
84 The SIS is a joint computerised information system containing information about persons and 
objects. According to article 92 (1) Schengen II, the designated authorities of the Contracting 
Parties may thereby have access to reports on arsons and objects for the purposes of border 
checks and controls and other police and customs checks and for the purposes of issuing visas, 
the issue of residence permits, and the administration of aliens in the context of the application
of the Convention's provisions relating to the free movement of persons. See articles 92 to 101 
Schengen II; further llaldwin-Edwardy'Hebenton, pp. 140-157; Nanz (1994), pp. 106-107, and 
Sob at ten berg.
86 See e.g. the remarks of Bernd Schmidbauer, in; Agence Europe, 16 December 1993 (N* 6130), p. 
10; see also Butt F’hilip, p. 179, and Philippe. Keraudren, Réticences et obstacles français face à 
Schengen: la logique de la politique de sécurité, in: Pauly (ed.) (1994), pp. 123-144.
86 Having failed three consecutive times to respect the agreed date of application since the 
beginning of 1993, the Executive Committee announced, after its meeting in Bonn on 27 June 
1994, that the Convention would be applied as from 1st October 1994 in five Member States, 
namely Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Spain and Portugal would 
follow shortly afterwards, but no indication was given as to when Greece and Italy would be 
ready. It is interesting to note that this date, which was mentioned at the press conference after 
the meeting, is not mentioned in the final communiqué. Another postponement cannot therefore 
be excluded. See Migration News Sheet, No. l3f»^ )4-07, p . 3.
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tional framework. Its objective is thus to provide for a complete and integral 
approach to the problems to be overcome, once the controls at the internal 
frontiers have disappeared. Article 2 (1) is the central dispositive provision of 
Schengen II: "Internal borders may be crossed a t any point without any checks 
on persons being carried out." Except for Title V, which deals with border 
controls regarding transport and goods, it deals almost exclusively with the 
consequences of this single paragraph®7. A broad analysis of all these 
provisions is not required for this research88. Instead, I will restrict myself to 
the following four observations.
Firstly, as defined by Carlos Westendorp, Spanish Minister for European 
Affairs, Schengen is supposed to be a "self-destructing mechanism" that will 
"fade away from the EC" once the latter covers these issues89, Schengen is thus 
supposed to act as a forerunner or testing ground with regard to a later abolition 
of internal borders in all the EC Member States. Ergo, political agreements and 
compromises obtained a t the level of the Schengen group will very likely pre­
empt successive agreements a t the Community level90, even though decisions 
made later at Community level will, from a legal point of view, not be pre-emp­
ted91. Yet, why should nine Schengen states "destroy" a mechanism on which
*7 The main elements of Schengen II are as follows: the institution of uniform controls and 
surveillance at the external frontiers, both in the interest of immigration and public safety and 
security; the measures with regard to the internal circulation of aliens (i.e. non-EC nationals), 
in particular with regard to refugees; police cooperation; judicial cooperation and assistance; 
harmonization and cooperation with regard to narcotics, drugs and firearms; the institution of 
computerized information exchange (SIS); the protection of privacy, both with regard to the 
automated exchange of information exchange and with regard to other forms of information 
exchange. Finally, Titles VII and VIII contain general procedural and final clauses.
m See Meyers et at.; Nam (1994); O'Keeffe (1992b); Pauly (ed.).
** Agence Europe, 2 July 1993 (N* 6013), p. 8.
90 They may even create a precedent on principles which might be enshrined in the future Treaty 
as regards the free movement of persons.
91 Schengen II contains two provisions which determine the relationship of the Convention with EC 
law: articles 134 and 142. Article 134 provides that the "provisions of this Convention shall apply 
only in so far as they are compatible with Community law". Article 142 (1) provides:
"When conventions are concluded between the Member States of the European Communities 
with a view to completion of the area without internal frontiers, the Contracting Parties shall 
agree on the conditions under which the provisions of the Schengen Convention are to be 
replaced or amended in the light of the corresponding provisions of such Conventions.
The Contracting Parties shall, to that end, take account of the fact that the provisions of this 
Convention may provide for more extensive co-operation than that resulting from the provisions 
of the said Conventions.
Provisions which are in breach of those agreed between the Member States of the European
Communities shall in any case be adapted in any circumstances."
Accordingly, e.g., at its meeting on 26 April 1994 in Bonn, the Schengen Executive Commit­
tee signed a protocol that provides for the replacement of the provisions on asylum in Schengen 
II once the Dublin Asylum Convention has entered into force. See Absrhtusskommuniqué tier
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they have agreed after difficult negotiations if cooperation at the level of the 
Twelve and agreements resulting therefrom will not grant them similar advan­
tages? Indeed, the Dublin Convention, the Draft External Frontiers Convention 
or the Convention on the European Information System and the corresponding 
chapters in Schengen II are strikingly similar, notwithstanding some divergen­
ces. Consequently, one may conclude that rendering cooperation-procedures in 
the fields of justice and home affairs at Community level "more democratic" may 
be a useless venture, if decisions have been "undemocratically" taken before this 
in the Schengen group.
This leads to the second remark: According to O’Keeffe, the lack of trans­
parency with which the Convention was negotiated, and the failure to inform 
national parliaments led to considerable protest92. True enough, Schengen II 
was subjected to parliamentary approval in all Schengen States which have up 
to now ratified the convention93. However, with the exception of the Nether­
lands, none of the ministers concerned were (publicly) questioned by their 
respective parliaments on the negotiations between 1985 and 198904 *. These were 
conducted in secrecy, and only in their final phase did German and Dutch MPs 
confidentially receive a draft of the Schengen Convention98. In Germany, the 
drafts of the Schengen Convention were discussed between only four members 
of the Bundestag and representatives of the German Government a t informal
Sitzung1 des Schengener Exrkutivausschusses, Bunn, 26. April 1904, point 12. For a general 
description of articles 134 and 142 Schengen II see O'Keeffe (1902b), pp. 209-211.
m See O'Keeffe (1992b), p. 188. I will not deal here with other deficiencies of Schengen which have 
been alluded to by numerous authors, e.g. the failure to give proper weight to pre-existing 
international conventions and agreements or the absence of a mechanism allowing for judicial 
or other review of the implementation of Schengen agreement policy and procedures. See the 
reports in Meijers et ai; O'Keeffe (1992b); Malangre, pp. 15-22, and the resolutions of the EPon 
the signing of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 23 November 1989 (OJ 
No C 323 of 27.12.1989, pp. 98-99) and on the entry into force of the Schengen Agreements of 19 
November 1992 (OJ No C 337 of 21.12.1992, pp. 214-215).
M See article 139 (1) Schengen II.
94 See Cruz, p. 6; van lersel, pp. 374-378; Croenendijk, pp. 397-399.
* According to French Senator Paul Masson, in 1989, the French Government had even urged the 
Dutch Government to systematically avoid informing its national parliament, particularly as 
regarded the provisions of Schengen II currently being negotiated, as such a procedure might
have set a precedent and could have prompted similar claims by the French parliament! See 
Cruz, p. 6, Only after the signing of Schengen 11 did French Parliament become active. A Sénat 
screening committee issued an adverse report, in which it recommended a number of measures
necessary in order to implement the agreement; see Sénat français (1991). In the National 
Assembly, the EC Delegation (see below Chapter 3.B, pp. 67-70) drew up two rejtorts: see 
Pandraud (1994b) and Pandraud (1993).
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■and secret consultations96. Even though those MPs raised no major objections, 
which implied an informal consent of the main political parties with the Con­
vention, informal and secret consultations between four MPs and government 
representatives were certainly no substitute for democratic and public debate. 
In this connection it is worth quoting Groenendijk who underlines the following 
dilemma national MPs faced when they tried to become involved in intergovern­
mental cooperation in general and the Schengen negotiations in particular:
"[MF*s] ... have the choice between refusing information that cannot be made public, or receiving 
the confidential information with the implication that not making objections will be interpreted 
as consent to its contents. In either case the main policy decisions would have to be made well 
before any informed public discussion of the issues would be possible. Such dilemmas do not 
reinforce democracy."97
Like the proceedings in the above-described intergovernmental fora, 
negotiations to Schengen II were "traditional" international negotiations in the 
sense tha t they were the exclusive competence of national executives. Con­
sequently, only casually preparatory documents and drafts were submitted to 
national parliaments. Except for vague reports, such information was at best 
given confidentially - often only to a handful of highly select MPs. In any event, 
it was not debated in public. With regard to the criteria defined in the introduc­
tion to this research, it can therefore be concluded that: access to documents 
was strictly limited; the decision-making process remained fairly closed; oppor­
tunities for a parliamentary input were low; and parliamentary sanctions were 
restricted to a "yes” or "no" a t the end of the negotiations. However, the negotia­
tions regarding the Schengen Convention enjoyed a major advantage in tha t 
they were conducted within a single institutional framework: the coordination 
and final responsibility for the texts on all matters which concerned the aboli­
tion of internal borders was concentrated a t the administrative level in the 
hands of a  central group of negotiators who were responsible to one Group of 
Ministers and State Secretaries. This organization stood in contrast to the 
discussions on the abolition of border controls among Member States of the 
Community in the above-mentioned fora. The institutional structure of Schen-
w Note that the Foreign Affairs Committee ("Auswärtiger Ausschuss") of the German Hundestag 
always meets in private. Minutes of the proceedings are confidenti al. Furthermore, this Comm i t- 
tee is a so-called "closed committee" ("geschlossener Ausschuss"). Members of the If undestag who 
are not members of the Committee do not have access to its meetings. Finally, subjects which 
require particular confidentiality are discussed between the chairman of the committee, one 
representative of each parliamentary group, and government representatives (so-called "Aus­
schuss^ Vorstandssitzung"). See VVeher-flananW/o, § 14.1 .C.
87 Groenendijk, p. 398.
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gen was therefore less complex. Also, it should be added th a t the absence of 
public debate in general and the lack of parliamentary participation in particu­
lar was not only a result of insufficient information, but also a result of media 
apathy and the initial absence of interest on the part of pressure groups, human 
rights associations, and MPs". Looking a t the Dutch example, where in  contrast 
to most of the other Schengen States the parliament slowly became concretely 
involved in the negotiation process and where eventually a  public debate emer­
ged, we see tha t the above-defined deficiencies were not necessarily an integral 
part of the intergovernmental model but also a consequence of national proce­
dures, or, quite simply, of insufficient interest.
The third observation regards the problem of the extensive powers of the 
Executive Committee: On many points Schengen II requires the elaboration of 
further implementing rules. Article 131 Schengen II provides for the establish­
ment of an Executive Committee, whose general purpose is to ensure that the 
Convention is implemented correctly, and which may take decisions (unani­
mously) on necessary measures". The Committee is not only assigned wide 
powers of supervision, interpretation and implementation of the Covention but 
is also empowered to act as a  legislative: it has the power to adopt "rules", 
"detailed provisions" or "measures" and to make decisions on revising or amen­
ding the Convention98 100. Working groups comprising "representatives of the 
Administrations of the Contracting Parties" will prepare the decision-making of 
the Executive Committee101.
Rule-making by such a procedure has some obvious disadvantages, first 
in terms of openness (limited access to working documents, action plans and 
draft decisions; confidential proceedings, limited publication of records and 
decisions, etc.102), and second because the status of such rules remains fairly
98 See the examples in Cruz, pp. 5-6.
99 See articles 131 (2) and 132 (2) Schengen 11.
100 See, inter alia, articles 3, 8, 12, 17, 75, and 131 Schengen II. In pursuance of article 132(2) 
Schengen 11 the Executive Committee has drawn up its own rules of procedure on 18 October 
1903. They have been revised on 14 December 1993. The rules of procedure have not been 
officially published. The unpublished version is dated 14 December 1993 and referenced as 
SCFVCom-ex (93) 1,2. Rev.
101 Article 132 (4) Schengen II.
102 Schengen II contains no rule about publication of any decision of the Executive Committee. The 
Contracting parties only approved a non-binding Joint Statement concerning article 132, that 
they "shall inform their national parliaments of the implementation of this Convention". In 
praxis a vague press release follows every meeting of the Committee. F\irsuant to article 3 and 
12 of its Rules of FVocedure, unless decided otherwise, the Executive Committee meets in private 
and minutes of the proceedings are confidential. Article 9(3) Rules of fYocedures stipulates thnt
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unclear* 1003. However, with regard to the first point, mention should be made of 
article 132 (3) Schengen II which provides that at "the request of the represen­
tative of a Contracting Party, the final decision of a draft on which the Execu­
tive Committee has taken its decision may be postponed until no more than two 
months after the submission of tha t draft". This "terme de grace" (Groenendijk) 
could thus be used for consultation with the national parliaments104. Also, 
article 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Committee provides th a t 
decisions of the Committee will enter into force only after all the Member States 
have notified that the required parliamentary and judiciary procedures have 
been finalised to enable such decisions to take effect on their respective territo­
ries.
It should be added that, unless decided otherwise, according to articles 
3(2) and 11(3) of the Rules of Procedures, the EU Commission may participate 
a t meetings of the Executive Committee, of the CNG and of all Schengen 
working groups. Furthermore, pursuant to article 2(5) Rules of Procedure the 
Commission receives the provisional agenda for each meeting, which has to be 
sent to the Member States 21 days before the beginning of the meeting of the
the publication of (final) decisions adopted by the Executive Committee is determined by 
national rules. The Executive Committee may im[x>se a confidentiality rule defiending on the 
circumstances of the case. The Dutch bill concerning the ratification of Schengen II explicitly 
provides for the publication of decisions of the Executive Committee in the "Tractatenblad", 
which is the Official Bulletin for the indication of Treaties. See Groenendijk, p. 396.
100 See Timmermans, p. 366. As for the above-mentioned nets approved under Trevi etc., the legal 
status of acts of the Schengen Executive Committee will have to be determined, firstly, by the 
applicable rules of international law. Questions of direct effect and supremacy of such acts,
however, may be considered solely a matter of national constitutional law. Timmermans, p, 366, 
argues that in some Member States rules enacted by the Executive Committee will "probably" 
be immediately applicable whereas in others they will have "the status of international agree­
ments (in a simplified form), which are not automatically incorjiorated in the national legal 
order". The van Outrive (T .9.92a,) report, p. 27, simply states that "the Executive Committee takes 
decisions which have the same legal force as the Convention itself and which in some cases are 
more important than it". Finally, it is of interest to note that the French Conseil Constitutionnel 
in its decision of 25 July 1901, has stated that: "... aucunc stipulation de to convention (de 
Schengen) ne confére flux decisions de ce comité un effet direct sur les territoires des parties
contractantes". Decision n* 91-384 du 25 juiliet 1991, JO, 27 juillet 1991, p. 10005.
104 In the Dutch bill concerning the ratification of Schengen 11 a provision was added to the effect 
that the drafts of all decisions of the Executive Committee that will be binding on the Nether­
lands will be made public as soon as the text has become final and will be submitted to parlia­
ment. In special circumstances, it may be submitted to parliament in a confidential way, e.g., if 
compelling reasons occur or if the draft is secret or confidential. The member of the Executive 
Committee representing the Netherlands, can only cooperate and participate in the decision­
making process after prior parliamentary agreement. Tacit approval is presumed, unless one or 
both Chambers express the wish - within a period of 15 days - to give it-Vtheir approval ex­
pressively. This provision guarantees some parliamentary control on the decision-making process 
within the Executive Committee and in fact gives the Dutch parliament a right of co-decision, 
since decisions of the Executive Committee have to be taken unanimously. See Groenendijk, p. 
396, and Outrive (1902a), p, 29. I should add that evidently no similar procedures have been 
formally established in the other Schengen States.
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Executive Committee. Moreover, only items in respect of which the documents 
have been sent to the Member States (and to the Commission) at the latest by 
the date on which the provisional agenda is sent, may be placed on th a t agen­
da105.
Finally notwithstanding the fact that cooperation among the Schengen 
States is taking place within a single institutional framework on a formal legal 
base, the gain of institutional transparency has been, if anything, rather mode­
rate. Firstly, Schengen does not replace the other intergovernmental fora but 
runs parallel to them. Secondly, due to a proliferation of working groups within 
the Schengen framework, the structure of Schengen has become increasingly 
complex106. Both phenomena create considerable impediments with regard to 
coordination on national and intergovernmental level. As Cruz points out:
"It ... apjiears that since the signing of the Agreement there has been a real proliferation of 
groups working towards its application, with, at the same time, an increase in the number of 
civil servants designated to the national delegation, (liven that the various Schengen working 
groups often discuss issues dealt with by other intergovernmental fora of the 12 EC States, it 
woud be not only desireable, but also logical that a systematic exchange of information be 
institutionalised among civil servants of the same country as well as among the different 
national delegations.
In reality, information exchange is seriously lacking ns the different fora dealing with the 
same issues are often not well informed of what the others are doing, or find out rather bite. 
What is even worse is that certain civil servants must sometimes participate in one meeting 
after nnother without having sufficient time to share information with their colleagues par­
ticipating in other groups. Among certain delegations, there are civil servants who are members 
of all or almost all of the groups working on similar issures and are, as a result, far better 
informed than the others who participate, for example, only in the Schengen working groups. It 
has already happened more than once that a civil servant participating in a Schengen working 
group made a prosfiosal in contradiction with a decision already taken in another inter­
governmental body."107
It goes without saying tha t not only parliamentary control but also 
ministerial oversight becomes increasingly difficult under such conditions.
106 Article 2(3) Rules of FVocedure of the Executive Committee.
109 According to an unpublished organigramme on 1 September 1994 Schengen was structured as 
follows: Six working groups (Felice and Security; Visa and Asylum; Judicial Cooperation; Exter­
nal Relations; Treaties and Regulations; Narcotics) and the SIS Steering Group report to the 
CNG, which prepares decisions for the Executive Committee. In addition there is a I Permanent 
Administrative Committee (CAP). TTie working groups are divided in several permanent/ad hoc 
sub-working groups. TTie Secretariat of the Benelux Economic Union still serves as a Secretariat 
of Schengen.
1OT Cruz, p. 14.
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J . Summary of Chapter 1
Cooperation among the EC Member States in the fields of justice and home 
affairs is closely linked to the objective set out in article 7a EC of establishing 
a common market without internal frontiers. However, even though it responded 
to a Community imperative, at least until 1993, cooperation on these matters 
evolved almost completely outside the Community legal and institutional order. 
As various authors have argued, the reasons for th is had little to do with the 
lack of Community powers to draw up legislation in these fields108; in reality, 
the intergovernmental path was taken because some EC Member States, the 
United Kingdom, Danemark and Ireland in particular, were unwilling to accept 
the Community approach in political highly sensitive areas such as immigration 
or asylum policy. Having little choice, the Commission "accepted" these 
preferences, thereby feeding the doubts as to the competence of the Community 
to legislate in these fields.
As claimed in the introduction, the result of the intergovernmental 
approach has been, so far, an ever-extending, increasingly complex and opaque 
patchwork of groups, organizations and facilities, differing in terms of their 
territorial remit, their area and the quality and intensity of the cooperation they 
pursue. After having portrayed some of the most important intergovernmental 
fora in Chapter 1, not much needs to be added to the introductory remarks 
regarding the complexity of the "system".
With regard to the other criterias established in the introduction observa­
tions made on Schengen above are transferable to virtually all the forms of 
cooperation described in Chapter 1. Access to documents being deliberated in the 
different fora was strictly limited, and intergovernmental meetings at adminis­
trative and political level were generally held in private. It was very difficult for 
national parliaments (and interest groups/NGOs) to find out when discussions 
were taking place, what was being discussed, what progress had been made, etc. 
Still today, it is difficult to find out what has been achieved and what is opera­
tional, In most cases, there was little or no previous consultation with the 
national parliaments for major meetings such as those of the Trevi and Im­
migration Ministers. Chances for parliamentary input a t an early phase of 
decision-taking were thus low, and it was virtually impossible for matters to be
Indeed, except for cooperation in the fields of police, crime combating or terrorism, article 8a 
EEC in connection with articles 100 or 235 EEC could have served as legal grounds for Com­
munity action in many fields dealt with intergovern men tally.
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publicly debated in advance. Moreover, the legal and political status of docu­
ments was never clear: were they public, secret or confidential, and who decided 
this? MPs were therefore often faced with the dilemma: either they had to 
refuse to accept information which they would not be a t liberty to pass on, or 
else they had to accept it on condition that they raised no objections. Public 
debate was thus rendered impossible. Finally, except for conventions, the out­
come of the meetings was not formally submitted to parliaments for their 
approval, the Netherlands being the only exception109. In any event, (treaty) 
texts resulting from intergovernmental cooperation were not subject to amend­
ment by national parliaments110 1.
The comments above on Schengen include some criticism with regard to 
the extensive competences and the future working methods of the Schengen 
Executive Committee. It is therefore of interest to note that both the Dublin 
Asylum Convention and the 1991 Draft External Frontiers Convention, which 
may at a later stage gradually replace the corresponding sections of Schengen 
II, provide for the establishment of similar Committees. I t is striking that these 
committees always have three functions: legislative, as they adopt "rules” and 
"provisions", and amend or supplement the conventions; executive, as, for 
example, they decide on the suspension of an application by a country, extended 
application etc.; and judicial, as they are entrusted with the interpretation of 
the respective conventions’11. As for the Draft External Frontiers Convention, it
See Iiobles I ’iquer, p. 11.
110 E.g., Dutch Parliament had sent its delegate back to the Schengen negotiating table with 
instructions to renegotiate with a view to securing a number of supplementary protocols to 
improve the agreement. The subjects to be covered were, inter 0Zia; greater 0(>enness and 
parliamentary control over the Executive Committee, and jurisdiction of the Eunq>ean Court of 
Justice to settle disputes beween the Schengen machinery and citizens or between the con- 
trading States. Further, it wanted the Euro[*nn Court of Justice to be assigned jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the agreements and protocols and of action by 
bodies set up pursuant to them. However, the Dutch Parliament afterwards ratified the agree­
ment without any supplementary protocols. See Outrive (U)i)2a), p. 29. However, as mentioned 
above, the Dutch government accepted an amendment to the Ratification Rill, granting parlia­
ment a right of information and approbation before decision-taking in the Executive Committee.
111 E g., article 18 of the Dublin Asylum Convention provides that:
"(1) A Committee shall be set up comprising one representative of the Government of each 
Member State.
The Committee shall be chaired by the Member State holding the FYesidency of the Council 
of the European Communities.
The Commission of the European Communities may participate in the discussions of the 
Committee and the working parties referred to in jmragraph 4.
(2) The Committee shall examine, at request of one or more Member States, any question of a 
general nature concerning the application or interpretation of this Convention.
The Committee shall determine the measures referred to in Article 11(6) and Article U(^) 
and shall give the authorization referred to in Article 17(2) Itenqwrary suspension of the 
Convention in one Member State).
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should further be added that the EC Commission has recently put forward a 
new proposal in which the EC Council will replace the Executive Committee112.
Furthermore, Chapter 1 has offered evidence tha t the intergovernmental 
model in the version used by the EC Member States not only thwarts parlia­
mentary scrutiny, it also hampers executive supervision. Intergovernmental 
cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs has become the 'battle­
ground of bureaucracies" on a European scale. However, while a similar state­
ment could probably be given with regard to the role of state officials in national 
politics, in justice and home affairs in particular, it seems far more accurate for 
intergovernmental cooperation. This phenomenon has been described by Robles 
Piquer, MEP, as follows:
"It is noticeable how much senior officials of Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, originally 
not diplomats, can behave like diplomats in old style in intergovernmental context, i.e. they are 
able to build up a position of power without the legitimacy they would have if they were 
politically accountable to elected bodies.
This is the core of the problem. Intergovernmental co-operation by its very nature leads to 
positions of power for officials.... National bureaucracies are becoming too big and too compli­
cated for ministers to keep an eye on everything, although they are deemed politically responsi­
ble for everything officials do or fail to do. Ministers of Justice and Interior are more preoccupied 
with their respective national problems and have little time to devote to international problems, 
of which they have only a superficial knowledge and which they often delegate to their staff. 
Frequently, when a minister does attend meetings, he is briefed in the plane on the way to the 
conference. It goes without saying that, as a consequence, his responsibility for the decisions 
taken is much more theoretical than practical. Only in the field of asylum policy has there been 
any change in recent years."11*
One may add to this tha t ministers are more preoccupied with their 
respective national problems because that is where parliamentary (and public) 
scrutiny and debate still takes place. Or, in short, because parliaments do not 
control their governments, ministers do not control their officials.
Finally, mention should be made of the participation of the EP in the 
fields of justice and home affairs prior to the introduction of Title VITEU. Even 
though it has never resigned itself to the state of affairs concerning cooperation 
in the Helds of justice and home affairs, the E Ps possibilities to participate in
The Committee shall adopt decisions revising or amending the Convention pursuant to 
Articles 16 and 17.
(3) The Committee shall take its decisions unanimously, except where it is acting pursuant to 
Article 17(2), in which case it shall take its decisions by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of 
its members.
(4) The Committee shall determine its rules of procedure and may set up working parties.
The Secretariat of the Committee and of the working pnrties shall be provided by the
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities."
112 See below, Chapter 2.B.1, p. 46. 
lli Robles Piquer, p. 12.
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these have been limited. As described above, European Community legislation 
in these fields continued to be exceptional with the result tha t a formal consul­
tation of the EP was generally bypassed1 H. The EP was thus restricted to the 
use of more general measures such as the drawing up of reports, the passing of 
resolutions, or oral and written questions. However, the EP has been remarka­
bly active in considering topical problems in these areas. Practically all subjects 
falling under the scope of free movement of persons, asylum, immigration, 
racism, xenophobia etc. have been covered by numerous in-depth reports and 
resolutions and countless parliamentary questions115.
In addition, two information procedures were established especially for 
matters of justice and home affairs. Firstly, the EPs Committee on Committee 
on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs116 was generally briefed every six months 
on the most important results of the activities initiated by the ministers respon­
sible for immigration affairs, though the quality of the information varied 
considerably (from extremely scant to extremely detailed)117 18. Secondly, on 7 May 
1990 the Genera] Affairs Council decided that the president of the Council 
responsible for immigration affairs and the presidents of the EPs committees 
concerned should begin meeting every six months. Such meetings have taken 
place after the half-yearly assembly of the competent ministers. However, 
according to van den Brink/Vierhout they have been of questionable merit. 
Information has been supplied only ex post to a highly select number of MEPs; 
it had usually already reached the EP through other informal channels115.
In addition, the EPs Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 
operated on an informal basis in advance of the introduction of the Maastricht 
arrangements through reports from the EC Commission on the activities of the 
intergovernmental working parties and ministerial meetings. It did not receive
1,4 The few Community acts adopted in these fields were generally based either on Articles 100,113 
or 235 EEC, which, at the most, provide for consultation of the EP.
m See e.g., the above quoted resolutions on Schengen or the reports by Malangre and Outrive 
(1992a) and (1903). f*auly(ed.) (1994), Annexe IX, pp. 325-367, quotes 39 written questions by 
the EP with regard to Schengen only.
116 The Committee was established in 1991. It was given responsibility, inter alia, for all matters 
relating to: human rights problems and civil liberties in the Eurojiean Union; the security of free 
movement of persons; asylum policy; the fight against racism; immigration jiolicy and policy 
towards nationals of third countries; the fight against international crime, drug trafficking and 
fraud; police cooperation, customs cooperation. Up to 1991 many of these fields were covered by 
the Committee of Legal Affairs and Citizens' Right. See European Parliament, Rules of proce­
dure, Annex VI: Powers and responsibilities of standing committees, XIV.
117 Malangre, p. 26, and van den Brink/Vierhout, p. 388.
118 Van den Brink/Vierhout, p. 388.
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any documents by right from these bodies, but informally the Committee 
received the resolutions and recommendations of some meetings from the 
President-in-Office, after they had been agreed119. Also, the Presidency began to 
attend a t least one committee meeting during his term of office, giving a fairly 
full report and taking part in one or two hours of questioning120.
Following Groenendijk, the outlined activities of the EP had, in particular, 
three effects121. First, they emphasized the civil liberties issues raised by the 
Schengen Convention and other intergovernmental agreements and conventions 
such as the Dublin Convention. Second, the EP brought attention to the inte­
rests of unrepresented groups and interests, such as the third county  immi­
grants, who were put to oneside in the early years of the negotiations122. Third, 
the EP constantly questioned the legitimacy of the intergovernmental model of 
legislation and underlined the democratic deficit of the latter. On the other 
hand, Groenendijk believes th a t the EPs activities have seldom given rise to 
new information on the status of the secret negotiations.
*
119 Even though the Committee has repeatedly requested draft texts of such texts before final
, adoption, it has never received anything in advance. See Copy of a Letter sent by the Chairman
of the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Mr Am^Jee Turner, MEP, to the 
President in Office of the Twelve Ministers Responsible for Immigration, Mrs Brite Weiss, in: 
Select Committee on the European Communities, HL (1993), p. 23.
120 Am£d£e Turner, Chairman of the EPs Committee on Civil Lieberties and Internal Affairs, in: 
Select Committee on the European Communities, IIL (1993), Evidence, p. 19. According to 
Turner, p. 20, the FVesidentof Schengen has also attended a number of the Committee meetings.
121 See Groenendijk, pp. 399-400.
122 See e.g. Report of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs on the harmonization 
within the European Communities of Asylum Law and [Policies, Rapporteur: Patrick Cooney, 5 
November 1992, A3--337/9^Part A and B (PE 20l.54(VA and R/fin.). In this report Cooney 
defined the EPs role as follows: The EP"must be involved as the vindicator of the asylum seeker 
as an individual whose need of protection must always take precedence over the expedient needs 
of state policy" (Report Part B, p. 2).
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Chapter 2. Title VITEU: A new Framework for Cooperation in 
the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs
A  The new legal framework
Title VI TEU, commonly referred to as the "Third Pillar" of the European 
Union, places cooperation for the first time among the Twelve in the fields of 
justice and home affairs (CJHA) on a formal treaty basis123. Title VI TEU 
comprises ten articles: articles K  and K.1 to K.9 T E U 124. Article K  simply 
provides that: "Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs shall be 
governed by the following provisions." Hence, in principle CJHA is not governed 
by earlier provisions of the Treaty, in particular those relating to the European 
Communities125. Instead, articles K.1 to K.8 describe how that cooperation is to 
be carried out in a number of defined policy areas regarded as "matters of com­
mon interest". Article K.9 establishes a procedure for transfering some of these 
matters to the EC Treaty, thus placing them within Community competence. 
Mention should also be made of the new article 100c EC, by which one small 
aspect of justice and home affairs - parts of the visa policy - has been placed 
within the competence of the European Community, as opposed to remaining 
within the competence of the Member States acting in cooperation under the 
Third Pillar126.
123 The Three-F’Sllar structure of the Union has been widely discussed and I shall not repeat this 
discussion here. Instead, see Conatanti'nesco, esp. pp. 253-264; Dehousse (101)4), pp. 6-12; 
Everting, pp. 1056-1077; Muller-GnifT, pp. 494*506. However, Weiler(1093), pp. 49-62, rejects the 
Three F*illar concept and suggests the theological metaphor of Trinity; "Neither Unity nor Three 
Rliars: rather a Trinity of Community, Justice and Home Affairs, and a Common Foreign and 
Security F\>licy in which «oneness* and «separateness* co-exist simultaneously" (p, 62).
121 In addition, two declarations adopted by the Conference have been attached to the TEU, one on 
Asylum, the other on fblice cooperation.
125 However, article K.8(l) TEU applies, for the purfiose of o)ierating Titel VI, several provisions of 
the EC Treaty: articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 EC. 
Secondly, article K.8(2)TEU provides that all exjienditure incurred in the framework of Title VI 
TEU m ust be born either by the Member States or by the Community budget. If the Council 
decides that operational expenditure to which the implementation of provisions agreed on under 
Title VI TEU gives rise, is to be charged to the budget of the EC, the budgetnry procedure laid 
down in the EC Treat shall be applicable.
126 Article l00c(l) EC requires the Council to determine the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States. The Council 
is to act by unanimity; but in recognition of the possible difficulty of reaching unanimous 
agreement, article 100c(2) EC enables temporary decisions to be taken by qualified majority, and 
article l00c(3) EC provides that from 1 January 1996 all decisions are to be taken by qualified 
majority. Article l00c(3) EC also requires the Council, before 1 January 1996, to adopt measures 
relating to a uniform format for visas. In each case the Council may only act u(«m the initiative 
of the Commission and after consulting the EP.
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Article K.1 TEU contains an exclusive enumeration of areas which M e m ­
ber States, for "the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Union, in par­
ticular the free movement of persons, and without prejudice to the powers of the 
European Community", are to be regarded as "matters of common interest". The 
areas described as matters of common interest by article K.1 TEU are the 
following:
"1. asylum policy;
2. rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the 
exercise of controls thereon;
3. immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries;
a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of 
Member States
h) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, 
including family reunion and access to employment; 
c) combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries 
on the territory of Member States;
4. combating drug addiction in so far as this is not covered by (7) to (9);
5. combating fraud on an international scale in so far as this is not covered by (7) to (9);
6. judicial cooperation in civil matters;
7. judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
8. customs cooperation;
9. police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug 
trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain 
aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system 
for exchanging information within a European F\>lice Office (Europol)."
Article K.3 TEU stipulates different forms and methods of cooperation 
which Member States shall use in areas referred to in article K.1. First, article
K.3(l) TEU provides that in these areas, "Member States shall inform and 
consult one another within the Council with a view to coordinating their action. 
To that end they shall establish collaboration between the relevant departments 
of their administrations." Second, article K3(2) TEU envisages several forms of 
cooperation going beyond the mere exchange of information and consultation. 
This provision starts by specifying who has the right of initiative, i.e. the right 
to propose action using any of these forms of cooperation. In the areas referred 
to in article Kl(l) to (6), the right of initiative belongs to any Member State or 
the Commission. In the areas referred to in article K.l(7) to (9) the right of 
initiative is restricted to any Member State'27. Article K.3(2)(a) to (c) lists the 
following forms of cooperation: first, the adoption of joint positions and the 
promotion of any cooperation contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the 
Union; second, the adoption of joint action and the decision on measures im-
Article K.3(2) TEU.
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plementing joint action; and third, the drawing up of conventions72*.
Cooperation under Title VI takes place outside the Community proce­
dures, and the resulting decisions and acts do not form part of Community law 
stricto sensu129. However, the Third Pillar is not without a legal quality: its 
substance is public international law130. Furthermore, article K.9 TEU provides 
for the possibility of transferring the areas referred to in article K.l(l) to (6) 
TEU into European Community competence:
"The Council, acting unaimously on the initiative of the Commission or a Member State, may 
decide to apply Article 100c of the Treaty establishing the Eurojjean Community to action in 
areas referred to in Article K.l(l) to (6), and a t the same time determine the relevant voting 
conditions relating to it. It shall recommend the Member States to adopt that decisions in 
accordance with their respective constitutional requirements."
Thus, pursuant to article K.9 TEU the unanimous decision of the Council 
to transform an area of common interest into a Community matter of article 
100c EC requires adoption by the Member States in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. The mechanism provided for in article
K.9 TEU is therefore not much more than a simplified procedure for amending 
the Treaties131.
The European Court of Justice is given no jurisdiction in respect of Title 
VI TEU itself. The only provision of Title VI TEU listed in article L is the one 
enabling conventions concluded under article K.3(2)(c) TEU to confer jurisdiction 
on the Court "to interpret their provisions and to rule on any disputes regarding 128
128 Article K.3(2Xh) to (c) provides: "The Council may: ...
(a) adopt joint positions and promote, using the appropriate form and procedures, any coojtera- 
tion contributing to the pursuit of the objectives of the Union;
(b) adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can be attained better by joint 
action than by the Member States acting individually on account of the scale or effects of the 
action envisaged; it may decide that measures implementing joint action are to be adopted 
by a qualified majority;
(c) without prejudice to Article 220 of the lYeaty establishing the European Community, draw 
up conventions which it shall recommend to the Member States for adoption in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements.
Unless otherwise provided by such conventions, measurs implementing them shall be 
adopted within the council by majority of two-thirds of the High Contracting Parties.
Such conventions my stipulate tha t the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to interpret 
their provisions and to rule on any disputes regarding their application, in accordance with 
such arrangements as they may lay down."
lï9 See MuJJer-Graff, p. 507-510.
Although, as underlined by Müller-Graff, pp. 495-503, due to its institutional, functional and 
procedural connections to the EC and Community Law the characterisation of the Third Foliar 
simply as public international law may not be appropriate. See also Snyder (1994 a), pp. 7*9.
m See article N (l) TEU.
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their application« in accordance with such arrangements as they may lay down". 
The Member States therefore have discretion whether or not to provide in a 
convention for the European Court of Justice to have jurisdiction, and if so, to 
prescribe the extent of such jurisdiction and the arrangements applicable to it. 
However, since by virtue of article M  TEU the Court retains jurisdiction in 
respect of the Community Treaties, it can properly determine the extent of the 
Community powers. Accordingly, in case of dispute, the Court can be expected 
to determine the boundary between the competence of the Community under EC 
Treaty and that of the Member States under Title VI T E U 132.
The above-described provisions give rise to numerous questions and com­
ments, both from a legal and a political perspective. However, four points seem 
to be of particular interest in the light of what has been stated in Chapter 1.
First, article K.1 TEU describes rather accurately the aspects of justice 
and home affairs on which the Member States have cooperated hitherto. In fact, 
pursuant to the Preamble of the TEU, the objective of the Third Pillar is "to 
facilitate the free movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security 
of their peoples" through cooperation on justice and home affairs. Thus, in 
substance the catalogue does not add anything new to what has been subject to 
intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs among 
the Twelve before Maastricht133.
Second, article K.1, in conjunction with articles K.3 and K.9 TEU, draws 
a clear distinction between matters that may be "communitarized" at a later 
stage and those which will remain within the sphere of "pure" intergovem- 
mentalism. Only the areas referred to in article K.l(l) to (6) TEU may, pur­
suant to article K.9 TEU, be transferred into European Communities' com­
petence, and only in these areas has the Commission been entrusted a right of 
initiative134. Hence, there seems to be a list of policy areas which are to be given 
"preferential” treatment under the new Title VI TEU. However, taking a closer 
look at the areas to which article K.l(l) to (6) TEU is referring, it is striking to 
note that they all concern matters which - even without making use of the 
rhetoric of a "Eurofanatic" - may be considered as of Community competence 
anyway. In fact, except for "judicial cooperation in civil matters", they were all
m See Debousse (1904), pp. 11-1*2.
,M As pointed out by WW/er (1993), p. 49, footnote 1, CJHA is a "euphemism covering most
particularly the cluster of issues concerning the status of third country nationals in the Com­
munity."
114 Article K.3(2) TEU.
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to be found among the policies identified by the Commission in its 1985 White 
Paper as matters which should be harmonized through Community legislation 
(Directives) in order to achieve the objectives of the internal market. Sure 
enough, several provisions in Title VI TEU explicitly state that they are "with­
out prejudice to the powers of the European Community" as laid down, for 
example, in articles 57, 100, 113, 129, 209, 220 or 235 E C 135. Furthermore, 
pursuant to article B TEU, maintaining "in full the «acquis communautaire*" 
has become an explicit objective of the Union, and article M  TEU excludes the 
possibility of Title VI affecting the EC Treaties, or the subsequent Treaties and 
Acts modifying or supplementing them. Legally speaking, Title VI TEU does not 
therefore generally exclude areas of article K.1 TEU from being treated within 
the framework of the EC-Treaty136. Nonetheless, de facto this may be exactly the 
outcome, the hidden agenda of some Member States having supported the 
establishment of Title VI TEU137. In any event, for the areas listed in article
K.l(l) to (6) TEU, the Commission's right of initiative is not much more than 
minimal and even article K.9 TEU may be considered not as a 'bridge" but as 
an additional 'barrier" for the "communitarization" of matters of justice and 
home affairs. Indeed, if Member States had wished to "communitarize" aspects 
of justice and home affairs in these areas, in most cases, if not to say in all 
cases, they could have done so without referring to article K.9 TEU138.
Title VI TEU could therefore be described as janus-faced. In the first 
place, as will be shown below, it puts intergovernmental cooperation within the 
institutional framework of the European Union and, as a result, moves these 
policies closer to the Community institutions. In the second place, however, it 
adds even more doubts as to the existing competences of the Community to 
legislate in the fields of justice and home affairs and, in any event, it makes the
See articles K.l, K.3(2Xc) and K.4(l ) TEU
136 See AfiiJJer-GrafT, pp. 503-506.
131 In fact, the idea of providing for cooperation on justice and home affairs, in a part of the Treaty 
separate and distinct from the provisions modifiying the Community Treaties, was a British one, 
and the resulting Treaty structure corresponds essentially to the orgininal British conception. 
See Hendry, p. 297, footnote 8. On the negotiations to Title VI TEU see also Cioos et. al., pp. 
492-495.
138 As suggested in Chapter 1, the absence of Community legislation on these matters was caused 
not so much by the lack of Community competences, but rather by the reticence of (some) 
Member States to accept the Community approach in these sensitive areas. In fact, if, in 
exceptional cases, all EC Member States agreed on the need to legislate in fields of justice and 
home affairs a t Community level they did so, and they didn't hesitate to do so on the grounds of 
articles 100 or 235 EEC. The above mentioned establishment of the European drug monitoring 
centre or the adoption of the EEC Directive on control and acquisition of firearms and amunition 
are telling examples.
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delimitation of these fields from the decision-making competence of the Com­
munity extremely troublesome139. Eventually, it may well strengthen the inter­
governmental approach even in Helds which used to fall within Community 
competence and it may create a presumption to be defined as: "in dubio pro 
intergouvemmentalism"140. Indeed, it is interesting to recall what Timmermans 
has written with regard to intergovernmental cooperation on these matters 
before the establishment of Title VI TEU:
"Where all Member States agree on the necessity of a common action on the level of the twelve 
and the Community enjoys the necessary |»ower to act, the Community as such should act, not 
its Member States by negotiating agreements in an intergovernmental framework. To accept a 
free option for Member States between using the Community framework or an intergovern­
mental approach would be incompatible with basic principles of the Community legal system."141 142
Is not this free option for Member States, between using the Community 
framework or an intergovernmental approach, exactly what the new Title VI 
TEU now provides?1,12 Thus, what at first sight looks like the preferential 
treatment for some areas could instead be interpreted as an additional "safety 
clause" to keep these fields under (inter-)goveramental control143. However, what 
is new about the Third Pillar is that where all Member States agree upon the 
necessity of common action by the Twelve in an area described in article K.1 
TEU, Member States will presumably be bound to use the institutional frame­
work of the Union as laid down in Title I and VI TEU144.
See e.g.f Curtin, p. 24.
140 Nanz (1992), p. 133, for instance, writes: "Oer grösste Teil der Themen aus den Hereichen 
Inneres und Justiz ist im Rahmen des Artikels K geregelt. Dies bedeutet einmal, dass es sich 
nicht um EG-Kompetenzen handelt, sondern um Bereiche intergouvemementalur Zusam­
menarbeit."
141 Timmermans, p. 362. See also Schwartz, in: GroeberyThiesinfi/Ehlermunn, Article 220, para. 43- 
69.
142 Theoretically, there remain limits to the extent to which Community institutions may abstain 
from the use of Community powers, one of these being the scope of article 175 EC, another being 
the possible potential of article 138b EC, which summarizes the interinstitutional role of the EP. 
See MüJ/er-GraflT, pp. 505-506. Similarly, the Commission could use the infringement procedure 
provided by article 169 EC, and sue the Member States jointly for having violated their Treaty 
obligations. See Oehousse (1994), p. 11, footnote 37.
143 This becomes even more evident if we turn to the areas listed in article K.l(7) to (9) TEU. By 
contrast to the areas described in article K.l(l) to (6) TEU, these areas do fall quite clearly 
outside Community competence. For instance, the EC Treaty does not give the EC legal com­
petence in respect of policing. Consequently, entrusting the Commission a right of initiative in 
these areas or providing for the possibility to transfer these matters to the EC Treaty would 
have signified a substantial change. Instead, this has been explicitly excluded by article K.3(2) 
and K.9 TEU.
144 Nanz (1992), p. 133.
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Thirdly, pursuant to article K.7 TEU, the "provisions of this Title shall 
not prevent the establishment or development of closer cooperation between two 
or more Member States". This provision is particularly aimed at the Schengen 
Convention and the respective implementing measures. However, article K.7 
TEU places a limit on such close cooperative arrangements. They may exist only 
"in so far as such cooperation does not conflict with, or impede, that provided 
for" in Title VI TEU. The intention is to give precedence to action under Title VI 
TEU; and, according to Hendry, "the implication appears to be that, once 
agreed, cooperative action by the Twelve would override any incompatible 
arrangements concluded between only some of them."145
This sounds good in theory. Reality, however, may be more complicated. 
For instance, even if a decision was taken at the level of the Twelve, provisions 
agreed previously under Schengen may not be fully replaced, for the latter may 
deal with the same subject from different points of view; they may be applicable 
under different circumstances, or they may be supplementary. The last case is 
especially likely to occur as (some) Schengen States may, due to broader consen­
sus, agree on more extensive cooperation in a particular field146. Thus, it could 
often be unclear whether agreements are incompatible at all, for they may 
constitute a lex specialis. Secondly, according to Hendry, the implication of 
article K.7 TEU "appears1 to be that cooperative action by the Twelve would 
override any incompatible arrangements concluded between only some of them. 
However, even though this is what the wording may suggest it is not absolutely 
certain whether article K.7 TEU actually constitutes a clause of precedence. If 
not, a solution would have to derive from international public law, in particular 
from the lex posterior principle as embodied in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties147.
Of course, none of the questions raised in the previous paragraph are 
really new. Yet they are particularly disturbing in this context, for they may 
occur quite often and they may occur in politically and legally highly sensitive 
fields. These questions will primarily be dealt with by national executives and 
courts. The result of this will inevitably be diverging interpretations in the 
Member States, a lack of clarity about legal force, and uncertainty about which
Hendry, p. 309.
148 See also article 142(1X2) Schengen II, quoted above in footnote 91.
141 See article 30 of the Vienna Convention, and Wolfram Karl, Treaties, conflicts between, in: 
Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclojiedia of lAiblic International Law, Vol. 7, Elsevier Science Publishers, 
Amsterdam 1984, pp. 467-473.
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regulation has precedence.
Finally, as described in Chapter 1, a confusing element of intergovern­
mental cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs has been the lack of 
coherence with regard to the legal status and effect of acts adopted. Title VI 
TEU will not put an end to this legal disorder. Instead, article K.3 TEU pro­
vides for various "new" forms of cooperation, and only "conventions" drawn up 
pursuant to article K.3(2)(c) TEU will be clearly indicative of a (binding) act of 
public international law. By contrast, the terms "joint positions" and "joint 
actions" are very general and seem to be appropriate for CSFP (Title V TEU), 
i.e. foreign policy, rather than for cooperation in the areas covered by Title VI 
T EU148. Are these forms of cooperation intended to be legally binding? Will they 
be public or confidential? Will they require parliamentary ratification or not? 
Similar questions will occur with regard to the measures decided by the Council 
implementing joint actions and conventions in pursuance to article K.3(2)(b) and
(c) TEU. The Treaty is silent on all these questions1".
According to Muller-Graff, "it seems most likely that a joint position in the 
context of the third pillar has to be understood as a joint declaration or recom­
mendation without a legally binding effect"150 15*.With regard to joint actions the 
author notes that on a linguistic level the term parallels the wording of article
J. 3 TEU, providing for joint action in the context of the CFSP. Yet the adoption 
of a joint action as set out in article K.3 TEU is not attributed expressly the 
same consequence as the adoption of the joint action in article J.3(4) TEU,G1. 
Muller-Graff therefore concludes: "... comparing the wording of articles J.3 and
K. 3 TEU, it seems doubtful that a joint action in article K.3 TEU - lacking the 
specific language of article J.3(4) TEU - can be understood to have a committing 
effect on the Member States in that sense"162. However, this conclusion cannot 
be generalized. Instead the question whether or not an act in the form of a joint 
action (or joint position) is binding in international law will primarily depend 
upon the intention of the parties and the terms of the concrete act itself153. The
148 The terms and tools established under Title VI TEU indicate that the Treaty was drafted by 
diplomats, and that Title V TEU had served them as a model.
149 See Cloos et. aL, pp. 504-507.
160 Muller-Graff, p. 509.
151 Article J.3(4) TEU provides: "Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they 
adopt and in the conduct of their activity." {Emphasis added).
163 Muller-Graff, p. 509.
153 See above footnote 57.
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legal effect of such acts within the national legal orders will depend upon 
national constitutional law.
Again, all these questions will be dealt with primarily by national execu* 
tives and courts, and again the result of this will inevitably be diverging inter­
pretations in the Member States and a lack of clarity about the legal force of 
such acts. Whilst this may (still) be acceptable in the fields of "traditional" 
foreign affairs, it seems to be far less so in the fields of justice and home affairs. 
Indeed, legal uncertainty in justice affairs seems almost a contradiction in 
terms.
Presumably, acts adopted under the new Title VI TEU will, from the 
lawyer's point of view, often have to be qualified as "soft law"154 *, thus changing 
the situationvery little in respect to the situation as it was prior to 1993. 
Interestingly, Title VI TEU even establishes a legal and institutional framework 
for the systematic use of such a regulatory technique. In practice, this may lead 
to the result that action under Title VI TEU, when taken, will be increasingly 
discretionary and opaque, and that it will be subject only with difficulty to 
democratic and legal controls156. Parliamentary participation at national level, 
for instance, often depends on the legal effect of the respective international 
agreement under negotiation156. Usually, only agreements binding in inter­
national law are subject to prior parliamentary information and consultation or 
to approval, even though the political impact of legally non-binding acts may 
often be equivalent to that of a treaty instrument proper157.
1M See above Chapter l.D, pp. 16-17. In fact, Member States may continue to use the same formats 
of acts as before. E.g., at its meeting in Luxembourg on 20 June 1004, the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council adopted a resolution on limitations on admission of third-country nationals to the 
Member States for employment. On the one hand, Member States have pledged to endeavour to 
seek to ensure by 1st January 1996 that their national legislation conforms with the principles 
of this resolution, and, on the other, the text stipulates that these same principles "are not 
legally binding on the Member States, and do not afford a ground for action by individual 
workers or employers". See Migration News Sheet, July 1994, No. 136-07, p. 1. At its 29/30 
November 1993 meeting the Council adopted, inter alia, a reommendation on crimes against the 
environment, a recommendation on the liability of organisers of sporting events, ronc/uxions 
concerning racism and xenophobia, and a declaration on extradition. See European Report, 1 
December 1993 (No. 1906), Î/4.
IM See Snyder (1994), pp. 13-14.
16,6 See below Chapter 3.
157 See Christian Tomuschat, Der Verfassungsstaat im (îeflecht der internationalen Beziehungen, 
in: Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL) 3fV197S, 
pp. 7-58, esp. 32-34,
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B. The new institutional framework
"It is the central feuture of the pi Hared approach, ... 
that we wanted to extend into these areas, that we 
wanted the European Union, but the thing we had to 
assure was that the Commission would not lend it, it 
would not be subject to the Eurnfiean Parliament, not 
subject to the Eurofiean Court".158
When in the future all the Member States agree on the necessity for cooperation 
among the Twelve in an area described in article K.1 TEU, such matters will 
have to be pursued within the institutional framework of the European Union 
established under Title I and VI TEU159 160. This new framework is thus supposed 
to eliminate the networks and institutions described above inasfar as they com­
prise all tw elve Member States. As underlined by M üller-Graff, the simplifica­
tion and the concentration of these contacts and cooperation together into one 
single institutional framework is, in practice, "the most important step taken in 
establishing" the Third Pillar100,
Pursuant to article D TEU, the European Council shall provide the Union 
"with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general 
political guidelines thereof. As for the role of the EP, the Council, the Commis­
sion and the European Court of Justice, article E TEU provides that these 
bodies "shall exercise their powers under the conditions and for the purposes 
provided for, on the one hand, by the provisions of the [EC] Treaties ... and, on 
the other hand, by the other provisions of this Treaty". Title VI TEU represents 
some of these "other provisions". The objective of article E TEU is thus to draw 
a clear line between the actions of these institutions within and outside the 
European Communities. In exercising functions pursuant to Title VI TEU, these 
institutions therefore act according to specially defined procedures, and not 
according to Community law and procedures.
However, as mentioned above, article K.8(l) TEU contains a list of EC 
Treaty provisions applicable to the provisions relating to the areas referred to 
in Title VI TEU. Significantly, article K.8(l) TEU applies to the operating of the 
Third Pillar, in ter alia, articles 142, 151 and 162 EC. Thus, even when acting
158 Kenneth Clarke, Secretary of State for Home Affairs, in: Home Affairs Committee, House of 
Commons, Intergovernmental Co-operation in the fields of Justice and Hume Affairs, Minutes of 
Evidence, Wednesday '21 April 1993, HC (1992-93) 625-i, p. 9.
159 See article C and K.l TEU.
160 Multer-Grnff, p. 496.
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under Title VI TEU, the EP, the Council and the Commission will follow a 
course of conduct according to their ordinary rules of procedure.
1. Council of Interior and Justice Ministers
Title VI TEU puts an end to the different forms of ministerial meetings among 
the Twelve as described in Chapter 1. The new Council o f Interior and Justice  
Ministers is the body within which the Member States are to act formally under 
Title VI TEU. It is part of the "Council of Ministers" under the TEU and will, 
therefore, be serviced by the Council Secretariat. The Secretariat will assist in 
making sure that papers are available and circulated, in making the practical 
arrangements, in preparing minutes, and so forth.
Pursuant to article K.4(3) TEU, the Council shall act unanimously, except 
on matters of procedure and in cases where article K.3 TEU provides for other 
voting rules. Article K.3(2)(b) TEU provides that the Council may decide "that 
measures implementing joint action are to be adopted by a qualified majority,',6\  
and, according to article K-3(2)(c) TEU, measures implementing conventions 
drawn up under the Third Pillar "shall be adopted within the Council by a 
majority of two-thirds of the High Contracting Parties".
Thus, in contrast to the executive committees established under previous 
(draft) conventions on matters of justice and home affairs, the Council, which is 
supposed to replace such committees, will not necessarily have to act unani­
mously when deciding on implementing measures162. However, article K.3(2)(c) 
TEU only sets up a presumption that measures to implement any convention 
concluded under Title VI shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the 
parties; the convention itself can override that presumption by stipulating 
different decision-making rules. Similarly, article K.3.(2)(c) TEU only sets up a 
presumption that these measures will be adopted "within the Council"; again, 
this presumption can be overridden by the terms of the convention itself.
The first meeting of the new Council of Justice and Interior Ministers 
took place in Brussels on 29/30 November 1993. At this meeting the Council *182
1M Article K.4(3) TEU provides that: "Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, 
the votes of its members shall be weighted as laid down in article 148(2) of the Treaty establi­
shing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require a t least 
54 votes in favour, cast by at least eight members."
182 See, for instance, article 26 of the (revised) draft External Frontiers Convention, pro|iosed by the 
Commission (COM (93) 684 final, 10 December 1993). See also articles 2(5), 5(3), 8(5), 10(4), 
11(3), 15(3), 16, 20(2), 21(2), 22(3) of this draft Convention which all give jiower to the Council 
to adopt implementing measures, e.g. detailed rules, to give effect to the Convention.
44
iI
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
agreed, in te r  alia, on a priority work programme for 1994 for all the areas 
within its responsibility1®5. In addition, the Council prepared an action plan in  
th e  fields o f Justice and Home Affairs which had been requested by the Euro­
pean Council on 29 October 199316\  Both documents were subsequently presen­
ted to the European Council and were agreed on by the latter at its Brussels 
meeting on lCyil December 1994163 465.
The work programme, which fits into the more general action plan, 
contains a fairly detailed list of "priority actions" and "other actions" to be taken 
by the Council in the fields of; (1) asylum and im m igration166; (2) police co­
operation, custom s cooperation and cooperation in  the figh t against drugs167; and
(3) judicial cooperation168. Furthermore, the programme provides for working 
structures (working groups) to be set up in these fields. The objective of the 
measures proposed by the Council is to "enable progress to be made towards the 
creation, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, of an area w ithout 
internal frontiers thanks to satisfactory security arrangements, and a considera­
ble boost to be given to cooperation between the Member States in these areas, 
to the benefit of the citizens of the Union"169. Work programme and action plan 
can thus be compared with the above-described "Palma Document". They are of
163 Spain maintained formal reserves on several topics though it was established that the document 
before the Council did not give rise to any objections in principle.
164 See Bull.EC 10-1993, point 1.5.
185 See Bull.EC 12-1993, point 1.8. Both work programme and action plan are not officially pub­
lished documents. The unpublished version of the work programme is dated Brussels, 2 Decem­
ber 1993 and referenced as European Union - The Council, 10655/93 (inch Annex 10655/93), JAl 
12 (hereinafter: Council, work programme); the unpublished version of the action plan is dated 
Brussels, 2 December 1993 and referenced as European Union - The Council, 10684^)3, J  Al 11 
(hereinafter: Council, action plan).
m  In these fields, the follwing areas are, inter alia, defined as priority actions: Monitoring the im- 
plemention of the Dublin Convention; Eurodac; harmonized application of the definition of refu­
gee within the meaning of article l.A of the 1951 Geneva Convention; definition of minimum 
guarantees in procedures for examining asylum applications; signing and completion of procee­
dings on application on the draft external frontiers Convention; consultation and coofierntion on 
the execution of expulsion measures. See Council, work programme, pp. 2-4.
187 In these fields, the following areas are, inter alia, defined as priority actions: Conclusion of 
Europol Convention; finalization of the Convention on the Customs Information System; 
completion of work on the Convention on the Europe an Information System. See Council, work 
programme, pp. 5-10.
166 In these fields, the following areas are, inter alia, defined as priority actions: examination of 
possible improvements in the area of extradition; mutual judicial assistance; enforcement of
foreign measures (disqualification from driving, confiscation); protection of the financial interests
of the Union; action against international organized crime; possible extension of the scoj>e of the 
Brussels Convention to family matters and succession. See Council, work programme, pp. 11-15, 
and Council, action plan, pp. 14-15.
Ifla Council, action plan, p. 4 [emphasis added).
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considerable political importance. Nonetheless, like the "Palma Document", they 
have not been officially published by the European Union.
2. The new working structure
Article K.4(l) TEU provides for the setting up of a Coordinating C om m ittee . the 
so-called "K.4 Committee", consisting of senior officals170. The K.4 Committee 
replaces, in te r  alia, the previous Coordinators' Group on the Free Movement of 
Persons, which has ceased to exist171. The K.4 Committee is supposed to bring 
into effect a more structured (channelled) communication between the ministries 
and law enforcement agencies responsible, and to streamline the link between 
policy-making and financial resources172. However, the K.4 Committee does not 
displace COREPER173, which retains its role in preparing the Council's work 
alongside the K.4 Committee. Quite obviously, there is a potential for conflict of 
powers between these two bodies inherent in this construction.
As indicated above, work under the aegis of the K.4 Committee has been 
organised by the Council into three sectors: immigration and asylum; police and
170 In addition to its coordinating rob* it shall he the task of the K.4 Committee to:
give opinions for the attention of the Council, either a t the Council's request or on its own 
initiative;
contribute, without prejudice to Article 15] of the Treaty establishing the Euro)iean Com­
munity, to the preparation of the Council's discussions in the areas referred to in Article K.l 
and, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 10()d of the Treaty establishing 
the Eurtqiean Communitey, in the areas referred to in Article 100c of that Treaty." (Article 
K.4(1) TEU).
1,1 See d'OUveira (1994), p. 263, and CIoos et. a}., p. 509.
172 The establishment of Title VI TEU in general and of the K.4 Committee in particular may also 
entail a more structured communication between (and within) the responsible ministries at 
national level. E.g., in France government's position in CJHA (and Schengen) is now being 
coordinated by the "Secrétariat généra/ du Comité interministériel pour lea Questions de 
Cooperation économique européenne (SCICI)". The SGCI has a staff of about 140 jpersons and is 
placed under the direct authority of the FYime Minister. In the past, it has already coordinated 
French jxisition in Community affairs very efficiently. French FYime Minister, Edourd Balladur, 
has therefore decided to extend SCCI's competences as follows:
"La mission du S.G.C.I. est étendue aux sujets du titre VI du traité sur l'Union européenne, 
notamment en ce qui concerne la définition des positions et des actions communes et l'élabora­
tion des instruments juridiques et des textes communautaires.
A ce titre, le S.G.C.l. est chargé de préparer de façon interministérielle la position française 
tenue dans les réunions du Conseil de l'Union européenne, du COREPER, du K 4, des grou[*es 
directeurs et des différents grouj*es de travail du conseil. A cette fin, il receuille les propositions 
des différents ministères et, en cas de désaccord entre tes ministères, il soumet le problème à 
l'arbitrage du FYemier ministre." Furthermore, the French representative in the K.4 Committee 
is a member of the SGCI. See ¡Vernier Ministre. Circulaire du 21 mars 1994 relative aux 
relations entres les administrations françaises et les institutions de l'Union européenne, JO , Liois 
e t Décrets, 31 mars 1994,4733-4785.
m Article 151 EC is expressly saved by the second indent of nrticle K.4(l) TEU.
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customs-cooperation; judicial cooperation. Each sector has a senior Steering  
Group which proposes a work programm^timetable to the K.4 Committee each 
year, and monitors progress within the respective working groups. In practice, 
the three Steering Groups comprise the same senior officials who previously 
coordinated the various working groups under Trevi, the ad hoc Group on 
Im m igration, MAG and EPC Judicial Cooperation. The latter fora have thus 
been merged into the K.4 structure. Each Steering Group is served by several 
permanent/ad hoc working groups. The new working structure can be described 
as follows174:
Council
n
CORGI’ER
U
K.4 Committee
u
Steering Group I: Immigration and Asylum (former Ad hoc Group 
on Immigration)
Working Groups14 15 *:
■  asylum
■  m ig ra tio n
■  visas
■  external frontiers
■  forged documents
Steering Group II: Security and law enforcement, and police and customs 
cooperation (former 7Vevi, MAG)
Working groups:
■  terrorism
* police cooperation (operational and technical)
■  drugs and organized crime
■  customs
■  ad hoc working party on Europol
Steering1 Group HI: Judicial Cooperation (former EflC judicial cooperation) 
ad hoc working parties118:
■  extradition
■  international organized crime
■  relationship between criminal law and Community law
* disqualification from driving
a extending the scope of the Brussels Convention to family matters and succession 
B simplify and ex|>edite procedures for the transfer of documents between 
Member States
114 See Council, work programme, pp. 4, 10,13 and 15.
115 In addition Cl REA (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum, and CIREFI
(Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Border and Immigration)
will continue their work.
118 In its working programme for 1904 the Council considered that the setting up of permanent 
groups was not yet an issue but that it should be re-examined in the tight of the experience 
gained when the new structures were in operation. Therefore, the setting up of (termanent 
working groups, both on criminal and civil judicial coofieration, a t a later stage is very likely.
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However, not all the previous arrangements among the Twelve in the 
fields of justice and home affairs have been merged into the K.4 structure. For 
instance, CELAD will continue to work outside this framework, and the Hori­
zontal Group on Data Processing, which is examining the possibilities of the 
creation of the EIS, reports directly to the K.4 Committee.
3. The role of the Commission
Pursuant to article K.4(2) TEU the Commission "shall be fully associated with 
the work in the areas referred to in" Title VI TEU. Accordingly, the Commission 
is now officially and institutionally involved in CJHA, and it has been given the 
right to attend and participate in all meetings (at all levels) held in applying 
Title VI TEU. However, this largely reflects the practice already followed before 
the Maastricht Treaty.
Legally speaking, the upgrading of the Commission's role is limited: its 
(partial) right of initiative is shared with Member States, and unanimity is not 
required to alter its proposals in the few instances, where majority voting is 
possible177. Most significantly, the Commission is not given the task of imple­
menting the provisions of the Title VI TEU178.
Wishing to derive maximum benefit from the new machinery, the Com­
mission has quickly made use of the right of initiative. Immediately after the 
entry into force of the TEU, the Commission submitted a proposal on a (revised) 
draft Convention on the crossing o f the external frontiers o f the M ember States, 
and a proposal for a regulation based on article 100c EC179. Subsequently, the 
Commission adopted a Communication on Immigration and Asylum  Policies1W0.
1 See article K.3 TEU.
178 Article K.8(l) TEU, which applies certain EC TVeaty provisions for the purjxise of «¡«rating Title 
VI TEU, does not mention article 155 EC.
179 See Commission of the European Communji/e-s, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament, (I) IVoposal for a decision, based on article K3 of the 
Treaty on European Union establishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers 
of the Member States. (II) FVoposal for a regulation, based on article 100c of the Treaty establi­
shing the European Community, determining the third countries whose nationals m ust be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 
final, 10.12.1993.
m  Commission of the European Communities (1994): Communication for the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM (94) 23 final, 
23.02. 1994.
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This communication was followed by further reports and initiatives'81.
Notwithstanding these varied activities, it remains to be seen whether the 
Commission will succeed in obtaining an active part under the Third Pillar. 
D'Oliveira, for instance, believes that the real impetus and initiative may come 
largely from the K.4 Committee, and that in the now established intergovern­
mental framework with its high frequency meetings machinery, it becomes less 
probable that the Twelve will allow the Commission to play an important role18 82 183*.
4. The role of the European Court of Justice
Title VI TEU as such is not under the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice. As noted by Dehousse, "national governments have offered evidence of 
their aversion to «judicialization» of diplomatic processes"18’1.
The Court may have power where it has expressly been given a role in 
conventions under article K.3(2)(c) TEU. This, for example, was proposed by the 
Commission with regard to the new draft External Frontiers Convention18*. 
However, several Member States, France and the United Kingdom in particular, 
have already indicated their opposition to such a provision185. Besides, similar 
objections have been made with regard to other draft Conventions now being 
prepared within the various working groups described above186.
5. The role of the European Parliament
Before Maastricht the EP was not officially involved in intergovernmental
181 See e.g., Commission of the European Communities, I "reposai for a Council Regulation laying 
down a uniform format for visas, COM (94) 287 final, 18.07.1994.
182 Oliveira (011)4), pp. 268-264.
183 A ‘ho us.se (11)1)4), p. 10.
1M Article 29 of this draft Convention provides that: "The Court of Justice of the Buro]>eun Com­
munities shall have jurisdiction:
to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of this Convention; references shall 
be made as provided in the second and third paragraphs of Article 177 of the Treaty establi­
shing the European Community;
in disputes concerning the implementation of this Convention, on application by a Member 
State or the Commission."
186 See Ameline (1994a), p. 26.
186 See, for instance, with regard to the draft Europol Convention and the draft EIS Convention, 
Agence Europe, 2Cy21 June 1994 (No. 6255), p. 8.
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cooperation on justice and home affairs. Article K.6 TEU now provides that:
"The FYesidency and  th e  C o m m iss io n  s h a ll re g u la r ly  in fo rm  th e  E u ro tte a n  P a r l ia m e n t  of 
discussions in  th e  a reas  covered by th is  T it le .
T h e  P res id e n c y  s h a ll c o n s u lt th e  E u ro p ea n  F’a r l ia m e n t on th e  p r in c ip a l aspects o f a c tiv it ie s  
in  the  a re a s  re fe rre d  to in  th is  T it le  a n d  s h a ll ensure th a t  th e  v iew s  o f  th e  Euroi>ean P a r l ia m e n t  
a re  du ly  ta k e n  in to  cons id era tio n .
T h e  E u ro p e a n  P a r l ia m e n t  m ay  ask  questions of the C o u n c il o r m a k e  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  to it . 
E a ch  y e a r , i t  s h a ll ho ld  a  d e b a te  on th e  progress m ade in  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f th e  a re a s  re fe rre d  
to  in  th is  T it le ."
The te rm s  vised in  article K.6 TEU are extrem ely vague. M oreover, a t  
le a s t the  f irs t  and  th ird  sentence of article K.6 TEU reflect only th e  practice 
th a t  was already  well estab lished  before 1993. As described in  C h ap te r 1, 
successive Presidencies k ep t the  E P  informed of progress on  justice and  home 
affairs, bo th  by tran sm ittin g  docum ents and through m in iste ria l appearances a t 
le a s t once every six m onths. In  addition, the  Com m ission reported on  the 
activities o f th e  intergovernm ental working p artie s  and  m in isterial m eetings. 
Article K.6 TEU  tu rn s  th ese  voluntary  arrangem ents in to  a n  (indistinct) trea ty  
requirem ent. Also, the  E P  had  already  asked questions, h e ld  debates and  passed 
resolutions, m aking recom m endations on m atters which now form the  basis of 
T itle VI T E U '87.
The second sentence of article K.6 TEU m ay, theoretically , be in terp reted  
as a n  advance on previous practice. The EP is given, for th e  f irs t time, th e  right 
to  be "consulted1' on th e  "principal aspects of activities in  a reas  referred to" in  
T itle VI; furtherm ore, th e  Presidency is obliged to  ensure th a t  the parliam ent's 
views are "duly tak en  into consideration". However, article K.6 TEU provides for 
various "loopholes" to m inim alize such parliam entary participation. Firstly, it is 
by no m eans clear w hat falls under "principal aspects of activities" on which the 
parliam en t should be consulted. Does th is include all th e  m easures the Council 
w an ts to  adop t on the grounds of article K.3 an d  K.9 TEU ? Obviously, article
K.6 TEU leaves the Presidency w ith great discretion on th is  behalf, an d  there  
will, in principle, be no jurisdiction of the European C ourt of Justice to  protect 
th e  parliam ent's  righ ts* 188. Secondly, "consultation" m ust logically be carried  out
W1 See on th is  b e h a lf  th e  new  a rtic le  94  (R ecom m endations  in  th e  fie ld s  o f  ju s tic e  and ho m e a ffa irs )  
o f  the  P a r l ia m e n t ’s ru les  o f p rocedure .
188 Fly c o n tra s t, a t  C o m m u n ity  le v e l, w h e re  T re a tie s  req u ire  th e  C ouncil to c onsu lt the  E P  befo re  an  
a c t is a d o p ted , th e  op in ion  o f th e  E u ro p en  P a rlia m e n t m u s t he sought a n d  ob ta ined  befo re  a n  act 
can  be la w fu lly  adopted . I f ,  in  such a case, th e  Council p u rp o rts  to a d o p t a n  a c t w ith o u t c o n s u lta ­
tio n , such a n  om iss ion  w o u ld  supp ly g rounds for seeking th e  a n n u lm e n t o f th e  a ct because an  
e s s e n tia l p ro c e d u ra l re q u ire m e n t h a d  been in fringed . See e.g„ E C J , C a s e  13ty79: S A  W aquet le  
F r è r e s  v. E C  C o u n c i l  (19801 E C R  3 3 3 3 .
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in advance. This implies th e  early  transmission, of d ra ft tex ts  and  th e  willing­
ness of M em ber S tates (and  of th e  Commission) to  give o ra l evidence to  th e  EP 
before any decision-taking. Yet u n d er article K-6 TEU th e  Presidency an d  the 
Com mission a re  only (explicitly) obliged to  inform the  E P  of "discussions in  the 
a reas  covered by th is  Title". Again, th ere  rem ains a large m arg in  of discretion. 
The sam e, finally, is tru e  for th e  obligation of the  Presidency to  "ensure th a t  the 
views of th e  E P  are  duly tak en  in to  consideration". In  h is re p o rt on  parliam en t's  
role in  CJHA, Robles Piquer, M EP, commented th is  clause a s  follows:
"A  c lause such as th a t  w h ic h  in s tru c ts  th e  presidency to  en su re  t h a t  th e  v ie w s  o f  th e  E u ro p e a n  
P a r l ia m e n t  a re  «du ly  ta k e n  in to  c o n s id e ra tio n * is a lm o s t m o v in g  in  i t s  n a iv e ty . H o w  is a 
re c o m m e n d a tio n  o f th is  k in d  possib le, w ith o u t anyone h a v in g  the  |>ow er to  enforce it?  H o w  does 
s o m e th in g  as n o n -b in d in g  as  th is  g e t in to  a trea ty?"“*9
Up to  now, the  restric tive in terpretation  of article K.6 TEU h as clearly 
prevailed. P arliam en t h a s  obtained draft texts only in  exceptional cases, an d  the 
m ajority of M em ber S ta tes  has favoured simple inform ation ex post ra th e r  th an  
consultation ex an te* 190 19. The Greek Presidency, for instance, h as  declined the 
inv ita tion  of th e  Com m ittee on Civil Liberties and  In ternal Affairs to inform  the 
Com m ittee prior to  the m eeting of th e  Justice and  Home Affairs Council of 23 
M arch 1994 in  B russels of the issues to be trea ted  during th e  meeting.
However, the E P  finds itse lf in  a  better position w hen proposals a re  pu t 
forw ard by th e  Commission. For instance, the above-m entioned Commission's 
proposal for a n  External F rontiers Convention, together w ith  th e  proposal for an  
EC regulation  on visa policy, w as published a s  a  Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament191. Both proposals 
w ere subm itted  to  the  E P  by th e  Commission on  10 Decem ber 1993. Three 
m onths la te r , th e  sam e com m unication was forwarded to th e  E P  by the Council; 
b u t th e  C om m ittee on Civil L iberties and Internal Affairs h ad  started  to consi­
d e r th e  d ra f t Convention well before being officially consulted by the Council. 
A fter four m eetings, th e  Com m ittee, on 29 March 1994, adopted a report and  a 
m otion for a  resolution192. Subsequently, the  report and th e  m otion were debated
W9 R o b i e s  l a q u e r ,  p . 17.
190 Sec A gence E u ro p e , 9  S e p te m b e r 1 9 9 4  (N *  6 3 1 1 ), p. 8 , a n d  2(^21 J u n e  1994  (N *  6 2 5 5 ) , p . 8.
191 C O M  (9 3 )  6 8 4  f in a l ,  10 D ecem b er 1 9 9 3 .
192 C o m m itte e  o n  C i v i l  L i b e r t i e s  a n d  I n t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Report on the C o m m u n ic a tio n  o f th e  C o m m is ­
sion c o n ta in in g  a p rop osal fo r  a decis ion, based on a rtic le  K 3  o f th e  T r e a ty  on E u ro jte a n  U n io n  
e s ta b lis h in g  th e  C o n v e n tio n  on the  crossing o f the  e x te rn a l fro n tie rs  o f th e  M e m b e r  S ta tes , 
R ap p o rte u r: C h r i s t o p h e r  R e a z l e y ,  A 3 -1 9 0 /9 4  (P E  2 0 8 .1 6 iV fin a l).
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in  parliam en t on 21 April 1994. Parliam ent approved th e  Com mission's proposal 
subject to  a  num ber of substan tial am endm ents* 1993.
The Commission finds itself in a  delicate position w hen  com m unicating 
w ith  the E P  on justice and  home affairs. According to  th e  second sentence of 
artic le K.6 TEU , the consultation of the  E P falls un d er th e  (sole) responsibility 
of th e  Presidency. If proposals do n o t stem  from th e  Com mission, the  la t te r  m ay 
be especially re luc tan t to  give th e  E P  information M em ber S ta te s  probably w ant 
to  m a in ta in  confidential. If the Commission does not respect th is  choice, i t  m ay 
soon find itse lf  outside th e  decision-making process.
To su m  up, th e  estab lishm ent of the Third P illar h a s  n o t changed th e  E P s  
legal s ta tu s  significantly w ith regard  to cooperation on j'ustice and  home affairs. 
Access to  docum ents h a s  rem ained restricted, th e  chances of partic ipation  are 
lim ited  an d  strongly dependent on  the  goodwill of the  M em ber S ta tes194. In  any 
event, the  parliam ent's  views and  recommendations have no binding force, and 
th e  M em ber S ta tes ' failure to respect article K.6 TEU by no m eans affects the 
validity of ac ts  adopted under T itle  VI TEU195 196.
P arliam en t h as  therefore called on the Council an d  th e  Commission to 
e n te r  into negotiations w ith  it regarding the conclusion of a n  interinstitutional 
agreement on  th e  application of article K.6 TEU. A draft for such an  agreem ent 
w as forw arded to the Council an d  the Commission in  Decem ber 1993136. This 
d ra ft agreem ent contains very detailed and fa r reaching provisions on p arlia ­
m entary  inform ation, participation and accountability u n d e r th e  Third P ila r .  It 
is divided in to  th ree  sections. The first section regards th e  information ("access
m  See O J N o . C  1 2 8  o f 9 .5 .1 9 9 4 , p, 3 5 8 .
191 M e n tio n  sh o u ld  also be m a d e  o f the  new  a rtic le  9 3  (C o n s u lta tio n  o f an d  p rov is ion  o f in fo rm a tio n
to  P a r l ia m e n t  in  th e  f ie ld s  o f  ju stice  a n d  hom e a ffa irs ) o f  the  B u ro fie a n  P a rlia m e n t's  ru le s  o f
p ro ced u re . In  th is  a r t ic le  th e  C o m m itte e  on C iv il L ib e rtie s  and  In te r n a l A ffa irs  is g iv e n  re s imin ­
a lb i l i ty  to  e n s u re  th a t  p a r lia m e n t is  fu l ly  in form ed a n d  consulted on th e  a c tiv itie s  covered  by
C J H A . A r t ic le  9 3  (3 )  s tip u la te s  th a t  th e  "Council and C om m iss io n  s h a ll p rov id e  the  c o m m itte e
re s jx in s ib le  w i t h  fu l l ,  re g u la r  and  t im e ly  in fo rm atio n  on  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f coo jie ra tion  in  th e  
fie ld s  o f ju s tic e  a n d  hom e a ffa irs" . O f  course, th is  p rov is io n  cannot b in d  the  C ouncil o r  C o m m is ­
s ion . So f a r ,  i t  has  re m a in e d  m ean ing less .
196 T lie  process o f co n s u lta tio n  on  the  g rounds o f a rtic le  K .6  T E U  should , th e re fo re , no t be confused  
w ith  th e  c o n s u lta tio n  procedure  on proposals for C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n  req u ire d  by s e v e ra l E C  
T r e a ty  a r t ic le s .
196 I n t e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n f e r e n c e  - E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  D e le g a tio n  (77ie  S e c re ta r ia t) , D ra f t  
in te r in s t i tu t io n a l a g re e m e n t betw een  th e  E urop ean  P a rlia m e n t, the  C o u n c il and  the  C o m m iss io n  
on the  p rocedures  fo r im p le m e n tin g  T i t le  V I  o f the T V ea ty  on E u ro p e a n  U n io n , B ru s s e ls , 1
D ec e m b e r 1 9 9 3 , P E  2 0 7 .0 8 (ÿ re v .
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to documents" etc.) which has to be made available to the EP:
"1. T h e  C o u n c il and C o m m iss io n  s h a ll keep  the  Europiean P a r l ia m e n t  in fo rm e d  a t  a l l  t im e s  o f  
th e  progress o f w o rk  in  the  fie ld s  o f justice  and ho m e a ffa irs .
2 . H a l fw a y  th rough, and  a t  the  en d  of, its  te rm , th e  C ouncil s h a ll s u b m it to  th e  Europ ieim  
P a r l ia m e n t  a b ia n n u a l re jK irt on  w o rk  in  hand and progress a ch ie v ed  in  th is  f ie ld . P a r l ia ­
m e n t  s h a ll hold a d e b a te  on th is  re|>ort in  presence o f the  IV e s id e n t  o f the  C o u n c il on th e  
basis  o f  a rep o rt by its  c o m p eten t c o m m ittee .
3 . T h e re  s h a ll be a b ia n n u a l co llo iju y  b e tw een  the  FY es iden t o f  th e  C o u n c il a n d  th e  com plètent 
c o m m itte e  o f  the  E u ro p e a n  P a r l ia m e n t  on cooperation in  th e  f ie ld s  o f ju s tic e  a n d  ho m e  
a ffa irs . T h e  E u ro p ea n  P a r lia m e n t 's  complètent c o m m ittee  m a y  re q u e s t th e  IV e s id e n t o f  th e  
C o u n c il to  a p p e a r b e fo re  it  fo r th e  purpose o f in fo rm a tio n .
4 . T h e  C o u n c il s h a ll be  rep re s e n te d  a t  th e  a p p ro p ria te  possib le  le v e l a t  th e  m e e tin g s  o f  th e  
com plètent body o f P a r l ia m e n t  a n d  s h a ll accepit th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f q u es tio n  tim e  in  c o m m it ­
tee ,
5. T h e  in s titu tio n s  s h a ll set up  a jo in t  in fo rm a tio n  n e tw o rk  for th e  tran s m is s io n  o f do cu m en ts , 
in c lu d in g  w o rk in g  docum ents on th e  C O R E L! m o d e l. M e m b e rs  o f P a r l ia m e n t  d ire c tly  
concerned m ay  no t be refu sed  access to such docum ents on th e  g rounds o f c o n fid e n tia lity .
6 . T h e  C o u n c il an d  th e  C om m iss io n  s h a ll supiply th e  com plètent body o f P a r lia m e n t, w ith o u t  
d e la y , w i th  a ll  the  d a ta  on w h ic h  th e  decision to  adopit a  jo in t  a c tio n  o r position  is  based.
7 . T h e  C o m m iss io n  s h a ll re g u la r ly  in fo rm  th e  com plètent body o f  P a r l ia m e n t  o f th e  c o n te n t o f  
th e  propxisals w ith  its  in ten ds  to  s u b m it to the  C o u n cil. T h is  in fo rm a tio n  sha ll a lso  cover th e  
a c t iv it ie s  o f  the  e x te rn a l d e le g a tio n s  in  th ird  coun tries  o r to  in te rn a t io n a l o rg a n iza tio n s ."
Section two of th e  d ra ft agreem ent regards th e  consultation ("partici­
pation") of th e  EP:
"1. T h e  C o u n c il s h a ll fo rm a lly  c onsu lt th e  Europiean P a r l ia m e n t  in  a d v an c e , and  in  accordance  
w ith  th e  a p p ro p ria te  pirocedures, on  proposed jo in t positions, jo in t  a c tio n  and  conventions  as  
sp ec ified  in  A rtic le  K .3 (2 ). P a r l ia m e n t  u n d ertakes  to  d e liv e r  its  o p in ion  w ith in  a piertod 
ag ree d  w ith  the  C o u n cil.
2 . P a r l ia m e n t  s h a ll be  im m e d ia te ly  in fo rm ed  of a n y  in it ia t iv e  by a M e m b e r  S ta te  o r th e  
C o m m iss io n  w ith  a v ie w  to th e  conclusion of a new  in te rn a t io n a l a g ree m e n t. I t  s h a ll be  
in v o lv e d  in  the  d e lib e ra tio n s  a n d  in  any  decision to in vo ke  A rL ic le  lt)0 c  o f th e  T re a ty  
e s ta b lis h in g  the  E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity  in  conjunction w ith  A rt ic le  K .9  o f th e  T re a ty  on  
E urop iean U n io n .
3. P a r l ia m e n t  s h a ll be fu l ly  in vo lv e d  in  the  substance o f d e lib e ra tio n s  betw een  th e  M e m b e r  
S ta te s  a n d  th e  C o m m iss io n  on th e  content o f the ag ree m e n t; fo r  th is  piurpiose, close coopera­
tio n  s h a ll be e s ta b lis h e d  be tw een  th e  C o o rd in a tin g  C o m m itte e  re fe rre d  to  in  A rt ic le  K .4  o f  
th e  T r e a ty  on Europ iean U n io n  a n d  P a rlia m e n t's  com plètent c o m m itte e .
4 . P a r l ia m e n t  o r, w h ere  a p p ro p ria te , its  complètent c o m m itte e , s h a ll be re g u la r ly  in fo rm e d  o f  
th e  prog ress  o f  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  th e  agreem ent a n d  s h a ll he  in vo lved  in  any  a m e n d m e n t  
th e re o f; th e  p r in c ip le s  defined  above  s h a ll extend to  conventions  im p e ie m e n tin g  a g re e m e n ts  
a n d  a g ree m e n ts  re q u ir in g  to  be concluded w ith  th ir d  c o u n tries .
5 . T h e  F Y es iden t o f th e  C oun cil m a y  in v ite  the  re p re s e n ta tiv e  o f  th e  Europiean P a r l ia m e n t  to  
a t te n d  a  C o u n cil m e e tin g  in  o rd e r  to  e lu c id a te  o ra lly  th e  opiinions d e live re d  by F’a r l ia m e n t ."
Section three, finally, regards the significance of parliam entary  recom­
m endations ("accountability") on m atte rs  of justice and hom e affairs
"1. T h e  FY es iden t o f th e  C oun cil s h a ll include on the  agenda o f each  C o u n c il m e e tin g  F’a r l ia -  
m e n t's  questions and  reco m m en d atio n s  p u rs u a n t to  A rtic le  K .6 , th ird  p a ra g ra p h , o f the  
T r e a ty  on Europiean U n io n .
2 . T h e  C o u n c il an d  C om m iss io n  s h a ll in fo rm  P a r lia m e n t as soon as  piossible o f the  a c tio n  ta k e n  
on its  re c o m m e n d a tio n s  a n d  s h a ll,  in  each case, specify the  m e a s u re s  u n d e rta k e n . W h e re  th e  
C o u n c il h a s  fa ile d  to  ta k e  actio n  o n  P a rlia m e n t's  o p in io n , i t  s h a ll in fo rm  F’a r l la m e n t  o f  its  
reasons."
5 3
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Q uite obviously, these proposals go fa r beyond th e  intentions of the  
M aastrich t Contracting Parties and of the content of a rtic le  K.6 TEU. P arlia ­
m ent, inter alia, w ants to  have access to practically all th e  docum ents produced 
under th e  Third Pillar, confidential documents an d  w orking docum ents included. 
I t  w ants to be consulted on th e  drafts of all jo in t positions, joint actions o r 
conventions as well as  of d raft m easures im plem enting an y  of these ac ts  before 
they  are adopted by th e  Council in  accordance w ith artic le  K.3(2) TEU. P a rlia ­
m en t even w ants to partic ipate  in  deliberations in th e  Council on th e  conten ts 
of such m easures.
T he Council's response to these claims h a s  been disapproving, an d  Afonar 
suggests th a t  th e  excessive character of parliam ent's proposals m ay be  one of 
th e  reasons why, in February 1994, the Council inform ed th e  EP th a t i t  did no t 
w ish to e n te r  into negotiations on the draft in terin stitu tional agreem ent on 
CJHA a t  a ll107.
C. S um m ary of C hap ter 2
T itle VI T EU  places intergovernm ental cooperation on  justice  and home affairs 
am ong th e  Twelve w ith in  a legal and institu tional framework. However am ­
biguous i t  m ay seem, i t  is dem onstrably less ram shackle an d  disorganised th an  
before.
T he institutional structure, however, rem ains ra th e r  complex. Firstly, 
cooperation u nder T itle VI TEU  will take place a t  five different levels: in  the 
Council, in  COREPER, in  the  K.4 Committee, in  th ree  steering  groups, and in  
num erous perm anenf/ad  hoc working groups. The d istribu tion  of powers be­
tw een COREPER and th e  K.4 Committee, in particu lar, is  fa r bum  clear1'*. By 
contrast, in  th e  E uropean Community COREPER is directly  connected to th e  
working groups. Yet such a comparison might be  m isleading for in  the  Com mu­
n ity  m ost of th e  preparatory  work is undertaken by th e  Commission. Secondly 
an d  m ore im portantly , Title VI TEU  does not m erge all existing forms of coope­
ra tio n  in to  one coherent framework. On the one hand , intergovernm ental 
cooperation on justice and hom e affairs am ong (some) M em ber S ta tes  will 
continue to  evolve outside the European Union, for instance w ithin th e  Schen- *18
Sce M o n a r ,  p . 7 1 6 .
188 S im ila r  p ro b le m s  e x is t u n d e r th e  Second F*¡llar (C F S F ’). A rtic le  J .8 (5 )  T E U  prov id es  fo r the  
e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a F \ > l i t i c a l  C o m m i t t e e  consisting » fF \> litic n l D ire c to rs  w h ich , w ith o u t p re jud ice  
to th e  com petences o f C O R E P E R , is  supposed to fu lf i l ]  fu n ctio n s , com parab le  to  th e  ones  
e n tru s te d  to  th e  K .4  C o m m itte e .
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gen Group. O n the  o ther hand, some aspects of justice an d  hom e affairs will be 
dea lt w ith  a t  Community level Obviously, th is ra th e r  puzzling d istribution of 
powers betw een  the  EU, the  EC and the  M ember S ta tes , w ith d ifferent legal 
in stru m en ts  and procedures creates additional complications. Visa policy, for 
instance, will be dealt w ith  partly  a t  Community level (EC -regulations)I01\  partly  
on the grounds of article K .l(2) and  (3a) TEU (joint actions, conventions, im ­
plem enting m easures), partly  w ith in  the Schengen Group (im plem enting m easu ­
res)19 200 an d  finally a t  national level201. It may therefore be concluded w ith  Weiler 
th a t  "the variety  of decision-making procedures w ith in  th e  Com m unity a re  
complex an d  obstruct th e  transparency of govemenance. B ut the T hree P illar 
s truc tu re  adds to this complexity w ithout ... really  achieving the goal of sepe- 
ra teness"202.
A lthough the  involvem ent of the  Commission an d  (m arginally) th e  E P  
holds ou t th e  prospect of g reater openness and wider debate, decision-making 
procedures rem ain  opaque and closer to those of classical diplomacy. Discussions 
an d  debate will be concentrated in  closed meetings of m in isters a n d  th e ir 
officials. Also, the  ro ta ting  presidency of the Council, which holds a  m ajor 
responsibility  in  m anaging business, is no t easily accessible, in  particu lar not to  
p arliam en tarian s  from other M em ber States. N onetheless, in  contrast to  previ­
ous arrangem ents, the  Council of Interior and Ju stice  M inisters will now act 
u n d er its  ordinary ru les of procedures, and this bears several advantages w ith 
regard  to  th e  transparency of th e  decision-making process. Eventually, work 
w ithin th e  Council will be more formalized and predictable203. Secondly, article 
7(5) of th e  revised Council's Rules of Procedure provides for the publication of 
votes (unless th e  Council decides otherwise by sim ple m ajority)204 *. Therefore, 
where th e  Council will adopt m easures under Title VI by m ajority vote206, 
theoretically, the resu lts  of such votes will have to be published. In addition, 
according to  the revised article 6 of its Rules of Procedure, the Council m ay
199 A rtic le  100 c  E C , and  C om m iss io n ’s proposal for a re g u la tio n  d e te rm in in g  th e  th ird  c o u n tries  
whose n a tio n a ls  m u s t be in  jm ssession o f a visa w h en  crossing th e  e x te rn a l bo rd ers  o f  th e  
M e m b e r  S ta te s , C O M  (9 3 )  6 84  f in a l ,  1 0 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 , pp. 4 0 -4 8 .
200 See a r t ic le s  9 -1 8  Schengen 11.
801 V isas  fo r  long v is its , e .g ., w i l l  r e m a in  a  m a tte r  o f n a tio n a l com petence.
202 W e i l e r  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 51 .
203 See e .g ., a r t ic le  2  fn g en d a -se ttin g j C oun cil's  Rules o f F Voce dure .
204 See O J  N o . L  3 04  o f  1 0 .1 2 .1 9 9 3 , p. 1 .
206 See a r t ic le  K .3 (2 X b ) and  (c ) T E U .
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decide to  hold m eetings in public. However, i t  would be unrealistic  to expect 
such public Council m eetings u n d er th e  Third P illa r in th e  n e a r  future.
L im ited  access to draft and final tex ts  re m a in s  one of th e  m ost 
troublesom e facts under the T h ird  Pillar. Indeed, in  co n tra s t to Com m unity 
legislation th e re  is no autom atic publicity for proposals. F urtherm ore , T itle VI 
TEU  does n o t provide for the publication of all m easures adopted un d er article
K.3 TEU'1®6. The Council's work programme for 1994 an d  th e  action p lan , for 
instance, w hich are of undoubted importance, have not b een  officially published  
by th e  E uropean  Union207. Moreover, ju st as before the in troduction of T itle  VI 
TEU , the  legal status o f documents will rem ain  unclear since article K.3 TEU 
is ra th e r  am biguous on  th is  regard . Acts under p repara tion  will often b e  consi­
dered as legally non-binding, an d  th is may serve M em ber S ta tes as a  (conve­
nien t) sh ield  to  keep th ings outside public or parliam en tary  scrutiny20®.
However, as shown above, under Title VI TEU, th e  Commission now 
shares a  r ig h t of initia tive w ith  th e  Member S tates, an d  in  contrast to th e  
la tte r, i t  h a s  no t hesita ted  to publish  proposals. The Com mission's proposal for 
a  d ra ft E x ternal F rontiers Convention, for example, was published as a n  official 
COM -Document the  day it was subm itted  to th e  Council. I t  m ay be recalled th a t 
th e  previous d ra ft on th e  E xternal Frontiers Convention, on which th e  Ad hoc 
Group on Immigration had  alm ost finished its  work by 1991, h as  never been 
subm itted  to  public scrutiny209. Similarly, the Dublin A sylum  Convention was 
only published after its  signature by eleven M ember S ta te s  on 15 Ju n e  1990.
T itle VI TEU does not explicitly provide for th e  general publication of 
proposals p u t forward and  acts adopted under th e  T hird P illar, The E P s  rights 
w ith  regard  to information, partic ipation and accountability have rem ained 
strictly lim ited. All this, however, does not m ean  th a t th e  estab lishm ent of the  
T h ird  P illa r has not h ad  a positive im pact w ith regard  to  openness and  p arlia ­
m entary  involvem ent in  CJHA a t  th e  national level. As will be shown for the  
U nited Kingdom, France and Germ any in C hap ter 3, th e  introduction of the  
T itle  VI T EU  has led in  these (and other) EU M ember S ta tes  to the establish-
P u rs u a n t to  a r t ic le  1 5 (3 ) o f  th e  C o u n cil's  R ules o f  P rocedure , the  C o u n c il m a y  decide u n a n im o u s ­
ly  to  p u b lis h  d irec tives , decisions a n d  recom m endatio ns  in  the  O f f ic ia l  J o u r n a l .  T h is  p ro v is io n  
m a y  a ls o  a p p ly  to  acts adop ted  u n d e r  T i t le  V I  T E U .
S u m m a rie s  o f  these docum ents h a v e  been  pu b lish ed  in  B u II .E C  1 1 -1 9 9 3 , p o in t 1 .5 .1 ., an d  
B u ll.E C  1 2 -1 9 9 3 , p o in t 1.8.
208 See above  in  C h a p te r  2 .B , pp. 4 2 -4 3 , w i th  re g a rd  to th e  le g a l n a tu re  o f  nets adop ted  u n d e r  T i t le  
V I  T E U ,  a n d  below  C h a p te r  3 .
2,8 See above  C h a p te r  l .D ,  p . 16, foo tno te  52 .
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m en t of special parliam entary procedures which will allow  for more system atic 
inform ation and chances of parliam entary  participation. T he silence of T itle VI 
TEU  on such  questions may, therefore, also be in te rp re ted  as an  a ttem p t to  
keep the EP  outside th e  decision-making process.
Chapter 3. National Parliaments and Cooperation in the Fields 
of Justice and H o m e  Affairs after Maastricht
In  th is ch ap ter it  will be argued th a t  even though the in tegration  of m a tte rs  of 
justice an d  home affairs into th e  framework of the E uropean  Union h a s  no t 
changed th e  intergovernmental character oí cooperation substantially , i t  h as  led 
national parliam ents to commit th e ir own governm ents to m ore openness and  to 
accept a  deeper parliam entary  involvement in  these m a tte rs  a t national level. 
T aking  th e  B ritish, French and G erm an examples i t  will be shown th a t in  these 
M em ber S ta te s  cooperation in th e  fields of justice and hom e affairs is no  longer 
legally defined as (traditional) foreign affairs which should  come u n d er the 
"domaine reservé" of th e  executive. Instead, th ese  m a tte rs  a re  now trea ted  like 
o r sim ilar to  European Community affairs, for which all M em ber S tates' parlia ­
m ents have  established special scrutiny procedures?10.
A  U nited  Kingdom
1. The ro le  of P arliam en t in  foreign affaire an d  in  Community affaire
As a  general principle, th e  conduct of foreign policy u n d e r th e  U nited Kingdom 
constitu tion  is w ithin th e  prerogative of the Crown. T h is m eans th a t decisions 
on  such m a tte rs  of foreign policy as the  recognition of foreign sta tes o r th e  
conduct o f diplomatic relations a re  taken by th e  governm ent. M inisters are  
responsible to parliam ent in  a  broad sense for th e ir  conduct of foreign policy210 11. 
T heir actions m ay be exam ined or criticised th rough oral or w ritten  questions or 
by debate in  either H ouse of Parliam ent. In addition, th e  House of Commons 
Foreign A ffairs Committee of the  House of Commons exam ines "the expenditure,
210 Fo r a s u rv e y  on the  E C -s c ru tin y  p rocedures  in  a ll  E U  M e m b e r  S ta te s  see P a n d ra u d  ( 1 9 9 4 a ) ,  pp . 
2 6 9 -3 2 0 .
211 O n  p a r lia m e n t 's  ro le  in  fo re ig n  a ffa irs  see B r o w n l i e ,  pp. 4 -9 ; W n d o / B r a d l e y ,  pp. 3 2 4 -3 3 4 , esp. 3 2 5  
and 3 3 1 -3 3 2 ;  S elect C o m m itte e  on th e  E urop ean  C o m m u n ities , H o u s e  o f  L o r d s ,  F Y lit ic n l U n io n :  
L a w -M a k in g  F W e r s  a n d  FYocedures, 1 7 th  Fieport, I l L  (1 9 9 0 -9 1 )  8 0 , A p ftend ix  4 [T h e  Fiole o f  
P a r l ia m e n t  in  th e  U n ite d  K ing dom  in  Ftegard to the  C onclusion  o f T re a t ie s ) .
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ad m in istra tion  and policy of th e  Foreign and C om m onw ealth Office and  of 
associated public bodies"212. O ther so-called departm entally related Select 
Committees, for exam ple the  Home Affairs Committee, m ay  conduct inquiries 
an d  report on  "foreign affairs" inasfar as they are re la te d  to  th e ir fields of 
com petence213.
M inisters do not, however, require prior authority  from  p arliam en t for any 
action which can by carried  out w ith in  the existing law of th e  U nited Kingdom. 
T here is, in  particular, no direct parliam entary involvem ent in  the m aking  of 
trea ties, w hich is a  wholly executive act. Parliam ent does n o t need to be con­
su lted  before or during nego tia to rs on a  trea ty  or before a  tex t is initialled. 
D raft tre a tie s  and o ther negotiating documents are n o t disclosed un less the 
orig inator of such docum ents h as  released them.
To th is , two qualifications m u st be made. Firstly, tre a tie s  as such do no t 
form  p a r t of U nited  Kingdom law. W here they impose com m itm ents a t  variance 
w ith  in te rn a l law, effect m ust be  given to them  by o r u n d e r statu te. F or th is 
reason, tre a tie s  requiring changes in  law are  given effect by legislation in  
parliam en t before they  are ra tified  or otherwise b rough t in to  force for the 
U nited  Kingdom. Yet often a  m in iste r may be able to m ak e  th e  required  chan­
ges in  n a tional law by exercising powers of delegated legislation. Secondly, 
u n d er th e  so-called Ponsonby Rule214, the government is  obliged to lay on the 
tab le  of b o th  Houses of P arliam en t every treaty, when signed, for a  period of 21 
days, a fte r w hich th e  tre a ty  will be ratified. This both inform s parliam ent of the 
tre a ty  an d  enables i t  to  be debated215. The Ponsonby Rule applies when th e  text 
of a  trea ty  h as been au then ticated  by signature or by adoption in  a  Final 
A d/R esolution of a Conference o r international organisation, b u t not when a 
te x t has only been initialled. It only applies w hen th e  consent of th e  United
See S t. O rd e rs  H C  N o. 1 3 0 .
813 W ith  r e g a rd  to  th e  fun ctions  and po w ers  o f Select C o m m ittee s  see G a v i n  D r e w r y  ( e d . ) ,  T h e  N ew  
S elect C o m m itte e s , 2 n d  ed ., O x fo rd  1 9 8 9 . I should add  th a t  th e re  a re  no such d e p a rtm e n ta lly  
re la te d  S e le c t C o m m itte e s  in  the  H ouse  o f Lords.
l u  TTie R u le  w a s  so c a lle d  a f te r  a n  u n d e rta k in g  g iven  to th e  H ouse o f  C o m m o n s  in  1924 by th e  th e n  
P a r l ia m e n ta r y  U n d e r-S e c re ta ry  o f S ta te  in  the  Fore ign O ffice , M r  FVmsonby ( la te r  L o rd  F*onson- 
by).
816 A s a g e n e ra l ru le , w h en  a tre a ty  o r  in te rn a tio n a l a g re e m e n t in  a n y  fo rm  is signed on b e h a lf  o f  
th e  U n ite d  K ing dom  w ith  a fo re ign  S ta te  or States or w ith  an in te rn a t io n a l o rg a n is a tio n  i t  is  
p re se n te d  to  p a r lia m e n t. C o n s itu tio n a lly , i t  is so p resen ted  by co m m an d  o f th e  ( ju e e n  and  
th e re fo re  becom es a C o m m a n d  P a p e r. In  practice  the res p o n s ib ility  fo r  p re s e n ta tio n  lies  w ith  the  
M in is te r  in  charg e  o f th e  re le v a n t G o ve rn m e n t D e p a rtm e n t. C o m m a n d  P apers a re  p r in te d  
fo llo w in g  th e ir  p re s e n ta tio n  to p a r lia m e n t  and  a re  included  in  a n u m b e re d  series . W h e n  a tre a ty  
has b e e n  p re se n te d  in  th is  w a y  its  te x t  becomes pub lic  d o m ain  a n d  qu es tio ns  m ay  be asked  to  
the  M in is te r  responsib le  ab o u t its  c on ten t.
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Kingdom to  be bound by th e  in strum ent is subject to a fu r th e r  formal ac t such 
as th e  exchange or deposit of an  instrum ent of ratification2'6. If a  trea ty  does not 
come un d er th e  Ponsonby Rule b u t needs legislation before i t  can  be b rought 
in to  force in  the  U nited Kingdom, i t  has now become com m on to lay  a  tex t 
before parliam en t before th e  legislation is debated.
On th e  whole, th e  parliam ent ra th e r plays a secondary role in  foreign 
affairs. U sually  i t  becomes involved only a fte r the  final decision-taking a t  
in te rna tiona l level. E arly  inform ation or consultation a re  exceptional proce­
dures. P arliam entary  sanctions ex ist in  theory, b u t in  practice p arliam en t has 
never refused to  authorise the ratification of a  tre a ty  laid  before it.
By contrast, special procedures have been estab lished  u n d e r which p a rlia ­
m en t is consulted on draft Community legislation before decisions are ta k e n  in 
Brussels. T he  U nited Kingdom system  of parliam entary  scru tiny  of Com munity 
legislation is quite sophisticated; i t  cannot be described h e re  in  full detail2'7. In 
short, the  EC-scrutiny re s ts  on th ree  pillars: extensive an d  early  information; 
estab lish m en t of special EC-Committees; "parliam entary reserve".
F irstly , effective scrutiny im plies th e  early provision of all re levan t docu­
m ents. Accordingly, governm ent supplies parliam ent w ith  th e  following "EC- 
Documents":
" (i) a n y  proposal u n d e r  th e  C o m m u n ity  T re a tie s  fo r  le g is la tio n  b y  th e  C o u n cil o f M in is te rs ;
( i i )  a n y  docum ent w h ic h  is p u b lish ed  fo r subm ission to  the  B u ro fie a n  C o u n cil or th e  C ouncil 
o f  M in is te rs ;
( i i i )  a n y  docum ent (n o t fa llin g  w ith in  ( i i )  above) w h ic h  is p u b lis h e d  by one C o m m u n ity  in ­
s t itu t io n  fo r o r w ith  a v iew  to  subm ission  to a n o th e r  C o m m u n ity  in s titu tio n  a n d  w hich  
does n o t re la te  exc lu s iv e ly  to cons idera tion  o f a n y  pro|>osal fo r  leg is la tion ;
( iv )  a n y  o th e r  do cu m ent re la t in g  to  E urop ean  C o m m u n ity  m a tte r s  de jx is ited  in  th e  House  
b y  a  M in is te r  o f th e  C ro w n ."216 *18
The governm ent h as  un d ertak en  to supply p arliam en t w ith such EC-Docu­
m ents w ith in  forty-eight hours of th e ir  receipt by th e  C ab inet Office (European 
Secretariat); i t  also agreed to supply both Houses with explanatory memoranda 
on th e  docum ents w ithin two w eeks219.
Secondly, in  both Houses up to one thousand EC* Docum ents are exam ined
216 A  rough e s t im a te  is th a t  ab o u t one in  fou r o f tre a tie s  e n te re d  in to  by th e  U n ite d  K in g d o m  are  
subject to  th e  F’onsonby R u le .
211 See B a te s ; D e n z a ;  W e b e r - i ' a n a r i e l i o , § § 4 -5 .
218 See S t. O r d e r  H C  N o . 1 2 7 (1 ).
2,9 E x p l a n a t o r y  m e m o r a n d a  a lw a y s  c o n ta in  th e  fo llow ing  in fo rm a tio n : s u b jec t m a tte r ;  m in is te r ia l  
re s p o n s ib ility ;  le g a l an d  p ro ced u ra l issues; s u b s id ia r ity ; g o v e rn m e n t's  v ie w  on jx d ic y  a n d  
f in a n c ia l im p lic a tio n s ; t im e ta b le .
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by special EC Select Committees every year220. These scru tiny  com m ittees, inter 
a lia, report on th e  legal an d  political importance of such docum ents221. If a  docu­
m en t is of sufficient im portance, th e  committees m ay recom m end it  for debate, 
e ith e r on th e  Floor or in  special European Standing Committees222 A fter such 
a  debate e ith e r House m ay  vote a  Resolution. Such resolutions, however, do not 
b ind  the  governm ent legally. Less im portant docum ents a re  cleared by the 
com m ittees im m ediately and th e  scrutiny process is com pleted.
Thirdly, w hen B rita in  acceeded to the  EC in  1972, th e  governm ent un d er­
took not to  agree to  any proposal in  the  Council of M inisters u n til parliam entary  
scrutiny w as complete. T he governm ent's undertak ing  w as subsequently embo­
died in a  resolution of th e  House of Commons of 30 October 198CF*. A M inister 
m ay, however, decide "for special reasons" to give agreem ent in  the Council of 
M inisters to  a  proposal still subject to scrutiny. The M in iste r m ust explain his 
reasons to  th e  Select C om m ittee o r to the House. The principle of "parliamenta­
ry  reserve" is applied in  th e  sam e way in the H ouse of Lords.
Thus, in  th e  U nited  Kingdom parliam entary partic ipa tion  in  Community 
affairs an d  in  foreign affairs differs quite significantly. Parliam ent is kept 
inform ed about EC legislative proposals and o ther im p o rtan t docilmente syste-
220 In  the  H o u s e  o f C om m o ns a S o  b e t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  E u r o p e a n  L e g i s l a t i o n  is  appo in ted  u n d e r S t. 
O rd e r  H C  N o . 127 . In  th e  H ouse o f Lo rd s  a S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s  is  
ap iK iin ted  each  session by  a  S[>ecial m o tio n . See e.g., H L  D e b , 2 3  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 3 , C o l. H O . Both  
C o m m itte e s , in te r  a l i a ,  possess a ll th e  {towers n o rm a lly  g ra n te d  to  S e le c t C o m m ittee s , including: 
jio w er to  sen d  fo r persons, papers  a n d  records; pow er to  a d jo u rn  fro m  place  to  place; pow er to  
ap)x>int s u b -co m m ittees ; p o w e r to a p |io in t specia lis t a d v is e rs .
221 B oth  c o m m itte e s  m a y  conduct s(icc ia l in q u irie s . H o w e v e r, the  m e th o d s  o f  s c ru tin y  in  th e  House  
o f C om m o ns  a n d  th e  H o u s e  o f  Lo rd s  d iffe r  w id e ly . T h e  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  H ouse  o f C om m ons E C  
S elect C o m m itte e  is confined  to d e te rm in in g  w hich pro{*osals a re  le g a lly  o r  { » l it ic a lly  im p o rta n t  
and to  a d v is in g  w h ic h  o f  th e s e  shou ld  be debated by th e  I lo use. O n ly  re c e n tly  the  C o m m itte e  has  
s ta r te d  to  adv ise  on th e  m e r its  o f  a proposal, o r  to c o n s u lt o u ts id e  e x { ie rt op in ion  o r  vested  
in te re s ts  on  its  substance . B y  c o n tra s t, th e  H ouse o f L o rd s  E C  S e le c t C o m m itte e  has  m uch  m ore  
focussed on  in -d e p th  e n q u ir ie s  a n d  re (io rts  on C o m m u n ity  prop osals  o r o th e r  docum ents. See 
W e b e r - /’unur/eJlo , §§ 4 a n d  5 .
222 E u ro p e a n  S ta n d in g  C o m m itte e s  o n ly  e x is t in  the  H ouse o f  C o m m o n s . See S t.O rd e r H C  N o . 102 . 
S ta n d in g  C o m m itte e s  sh o u ld  no t be confused w ith  S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e s . S ta n d in g  C o m m itte e  are  
p u re  " d e b a tin g  c o m m ittees" . T h ey  use  th e  sam e d e b a tin g  p rocedures  as th e  H ouse, a n d  indeed  
are  m u c h  l ik e  th e  H ouse  in  m in ia tu re . T h ey  m ee t in  p u b lic ; th e y  h a v e  n e u tra l c h a irm e n , and  
th e y  e x a m in e  b ills  a n d  o th e r  m a tte rs  such as E C  D o cu m en ts , in  m u c h  th e  sam e w a y  as the  
H ouse does. U s u a lly  S ta n d in g  C o m m itte e s  a re  a d  h o c  c o m m itte e s . T h e  tw o  E u ro p ea n  S ta n d in g  
C o m m itte e s  in  th e  H ouse  o f C o m m o n s , how ever, w h ic h  c o n s tis t o f  13 M e m b e rs  each, a re  
p e rm a n e n t com m ittee s . See W e b e r-f ’anarie IJo, § 4 . I I .
323 T h is  R es o lu tio n  has been rev ised  b y  a  second R eso lu tion , voted by th e  H o u se  o f C om m ons on 24  
O ctob er 1 9 9 0 , in  o rder to  ta k e  in to account the  in s titu tio n a l changes o f th e  S ingle  Euro(>ean A ct  
[ in tro d u c tio n  o f th e  coop eration  p rocedure  p u rs u a n t to a rtic le  1 4 9  E E C J. Th e  R eso lu tion  is  
p rin te d  in  e v e ry  rep o rt o f  th e  H ouse o f C om m ons Select C o m m itte e  on E u ro p e a n  L e g is la tio n . See 
e g., S e le c t C o m m i t t e e  o n  E u r o p e a n  L e g i s l a t i o n ,  S c ru tin y  a fte r  M a a s tr ic h t ,  F irs t  S p ec ia l Re{K»rt, 
H C  (1 9 9 3 -9 4 )  9 9 , p . i i i .
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maticaily and at an  early stage. The government will give its  consent in  the 
Council only afte r parliam ent h as  been given th e  possibility to  scrutinize and 
debate such a  proposal. Some scholars therefore even consider th a t  influence 
can be brought to bear a t  a  much earlier stage in  th e  form ulation of EC-Jegisla- 
tion  th an  is  tru e  for domestic law  (or international trea ties), w here parliam en t 
is often th e  la s t to be consulted. Brew, for instance, concludes: "It m ay b e  ... th a t  
while th e  form al power of P arliam ent has been eroded, i ts  real influence has 
actually been  enhanced."224 And th e  British Secretary of S ta te  for Foreign 
Affairs, D ouglas H urd, recently expressed the following opinion: "I feel th a t  th e  
w ay in w hich th is  Parliam ent controls and deals w ith E uropean  decision-ma­
king, to pu t it mildly, is a t  least a s  brisk and thorough as  th a t  which i t  does 
w ith  domestic."225
2. Parliament and CJHA
T itle VI T EU  does not provide for "Community legislation", an d  proposals will 
n o t be "Community" proposals. Accordingly, th e  above described special EC- 
scrutiny procedures do n o t autom atically apply to  the T h ird  Pillar.
The question of parliam entary  scrutiny of the  in tergovernm ental pillars 
was, therefore, addressed during 1993 in  both H ouses on  several occasions226. 
T he House of Lords' Select Com m ittee on the European Com m unities, in  parti­
cular, se t up  a  full inquiry on th is  m atter. In its  final repo rt, the  Com mittee 
noted th a t:
"H y co m p a ris o n  w ith  C o m m u n ity  le g is la tiv e  procedures, th e  C o m m is s io n  w i l l  have a  s m a lle r  
ro le , th e re  w i l l  be no a u to m a tic  p u b lic ity  for proposals a n d  g o ve rn m en ts  w i l l  tend  to  p re fe r  for 
th e ir  n e g o tia tio n s  the  secre t ways to w h ic h  they are accustom ed. T h is  la y s  a g re a te r  respon­
s ib ility  on  n a t io n a l p a r lia m e n ts  each  to  hold th e ir  ow n m in is te rs  to  account. I h e  E u ro |ie a n  
P a rlia m e n t 's  fo rm a l po w ers  under th e  M a a s tr ic h t  T re a ty  a re  l im ite d  in  re g a rd  to  ... ju s tic e  and  
hom e a f fa irs , a n d  the  P a r lia m e n t is less  ab le  to in fluence  the  o u tco m e o f  in te r-g o v e rn m e n ta l 
n e g o tia tio n s  th ro u g h  th e  C om m iss io n  w hose ro le  is also lim ite d . As w ith  C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n ,  
th e  w o rk  o f th e  E u ro p ean  P a rlia m e n t a n d  th e  w ork  o f n a tio n a l p a r lia m e n ts  are  c o m p le m e n ta ry , 
b u t w e see n a t io n a l p a r lia m e n ts  as h a v in g  th e  stronger p o te n tia l in  re g a rd  to th e  in te r -g o v e rn ­
m e n ta l p i lla rs ." 221
T he Com m ittee continued:
"The k e y  to  e ffec tive  superv is ion  is to  o b ta in  th e  r ig h t docum ents, a n d  to  o b ta in  th e m  in  t im e  to
224 B r e w ,  p . 2 4 6 .
225 D o u g l a s  H u r d ,  in: F o r e i g n  A ffa irs  C o m m i t t e e ,  H o u s e  o f  C o m m o n s ,  E u ro p e  a fte r  M a a s tr ic h t ,  
Second R ei>ort, H C  (1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 3 )  6 42 -1 , p. xxv [em phasis  added|.
226 See H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e ,  H L  ( 1 9 0 3 ) ,  a n d  F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e ,  above fo o tn o te  2 2 3 . 
221 S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  E u r o f > e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  H L  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 2 2  (p a ra . 4 8 ).
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in flu e n c e  th e  outcom e. A c q u ir in g  docum ents  w h ich  are sub ject to in te r -g o v e rn m e n ta t n e g o tia tio n  
is  m uch  m o re  d iffic u lt th a n  a c q u ir in g  d ra ff  C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n , w h e re  a lm o s t a ll  m easures  
begin  w ith  a  fo rm a l proposal from  th e  C om m iss ion  w h ic h  is in  th e  p u b lic  d o m a in .... In  o rd e r to 
exerc ise  in flu e n c e  over th e  substance o f  in te rn a tio n a l a g ree m e n ts  a n d  decis ions i t  is e s s e n tia l to  
see te x ts  in  d ra ft . Once a  te x t  is f in a lis e d  a t  the  in te rn a tio n a l le v e l th e  o n ly  choice a v a ila b le  in  
p ra c tice  to  n a tio n a l p a r lia m e n ts  is  b e tw e e n  acceptance, o u tr ig h t  re je c t io n  o r  a d e m a n d  fo r r e ­
n e g o tia tio n . ... W e  seek to  m a k e  a m o re  constructive in p u t" .228
To th is  end, th e  Com m ittee proposed th a t  th e  governm ent should  in  
principle provide parliam ent w ith  any document qualifying under one of th e  
following th re e  tests:
s ig n ific a n c e  (p a r t ic u la r ly  w h ere  th e  r ig h ts  or du ties  o f  in d iv id u a ls  m a y  be affec ted); 
e v e n tu a l need for U n ite d  K in g d o m  p r im a ry  o r secondary le g is la tio n ;  
im p o s it io n  o f le g a lly  b in d in g  c o m m itm e n ts  on the  U n ite d  K in g d o m 229 *231.
These docum ents should be deposited in  p arliam en t w ithin forty-eight 
hours, an d  followed a f te r  the norm al period by a n  explanatory  mem orandum. In  
th e  Com m ittee's opinion, the need  for a  speedy decision should not restric t dis­
closure. Also, M inisters should be reluctant to  displace th e  presum ption of 
public availability  of a  negotiating document, and  they  should be prepared to 
explain th e  need for secrecy to  parliam ent when the m a tte r  does become public 
knowledge.
Furtherm ore, th e  Com m ittee proposed th a t  parliam en tary  supervision of 
th e  T h ird  P illar should proceed as for the supervision of EC legislation230,231. 
P articu larly , the  objective should  be to install a  system  u n d er which the  go­
vernm en t undertakes w herever possible, no t to  agree to  a  proposal in  the 
Council u n til parliam entary  scru tiny  has been com pleted232.
228 S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  H L  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 2 2  (p a ra . 50).
229 See S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  H L  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 2 3  (p a ra . 53).
250 In  th e  C o m m itte e 's  o p in io n  p a r lia m e n t  can best c o n trib u te  to th e  e ffec tiv e  fo rm a tio n  o f policy in  
ju s tic e  a n d  hom e a ffa irs  by e x te n d in g  its  m a in ly  p u b lic  procedures: "T h is  m ethod p e rm its  o u r  
ow n v ie w s  to  be s tren g th en ed  by th e  reception  o f in d e p e n d e n t ev idence and p e rm its  oj>en 
q u e s tio n in g  o f th e  go vernm en t's  p o s itio n  and the  reasons for i t ... W e  w o u ld  n o t w is h  to exclude  
a lto g e th e r  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  for c o n fid e n tia l brie fings, b u t  we recog n ise  th a t  the  d isa d v a n ta g e  o f  
these is  o u r  in a b ili ty  to  re fe r  to th is  in fo rm a tio n  e ith e r  in  re p o r t in g  to  th e  H ouse o r  in  pu b lic  
d eb ate ."  S e lec t C o m m itte e  on th e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  H L  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 24  (p a ra . 5 7 ).
231 B es id es , in  re c e n t y e a rs  th e  H ouse  o f  Lo rd s  E C  Select C o m m itte e  h a s  a lre a d y  c a rr ie d  o u t sev e ra l 
e n q u ir ie s  in  th e  a re a s  w ith in  th e  T h ir d  P il la r .  These in c lu d e , i n t e r  a l i a ,  th e  R ep o rt on  P assp ort 
U n io n  (1 0 th  R eport, H L  (1 9 7 9 -8 0 )  5 8 ), C o m m u n i t y  /W ie y  an d  M i g r a t i o n  (1 0 th  R ep o rt, H L (1 9 9 2 -  
9 3 )  3 5 ) , a n d  S e lect C o m m i t t e e  on th e  E u ro p ea n  C o m m u n ities , H L ( 1 9 S 9 ) .  In  a ll these  a re a s  th e re  
w as som e c la im  to  C o m m u n ity  com peten ce  and for th a t  reason som e proposal o r c o m m u n ic a ito n  
from  th e  C om m iss io n , deposited  b y  th e  governm ent p u rs u a n t to  t h e ir  u n d e rta k in g s  re la t in g  to 
E C  s c ru tin y , w h ich  fo rm e d  the  s to r t in g  p o in t fo r th e  e n q u iry .
232 See S e le c t C o m m i t t e e  on  the  E u ro p e a n  C om m u nities , H L  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ,  p . 24  (p a ra . 6 2 ).
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The government's response to these proposals an d  sim ilar proposals put 
forward by th e  House of Commons' Foreign Affairs C om m ittee and th e  Home 
Affairs Com m ittee was am biguous233. On the one hand , th e  governm ent agreed 
th a t  accountability for work under the intergovernm ental p illars should be to 
national parliam ents, an d  th a t th e  key to effective p arliam en tary  supervision 
w as to m ake  available th e  righ t documents in  tim e to influence th e  outcome. It 
therefore considered th a t  p arliam en t should receive in  re la tio n  to  T itle VI:
th e  f ir s t  fu ll te x t  th a t  is  ta b le d  o f  a n y  C onven tio n  o r  proposals  w h ic h  w i l l ,  i f  a g re e d , re q u ire  
la t e r  p r im a ry  le g is la tio n  in  th e  U n ite d  K ing dom , except w h e re  th e  pro |io sa I re la te s  to  
s e c u r ity  a rra n g e m e n ts  o r  o jie ra tio n a l m a tte rs  a n d  p u b lic a tio n  c ou ld  p re jud ice  th e  e ffe c tiv e ­
ness o f  th e  in ten d ed  a ction ;
s u b s ta n t ia l changes w h ic h  s ubsequently  occur d u rin g  the  n e g o tia t io n  o f the  f in a l te x t;  
o th e r  docum ents g o ing  to  the  C o u n c il o f In te r io r  a n d  J u s tic e  M in is te r s  w h ich  a re  o f s ig ­
n if ic a n t  im p o rta n c e 23*.
If th e  governm ent concluded th a t a  docum ent regard ing  the  T hird  P illar 
fell un d er th e  agreed crite ria  for submission to  parliam ent, i t  would be  th e  go­
vernm ent's  in tention to  deposit i t  "quickly" and to  supply a n  explanatory memo­
randum  w ith in  ten  w orking days of its  deposit. Also, governm ent welcomed th e  
H ouse of Lords' EC Select Com mittee's conclusion th a t  parliam en t should focus 
an d  give independent views on government policy in  th is  a re a  through hearings 
an d  briefings. M inisters would, therefore, be read y  to offer briefings on m atte rs  
of p articu la r in te rest to  th e  Committee. Such m eetings should  be held m ainly in  
public. F o r certain  business, however, confidential sessions m ight be m ore ap ­
propria te235 *238.
T hus, th e  governm ent com m itted itself to  quite ex tensive and early  infor­
m ation. O n th e  other hand , it  w as not persuaded th a t a  formai scrutiny reserve 
w as appropria te  for cooperation carried out un d er th e  T h ird  Pillar. Michael
2,3 See H o u s e  o f  L o r d s  S c r u t i n y  o f  t h e  I n t e r - G o v e r n m e n t a l  H i l l u r s  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  -  O b s e r v a ­
t i o n s  b y  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S t a t e  f o r  F o r e i g n  a n d  C o m m o n w e a l t h  A f f a i r s  a n d  the S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  
f o r  H o m e  A f f a i r s ,  F Ye Rented to  F’a r l i  a m e n t by th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te  fo r F o re ig n  a n d  C o m ­
m o n w e a lth  A ffa irs  by C o m m a n d  o f  H e r  M a je s ty , F e b ru a ry  1 9 9 4 , C m  2 4 7 1  (h e re in a fte r :  G o v e r n ­
m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e ) .
234 See G o v e r n m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e ,  p. 4 ,  a n d  M e m o ra n d u m  b y  t h e  H o m e  O f f i c e ,  In te rg o v e rn m e n ta l
C o o p era tio n  in  the  F ie ld s  o f J u s tic e  and  H om e A ffa irs , in : S e lec t C o m m itte e  on th e  E u ro p e a n  
C o m m u n itje s , H L  ( 1 9 0 3 ) ,  E v idence , p . 5 . In  its  response th e  g o v e rn m e n t a n tic ip a te d  th a t  
docum ents  o f a l e g a l l y  b in d in g  n a tu re  w o u ld  fa ll u n d e r the  h e a d in g  o f o th er docum ents  o f  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p o r t a n c e  a n d  could "accept a n  e xp lic it c o m m itm e n t to  p ro v id e  th e m , su b jec t to  th e  
re q u ire m e n ts  o f s ecu rity  a n d  c o n fid e n tia lity " . F u rth e rm o re , the  g o v e rn m e n t agreed t h a t  secrecy
m ay  re s tr ic t  d isclosure u n d e r th e  T h ir d  F*illar b u t w o u ld  ta k e  "rea s o n a b le  steps to  e n s u re  th a t
th is  execep tio n  is on ly  used  w h ere  a b s o lu te ly  necessary". G o v e r n m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e ,  p . 4 .
238 See G o v e r n m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e ,  pp. 4 -5 ,
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Howard, Hom e Secretary, defended th is view before th e  H ouse of Lords* EC 
Select Com m ittee as follows:
[T h ere  w i l l  be  no f o r m a t  p o w e r  o f  s c ru tin y  r e s e r v e  w h ich  th e  C o m m it te e  w o u ld  have  to  li f t )  h u t 
the  rea s o n  fo r  th a t  is th is : th e  s c ru tin y  reserve  has been  exerc ised  u p  to  now  in  th e  con tex t o f  
pro jtoaals  fo r  le g is la tio n , fo r C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n , w h ic h  is o f course  b in d in g  u|*>n th is  c o u n try . 
T h a t  is  in  a p a r t ic u la r  ca tego ry  w h e re  I th in k  the  m a c h in e ry  o f  s c ru t in y  reserve  is d ire c tly  
re le v a n t. W e  a re  n o t he re  ta lk in g  a b o u t C o m m u n ity  le g is la tio n  a n d  I th e re fo re  do n o t th in k  th n t  
th a t  p re c is e  procedure is  a p p ro p ria te . W e  a re  seeking to  rep ro duce  in  g e n e ra l te rm s  th e  opjtor- 
tu n it ie s  fo r  s c ru tin y  w h ic h  th is  an d  o th e r  co m m ittees  w i l l  h ave , b u t  th e  procedures w i l l  no t be 
id e n tic a l because the  decis ion m a k in g  processes a re  n o t id e n tic a l." *3*
Consequently, except for th e  "traditional" constitu tional tools (Ponsonby 
Rule) w hich continue to  apply to  CJHA, there will be no  special scrutiny requi­
rem en ts w hich could prevent th e  U nited Kingdom's agreem ent to  a  proposal in  
th e  Council. Accordingly, th ere  will be less incentive for th e  governm ent to  
provide p arliam en t w ith  early inform ation since it is n o t bound to aw ait the 
com pletion of parliam entary  scrutiny before i t  m ay act. By contrast, in  the 
scrutiny of EC legislation, the  principle of parliam entary reserve h as  served 
p arliam en t as a  useful weapon to  push through early  an d  com plete information.
N onetheless, un d er these new  arrangem ents p arliam en t finds itse lf in a 
position which is clearly b e tte r th a n  th a t prior to  M aastrich t. The institutional 
an d  legal fram ework un d er T itle VI TEU has enabled C JH A  to  become more 
efficiently structured  an d  tran sp a ren t and therefore ea s ie r  to  follow. Most 
im portantly , th e  government now earlier an d  system atically  provides both 
Houses w ith  m ore inform ation237. Significantly, only in  exceptional cases will 
th is  inform ation be subject to confidentiality.
M S e l e c t  C o m m i t t e e  o n  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t i e s ,  H L ,  ( 1 U 0 3 ) ,  E v id e n c e  p. 1 1. See a lso  G o v e r n ­
m e n t ' s  R e s p o n s e ,  p. 5 .
237 O n  th e  re q u e s t o f  the H o m e  A ffa irs  C o m m itte e  the H o m e  O ffice  p ro d u ced  a l is t  o f  those docu­
m en ts  discussed a t  the  J u s tic e  a n d  H o m e  A ffa irs  C oun cil M e e tin g  o f  2 3 /3 0  N o v em b e r 1 9 0 3  w h ich  
w ould  h a v e  been d é p o s ita ire  u n d e r  th e  new  c r ite r ia  described above . T h is  lis t , in te r  a lia , 
in c luded  th e  C ouncil's  a c tio n  p la n  a n d  w o rk  p ro g ra m m e  fo r 1 09 4 ; th e  re p o rt on th e  a c tiv itie s  o f  
C ÎR E A ; FYogress re jjo rts  on EUROrOL (th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t n f E D U ;  progress  in  d ra ft in g  th e  
C o n v e n tio n ); th e  in te r im  progress re p o r t  reg ard in g  e x tra d it io n ; th e  C oun cil's  res o lu tio n  on th e  
p ro te c tio n  o f  th e  C o m m u n ity 's  f in a n c ia l in te re s t. S in ce , a ll tho se  d o cu m ents  ha v e  been m ad e  
a v a ila b le  to  bo th  H ouses. See H o m e  A f f a i r s  C o m m i t t e e ,  H C  ( 1 p p . 4 5 -4 6 .
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B. France
1. The role of Parliament in foreign affairs and C om m unity a ffa irs
T he powerful position of French parliam ent u nder the T h ird  an d  F ourth  Repu­
blics led to  perm anent governm ental crises, and  to th e  b ad  rep u ta tio n  of the 
parliam en tary  governm ent in  France. Consequently, u n d e r  th e  F ifth  Republic 
th e  previous "parlementarisme exacerbé" was replaced b y  th e  "parlementarisme 
rationalisé": P arliam ent’s legislative powers and  those to  control th e  Executive 
w ere rigorously reduced238. The conducting of foreign affairs w as alm ost en tirely  
en tru sted  to  the Executive, i.e. to the government on th e  one side an d  to the  
P residen t on the other230.
As in  the  United Kingdom, there is no parliam en tary  involvem ent in  the  
making  of treaties, an d  P arliam ent does not need to  be consulted before or 
during  negotiations on a  treaty . T he Foreign Affairs Committees, which theore­
tically could communicate w ith th e  government, play a  very  m arginal role and 
have been  described by Cot as "friendly clubs which m ee t once a  week to  ta lk  of 
th is  and th a t"239 40. The possibilities for Parliam ent to criticise the  government 
have been  considerably reduced since the Conseil Constitutionnel in  a  decision 
of 1959 he ld  th a t Parliam ent should not vote resolutions "qui tend ra ien t à  
o rien ter ou à  contrôler l'action gouvem m entale"241. In o th e r words: governmental 
actions m ay be exam ined or criticised through oral or w ritten  questions, bu t if 
parliam en t w ants to influence, before final decision-taking, a certain  govern­
m ental action in foreign policy by putting it to vote the only possibility is  a  vote 
of censure242. A fu rther restric tion  of parliam ent's powers is evident in  th e  fact 
th a t  only the government is responsible to parliam ent. T he directly elected 
President who plays a n  im portan t role in  foreign policy is no t accountable to 
parliam en t a t  all. Zoller therefore concludes:
"D ep u is  1 9 5 8 , i l  est c la ir  qu 'en  m a t iè r e  e x té rie u re , les  assem blées  n 'o n t aucune in it ia t iv e , n i 
aucun p o u vo ir d 'o r ie n ta tio n . S u r le  p la n  ju rid iq u e , la  ra is o n  e s s e n tie lle  en  e st que la  p o litiq u e
239 O n  th is  re g a rd  see e.g ., J o h n  F r c u r s ,  th e  F rench  P a rlia m e n t: L o y a l W o rk h o rs e , FVor W atchdog, 
in: W e s t E u ro p ean  P o litic s , V o l. liyil, pp. 32-48 .
239 See esp. a rtic le s  2 0  a n d  5 2  Cf.
2+0 Cot, p . 1 3 .
241 D ec is io n  n *  59-2  D C , 17 , 18  e t  2 4  ju in  1 95 9 . See also Z o l f e r ,  3 7 f.
242 See a r t ic le  4 9 (2 )  C f.
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étrangère n'est plus seulement l'affaire de l'exécutif, comme c'était déjà le cas sous les Républi­
ques antérieures et comme c'est d'ailleurs le cas dans tous les régimes |<oIitiques; la politique 
étrangère est aujourd'hui l'affaire exclusive de l'exécutif dans la mesure où, d'une part, le 
parlement ne [»eut plus comme autrefois se saisir de n'importe quelle question et, d'autre port, 
il existe non seulement des dispositions (notamment, art. 20 et 52 de la Constitution), mais aussi 
un organe (le conseil constitutionnel) ¡mur l'enqiêcher de sortir du rôle bien défini que le 
constituant lui a assigné.""3
In practice, parliament becomes involved only after a treaty has been in­
itialled or signed. Pursuant to article 53 Cf., inter alia, treaties of peace, trade 
agreements, treaties relating to international organization, those involving a 
financial burden for the state, and treaties modifying laws244 can only be ap­
proved or ratified by virtue of a law245. Interestingly, article 53 Cf. stipulates the 
intervention of parliament not only before ratification but also before approval. 
Thus, parliamentary intervention is not justified by a formal criterion (the 
existence of a treaty needing ratification in order to enter into force), but by a 
material one (the subject-matter of the however legally binding agreement). 
Nonetheless, article 53 Cf. gives parliament only limited power. Firstly, the 
government can make such a law of approval an issue of confidence and the 
constitution makes it very difficult for the parliament to defeat government246. 
Secondly, parliamentary approval can be bypassed if the president decides to 
hold a referendum on the respective law to approve a treaty247 2489. Thirdly, accor­
ding to Cot, parliamentary control "is severely limited in practice, sometimes by 
an unbelievable disorder in the selection process by which treaties are sub­
mitted to parliament and by a too strict interpretation" of article 53 Cf. itself24*..
Until 1979, parliamentary participation in European Community affairs 
was practically non-existent^'*. After the first direct elections to the EP, the 
FVench Parliament adopted a law on the establishment of special parliamentary
Zollcr, 37.
944 Article 34 Cf. contains a list of matters which have to be dealt with by (parliamentary) laws 
("loi"). fHirsuant to article 37 Cf. alt matters which don't (explicitly) have to be dealt with by law 
may be dealt with by (governmental) regulations ("réglement").
Article 53 Cf.: "Les traités de paix, les traités de commerce, les traité ou accords relatifs à 
l'organisation internationale, ceux qui engagent les finances de l'Etat, ceux qui modifient des 
dispositions de nature législative, ceux qui sont relatifs à l'état des j>ersonnes, ceux qui com­
portent cession, échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne pouvent être ratifiés ou approuvés qu'en 
vertu d'une loi."
246 See article 49(3) Cf.
247 See article 11 Cf., and Zoller, p. 321.
248 See Cot, pp. 16-20.
249 On the following see Weber-ftonarieifo, §§ 10-11.
66
“ f
I
¡
"EC Delegations'* 1 ®. This law was revised in 1990*', The government was 
obliged to provide the delegations with proposals for directives and regulations 
and other "necessary" documents produced by the European Community in­
stitutions. Furthermore, the government had to inform the delegations on the 
course of negotiations at Community level. To this end, the EC Delegations were 
given the power to receive evidence from ministers and from other persons and 
institutions such as the EC Commission*2. As a result, the EC Delegations 
became increasingly well-informed about EC matters and steadily improved the 
number and quality of their (public) reports. However, these reports could not 
be especially debated in parliament. In particular, as mentioned at>ovc. neither 
House had the right to vote resolutions on the results of such reports in order 
to influence government's strategy in negotiations at Community level. Conse­
quently, the work of the EC*Delegations remained known to "insiders" only and 
parliamentary participation in Community affairs continued to be a thankless 
"hobby" for a handful of experts.
On the occasion of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which in 
France required a change of the constitution, the parliament succeeded in 
pushing through a new provision, article 88-4 Cfi, by which government, for the 
first time, became constitutionally obliged to provide parliament with all propo­
sals for Community acts which, if they were adopted at national level, would I*» 
subject to a law. More importantly, both Houses of Parliament were explicitly
250 Loi n* 79-564 du 6 juillet 1979 modifiant I'onlonunce n" 58-1100 du 17 novembre 1 relative 
au fonctionnement des Assemblies parlement« ires en vue de In création de délégations pari*- 
mentaires pour les Communautés eurofioennes, JO, I »is el Décrets, 7 juillet 1979, |649f, m t 
JO, 18 juillet 1979, 1867, hereafter: Ordonnance 58.11(H).
I should add that according to article 49(2) Cf., neither House may establish tin ire than si« 
(permanent) parliamentary committees. TTiis provision, which fits well with the nmn-pt of the 
"parlementarisme rationalisé", was introduced in 1958 in order to hinder the previously deplored 
"government of committees". In 1979, lioth Houses already hiul six committees, n*. establish­
ment of(permanent) EC Committees was therefore impossible. Tiw French Constitution does not 
provide for "parliamentary delegations"; consequently, only limited jiowers rtuiJd !«• entrusted to 
the EC-De legal ions of the Sénat and the National Assembly. However, today the K(MMi-giiln>n* 
have achieved a position which, both legally and practically, is almost «spud to that of par­
liamentary committees. On the legal issues regarding parliamentary delegations see /Verre 
AvriyJean Gicquei, Droit Parlementaire, Montchrestien, Paris 19K8, pp-85 87, and ./arque* 
Desandre, Les délégations parlementaires, bilan et questions, fievue du droit |*jhlir et de la 
science politique en Prance e à l'étranger 1984, pp, 77*109, esp. 94* 109..
261 Loi n* 90-385 du 10 mai 1990 modifiant l'article 6 his de l'ordonnance n* 58-1100 du 17 novem­
bre 1958 relative au fonctionnement des assemblées parlementaires, JO 19ÎK1. Ld* et Ibi-rei*.
11 mai 1990, 5619.
252 See article 6bis (IV) Ordonnance 58-1100.
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empowered to vote resolutions on such proposals253.
Especially in the National Assembly, the EC-Delegation immediately took 
the lead, and established a scrutiny procedure which has become very similar to 
tha t of the EC Select Committee in the House of Commons254. The delegation 
has begun to systematically sift all incoming EC-proposals, to produce regular 
reports and to make proposals for resolutions255. These proposals are first 
deliberated in a parliamentary committee and then debated on the Floor256. 
Resolutions adopted by either House do not legally bind the  government257.
Two remarks should be added to this. Firstly, as noted above, article 88-4 
Cf, only applies to Community proposals which, if they were adopted at national 
level, would be subject to a parliamentary law. The possible scope of article 88-4 
Cf. is thus significantly narrowed, for under article 34 Cf., in conjunction with 
article 37 Cf., parliament's legislative powers are fairly restricted25“. Secondly, 
article 88-4 Cf. contains no clause, which, as in the case of the United Kingdom, 
would oblige government to give its consent in the Council only after parliament 
has had the possibility to complete the scrutiny. As a result of this, in the two 
years following the introduction of article 88-4 Cf. parliam ent was frequently
252 Article 88-4 Cf.: "Le Gouvernement soumet à l'Assemblée nationale et au Sénat, dès leur 
transmission au conseil des Communautés, les profiositions d'actes Communautaires coin|x>rtant 
des dispositions de nnture législative.
Pendent les sessions ou en dehors d'elles, des résolutions peuvent être votées dans le cadre 
du present article, selon les modalités déterminées par le règlement de chaque assemblée."
*** It should be added that the previous article 6bis Ordonnance 58-1100, which constitutes the legal 
base for the ojieration of the EC-Delegations remained untouched by article 88-4 Cf. This is 
important, because this provision obliges the government to far more extensive information than 
article 88-4 Cf. The situation may therefore, in short be described, as follows: the EC-Delegations 
continue their work under article 6bis Ordonnance 58-1100. In addition, parliament has 
established special information, debating and voting procedures for EC-projwsals that fall within 
the scope of article 88-4 Cf.
256 The EC Delegation of the National Assembly is now assisted by a staff of some 15 j>ersons. Ten 
of them are academics. From April 1993 to June 1994 the Delegation produced 18 rejxjrts. A 
report on the OATTcomprised some 450 pages; another regarding the role of French parliament 
in the EU 400 pages. See Ihindraud (1004), 403flf.
256 On the work of the EC-Delegation and the scrutiny procedures in the National Assembly see 
Pandraud (1994a), and articles 151-1 to 151-4 RAN. In the Sénat, the EC Delegation plays a less 
important role and initiatives do more often stem from one of the six permanent parliamentary 
committees. See article 73bis RS, and Jacques Genton: Le Sénat face à la législation com­
munautaire, Rapport d'information fait au nom de la délégation du Sénat pour les Communautés 
européennes. Sénat, N’ 338 du 13 avril 1994, in: "Les rapports du Sénat", N* 338 (1993-1994).
257 See Conseil Constitutionnel, t)C n* 92-314 du 17 décembre 1992, printed in: Luchaire, 321 
(consideration n* 7).
268 See above footnote 244.
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informed by the government too late2™. At best, early and complete information 
took place if the government sought parliamentary backing for negotiations at 
Community level. This situation has, however, now started to change, since on 
19 July 1994 French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, undertook to respect, 
within the scope of article 88-4 Cf., a "reserve d'examen parlementaire", which, 
on paper, looks quite similar to the scrutiny reserve in the United Kingdom2*10.
To sum up, during the last two years, the French system of EC-scrutiny 
has undergone an astounding evolution. After almost forty years of lethargy, the 
parliament has, in a short time, succeeded in establishing a  scrutiny procedure 
which has become very similar to that which is successfully applied in  the 
United Kingdom. Thus, in France, Community affairs are no longer treated as 
foreign affairs. It should be added that the recent upsurge of the conservative 
and nationalist parties in France has undoubtedly furthered this process.
2. Parliament and CJHA
Up to now, however, the government has taken a more cautious approach with 
regard to parliamentary participation on CJHA. Like the United Kingdom it has 
not accepted complete analogy to Community affairs. Supported by an advisory 
opinion of the French Conseil d'Etat, the government has decided to apply the 
new article 88-4 Cf. neither to the Second Pillar (CFSP) nor to the Third Pillar. 
The government argues that these European Union policies were not within the 
scope of article 88-4 Cf. which only mentions "proposals for Community acts" 
("propositions d'actes communautaire"). No doubt, from a  legal point of view this 
grammatical interpretation of article 88-4 Cf. is correct201. As a result, Parlia­
ment may not vote resolutions on proposals under Title VI TEU and the go­
vernment is not bound to respect the "reserve d'examen parlementaire".
However, in June 1994 Parliament pushed through a revision of article 
6bis Ordonnance 58-1100, which, as explained above202, continues to form the
259 In fact, proposals for Community acts often arrived at the parliament after they had been 
adopted by the Council. 2601
260 See f Vernier ministre, Circulaire du 19 juillet 1994 relative è la prise en compte de la |»osition 
du Parlement français dans l'élaboration des actes communautaires, JO, Lois et Décrets, 21 
juillet 1994, 10510.
261 See Weber-flanarieUo, § ll.ll.H.b.
262 See above footnote 254.
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legal basis for the operation of the EC-Delegations in both Houses of Parlia­
ment21^ . The delegations were renamed £ [/-Delegations ("délégationsparlemen­
taires pour 1'Uni on européenne"), and their competence to obtain information 
from the Goverment (and others) was explicitly extended to all matters regar­
ding the European Union2*4. Accordingly, article 6bis (IV)(1) to (3) Ordonnance 
58-1100 now provides:
"Les délégations parlementaires pour 1*1 Jnion eurojiéenne ont pour mission de suivre les travaux 
conduits par les institutions de l'Union euro|iéenne en application des traités du 18 avril 1951 
et du 25 mars 1957, de l'Acte unique européen des 17 et 28 février 1986, du traité sur l'Union 
européenne signé le 7 février 1992 et des textes subséquents afin d’assurer (‘information de leur 
assemblée res|»ective.
A cet effet, le Gouvernement leur communique, dés leur transmission au Conseil de l’Union 
eurojiéenne, les projets de directives et de règlements et autres actes de l’Union, à l’exception des 
jirojets d'actes à caractère nominatif établis sur le fondement du titre VI du traité sur l'Union 
européennes, ainsi que tout document nécessaire établi par les différentes institutions de l'Union 
eurojiéenne. Le Gouvernement les tient en outre informées des négociations en cours.
Les délégations jieuvent demander à entendre les ministre ainsi que des rejirésentants des 
institutions de l’Union."
The government is thus supposed to provide both delegations with propo­
sals going to the Council of Interior and Justice ministers and with other 
documents established by the institutions of the European Union under the 
Third Pillar. Furthermore, article 6bis (IV)(2) Ordonnance 58-1100 obliges the 
government to keep the EC Delegations informed of ongoing negotiations 
regarding CJHA2*56. Parliamentary access to documents and to the decision­
making procedures in the areas of Title VI TEU has thus become easier.
On the whole, like in the United Kingdom, the French parliament finds 
itself in an ambiguous situation. Thanks to the inclusion of CJHA into the 
framework of the TEU, it is now provided with information a t an earlier stage 
and more systematically than under previous arrangements. Importantly, these 
policies will now be scrutinized by parliamentary bodies, the EU Delegations,
Loi n* 94-476 du 10 juin 1994,in: JO, Lois et Décrets, 11 juin 1994, 8449.
264 See also Lucien Lanier (Rapporteur), Rnjijiort fait au nom de la commission des Lois consitu- 
tionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d'administration générale sur: 
1 ’ la projxjsition de loi de M. Jacques Genton tendant à modifier l'article 6 bis de l'ordonnance 
n" 58*1100 du 17 novembre, ... , Sénat, N* 415 (Second S.O. 1993-1094); and Pierre Mazeaud 
(Rapporteur) Rajijiort fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation 
et de l'administration générale de la République sur la projiosition de loi (n’ 1055) de M. Robert 
Pandraud et plusieurs de ses collègues, tendant à modifier l'article s 6 bis de l'ordonnance n* 58- 
1100 du 17 novembre 1958, Assemblée nationale, N' 1140 du 20 avril 1994. 265
265 However, excluded are pursuant to article 6bis (I VX2) Ordonnance 58-1100 "des jirojets d'actes 
à caractère nominatif établis sur le fondement du titre VI du traité sur l'Union européennes". 
Acts and information regarding ajijxiintments, which in particular for safety reasons may require 
strict confidentiality (e.g. combating terrorism) will thus not he transmitted to parliament.
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which in the last years have built up a considerable expertise and started to 
conduct a substantive dialogue with the government on Community affairs. 
Apart from that, however, matters of Title VITEU are still dealt with muc h like 
foreign affairs: there is no "réserve d'examen parlementaire" and parliament 
may still not vote any resolution on matters of justice and home affairs'5''.
C. Germany267 268
1. The role of Parliament in foreign Affairs and in Community affairs
Prom a legal point of view, the German Bundestag's position in foreign policy 
does not look much different from that of the two parliament* de«crilx-d nlxivr. 
Foreign policy under the German constitution is within the prerogative of the 
government, and ministers' actions may be examined or criticised through oral 
or written questions or by debate'266. like the British parliament, the Bundestag 
may vote (legally non-binding) resolutions on matters of foreign policy. However, 
the Bundestag does not need to be formally consulted by the government U'fom 
or during negotiations on a treaty or before a text is signed. After signature, 
pursuant to article 59(2) GG, the assent or the participation of the legislative 
bodies to be given in statutory form "is required with respect to treaties which 
regulate the political relations of the Federal Republic or which relate to sub­
jects of federal legislation". The first group of treaties concerned are "political" 
treaties269. The second and more important group of treaties includes those for
266 interestingly, in practice, parliament has found a way to evade; the restriction* of article 8M 4 V.f 
and to vote resolutions on matters of Title V and V| TKU. Th«* KG | Higotion of the Nntionnl 
Assembly produced a report on CFSF*. The findings of this n-j*irt were sutmoqu<-tii|y inserted 
into a draft resolution on the drall Community budget for 1 iW.1, which had tnm*milled to 
parliament pursuant to article 88-4 Cf., and which included i-xis-nditiires on GKSl'tnnd (111IAI 
On 14 July 1094, the draft resolution was debated in the National Assembly and finally adopted 
in a modified version. See [Serre Lellouche (Rapporteur), Uappirl d'informntion <l«-|«iae pur In 
Délégation de l'Assemblée nationale jsrnr les Communauté* eun>[»(enne* sur IKupqie et *■« 
sécurité: bilan et avenir de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (IICNC) d« nhu«n 
eimqiéenne, Assemblée nationale, N* 1294 du 31 mars 1994, and .Kl, Assemblée nationale. 
Débats, 14 juillet 1994, 4852-4865.
267 This section will only deal with the directly elected /(undestag, which is the primary parlia­
mentary body in Germany and to which alone the federal government is accountable. For a 
detailed and up-to-date description of the role of the Bundesrat in matter* of th** Kunqs-an 
Union see Rudolf MorawittfWiihelm Kaiser, Die Zusammenarlx*it von Mund und lindern Ini 
Vorhaben der Europäischen Union, Bonn 1994.
268 See Tomuachat (1980), p. 26-40.
260 These have been defined by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht as agreement* w hu h nflWt 
"the existence of the state, its territorial integrity, its mdeiM-mb-nro, it« mde|n-nre, its tumitn'ti 
or its relevant weight in the international community". BVerflîK 1, 380.
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the implementation of which federal legislation has to be enacted*7”. As in 
France (and in the United Kingdom) the Bundestag’s right of formal approval 
depends upon the legal force of the act in question. Therefore, "soft law" (and 
other legally non-binding acts) is not susceptible to being brought before parlia­
ment for formal authorization.
Notwithstanding the described similarities, in practice, parliamentary par­
ticipation in foreign affairs in Germany differs rather significantly from that in 
the United Kingdom and in France. Notably, much more importance is given to 
the work of (departmentally-related) specialist committees*71. International 
treaties for which parliamentary approval is required under article 59(2) GO are 
referred to the competent committee(s) which proceed(s) to a rather detailed 
assessment. Only questions of principle are raised in public debate on the Floor. 
Furthermore, the government normally furnishes regular information to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee on any important negotiating process which it has 
started or is about to initiate* 27172. According to Schweitzer, however, deliberations 
in this committee often remain rather superficial and the information furnished 
to it by the government is not always complete273. More detailed or confidential 
information may be given in meetings of the head representatives of each par­
liamentary group in the Foreign Affairs Committee274. FVobably the most sub­
stantial dialogue between the government and its majority is conducted in the 
so-called "working parties "of the parliamentary groups275. Working parties meet 
before every session of their corresponding specialist committee in order to 
discuss matters on the committee's agenda. On government side, ministers and 
officials regularly attend such meetings, thereby granting earlier information 
and opportunities to participate for the parliamentary majority. It should lx* 
added, however, that this dialogue between the government and its majority is 
conducted far more intensively on national policies than on foreign policy.
170 BVerRJE 1, 388. Thereby included are all treaties which directly affect the citizen, ns in par­
ticular legal duties of the citizen can be created only by an act of parliament, the executive . in 
contrast to France - lacking any autonomous |»wers of passing regulations or other acts of 
delegated legislation. See Tomuschat (1980), p. 27.
271 Even though the Foreign Affairs Committee is entrusted with the great bulk of activities 
concerning foreign policies, it does not have exclusive jurisdiction.
272 See Tomuschat (1980), pp. 35-37.
273 See Schweitzer (1980), pp. 12-13.
See above, footnote 96.
876 Tlie "working parties" comprise all members of a parliamentary group sitting on a sjx-rifir 
committee.
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In the past the German Bundestag has shown little interest in scrutini­
zing Community affairsm. This may, firstly, be explained by the pro-European 
consensus among all the major parties. Secondly, the Bundestag has always 
supported the EFs claims for more powers. Accordingly, it has considered itself 
more as a "temporary substitute” for the EP; that is, it would scrutinize such 
issues only until the EP was a parliament "in the full sense of the word". 
Thirdly, the work of the Bundestag rests heavily on a sophisticated groundwork 
of specialist committees. In these committees, and in the working parties, 
national policies are discussed among parliamentary experts and government 
representatives at length and in great detail. Thereby, parliament tries to make 
a substantial contribution and to add more expertise to the final outcome of 
such policies. For obvious reasons (e.g. less time, more actors, limited infor­
mation etc.), the application of such procedures to Communiiy affairs is far 
more difficult and may easily cause great frustration among MPs. Therefore 
even though, in 1957, government undertook to provide regular information to 
the Bundestag on developments within the Council*71, Community nffairs were 
rarely discussed in detail in committees or working parties or debated on the 
Floor. Several attempts to establish powerful EC-Committees have also failed27".
However, the situation changed after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. 
As in France, the ratification of the TEU in Germany required a change of the 
constitution. To this end, a new article 23 GG was adopted by the Bundestag 
and the Bundesrat in December 1992. Article 23 GG not only authorises Ger­
m an membership in the European Union271*, it also introduces special rub's 
regarding parliamentary participation in European Union affairs. Article 23(2) 
and (3) GG, in particular, stipulates:
"In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wirken der Bundestag und durch dm Mund« »ml 
die Länder mit. Die Bundesregierung hat den Bundestag und den llundesral umfassend mul 
zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt zu unterrichten.
Die Dundesregierung gibt dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme vor ihrer Mit 
Wirkung an Rechtssetzungsnkten der Europäischen Union. Um* Bundesregierung l** ru' k*x hligl 27689
276 See Weber-PanarieUo, § 16.1.
277 See article 2 of the act confirming the EEO and EAEG treaties, BGHI. II, 7r>3
278 See Weber-Panariel/o, § 16.11.
279 See article 23(1) OG, and Ulrich Everl/ng, Überlegungen zur Struktur der Kurepiiiw h-n I 
und zum neuen Europa-Artikel im Grundgesetz, in: iVulsche» \«-rwnliung*hlati 1 .*“*.1, | 
940.
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die Stellungnahmen des Bundestages l>ei den Verhandlungen. Das nähere regelt «-in Gesetz '**'
The government is thus obliged to inform the Bundestag comprehensively 
and early with regard to European Union affairs2*1. Furthermore, before giving 
its consent to a legislative proposal in the EU Council, the government must 
provide the Bundestag with the opportunity to give an opinion on such a propo­
sal ("parliamentary reserve")280 182 283. Opinions given by the Bundestag shall be taken 
into account by the government in negotiations at the level of the European 
Union28,1.
In addition to article 23 GG, a new article 45 GG was adopted which 
stipulated the establishment of a parliamentary Committee for European Union 
Affairs. This Committee may, by delegation, exercise the Bundestag's power« 
under article 23 GG284 285.
On the whole, parliamentary participation in European Union affair« has 
thus become significantly more formalised. Basic principles are now explicitly 
laid down in the constitution; detailed rules are set up in the EUZBTG. The 
establishing of a special committee widens the chances of a mono systematic and 
coordinated parliamentary participation than under the previous nrrange- 
ments2H\  Interestingly, the German EC scrutiny system, like the French system, 
seems to be moving towards the British model, which, as shown above, rest»
280 Article 23(4-6) GG contains detailed provisinns regarding the pnrtinpation <if the liun<ir*rnl in 
matters of the Eurojiean Union.
281 ln Order to bring into effect article *23(2) and (3) (KJ piirlinment adopted n nfw-rinl law ■ the 
EUZIiTG (see List of Abhreviotions). With regard to the in/hrimitton of the Bundestag, this law, 
inter alia, provides in § 4: "Die Bundesregierung ütiersendet dem Bundestag insln>*nn«lere die 
Entwürfe von Richtlinien und Verordnungen der Europäischen Union und unterrii ht*-l den 
Bundestag zugleich über den wesentlichen Inhalt und die Zielsetzung, über das la-im Erl«** des 
geplanten Rechtsetzungsakts innerhalb der Europäischen Union anzuwendende Verfahren und 
den voraussichtlichen Zeitpunkt der Befassung des Rates, iimt «'sondere den voraussichtlichen 
Zeitpunkt der Beschlussfassung im Rat. Sie unterrichtet den Bundesing unverzagt« h uln-r ihn* 
Willensbildung, über den Verlauf der Beratungen, ülier die Stellungnahme des Europäischen 
Parlaments und der Europäischen Kommission, über die Stellungnahmen der anderen Mitglied 
Staaten sowie über die getroffenen Entscheidungen.'
58,2 § 5 El JZBTO provides: "Die Eiundesregierung gibt vor ihrer Zustimmung zu Rrchtsetzungsnktcn 
der Europäischen Union dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme. Die Frist zur Stellung 
nähme muss so bemessen sein, dass der Bundestag ausreichend Gelegenheit hat, sich mit <ler 
Vorlage zu befassen. Die Bundesregierung legt die Stellungnahme ihren Verhandlungen
zugrunde."
283 Such opinions, however, do not legally bind the govemnient. See Molfar/Umfx'rt. |*f*. 27 2*
284 Article 45 GG provides: "Der Bundestag bestellt einen Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union. Er kann ihn ermächtigen, die Rechte des Bundestages gemäss Artikel 23 
gegenüber der Bundesregierung wahr zunehmen."
285 See Weber-I’anariello, § 16. VIIFunktion und Koni|>etonzen des zukünftigen Kun>|umu*** hu**e»|
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mainly upon the three pillars: early and extensive information based on a for­
malised procedure, systematic examination of proposals by special EC-Commit­
tees, and "parliamentary reserve".
2. Parliament and CJHA
In contrast to the United Kingdom and Prance, however, in  Germany legally no 
distinction is made between European Community Affairs and European Union 
Affairs. The special procedures established under the new article 23 (2) and (3) 
GG aplly fully to the Third Pillar. As in the parliaments described above, these 
arrangements do not displace the Bundestag's "traditional" powers concerning 
the ratification of international treaties under article 59 GG.
With regard to the special procedures for European Union Affairs, it is of 
interest to note, however, that the principle of "parliamentary reserve" as laid 
down in article 23(3) GG and § 5 EUZBTG only applies to proposals for legisla­
tive acts ("Rechtsetzungsakte") a t the Union level. A similar qualification was 
made with regard to the government's obligations to inform the Bundestag. The 
above quoted § 4 EUZBTG2*’, which specifies government's respective obliga­
tions, is aimed a t EU-legislative proposals. Documents which do not concern 
such proposals will, pursuant to § 3 EUZBTG, only be submitted to the Bundes­
tag if they are "of interest to Germany"* 287. As acts adopted under Title VI TEU 
will in many cases not be clearly legally binding, the German government is left 
with great discretion when applying article 23 GG and the EUZBTG to CJHA.
These reservations notwithstanding, the Bundestag's rights with regard 
to information and participation in CJHA have been strengthened by article 23 
GG. Firstly, the new arrangements will lead to a more comprehensive and 
systematic informing of the Bundestag on matters of Title VI TEU. Presumably, 
information will no longer be reserved for a handful of highly select MPs within 
the parliamentary group on the side of government or within a specialist 
committee288. Secondly, according to article 23(3) GG and § 5 EUZBTG, the 
Bundestag now has the explicit right to be formally consulted before the govern­
ment gives its consent to a legislative act in the Council of Interior and Justice 
Ministers.
See above footnote 281,
287 See Weber-Pnnarielio, § 16.V.B.
288 See above footnote 96.
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Conclusions
The establishment of the Third Pillar has not, as such, changed the intergovern­
mental character of CJHA. It has, however, changed the model of intergovern­
mental cooperation in these fields significantly.
As argued in Chapter 2, cooperation under the new legal and institutional 
framework of Title VI TEU has become more structured and formalized than 
under previous arrangements as described in Chapter 1. Even though numerous 
deficiencies remain288, it may therefore be suggested that this new framework 
will lead to more "legislative” procedures - in contrast to "diplomatic procedures" 
- apd openness in CJHA at the level of the European Union.
In addition, the conclusion of the TEU has, at national level, stimulated 
debates on the role of national parliaments not only in Community affairs but 
in all European Union affairs. Importantly, due to the introduction of CJHA 
into the framework of the TEU, national parliaments have become more aware 
of the cooperation among the Twelve in these fields which, as shown above, had 
started a long time before 1993.
Consequently, during the ratification of the TEU, national parliaments 
have pushed their governments to commit themselveç to more openness and 
deeper parliamentary involvement. Before the establishment of the Third Pillar, 
intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs was 
generally assessed as foreign policy. Traditionally, the conduct of foreign policy 
comes within the prerogative of the executive and the rights of parliaments to 
participate are fairly limited289. However, Maastricht has made it clear that 
because of the close links between the First Pillar and the Third Pillar, the 
proper analogy should be with the scrutiny of Community affairs, for which all 
Member States’ parliaments have established special scrutiny procedures 
granting them more extensive information and earlier participation.
In the Member States described here as well as in other EU Member 
States290, these special arrangements now also apply to the Third Pillar. 
However, not in all Member States have governments agreed to full analogy.
See Chapter 2.A, pp. 37-42, and the summary of Chapter 2, pp. 54-56.
** See above pp. 57-58, 65-66 and 71-72.
^  For recent descriptions of the Danish example see Amehne (1994b); Parlement Européen ■ 
Direction générale des études, Danemark - Folketing; Procédures gouvernementales d’information 
du parlement sur les question européennes, Note d'information N* 48/94 (PE 183.044). With 
regard to the other Member States, The Netherlands in particular, see Pundraud (1994), pp. 
269-320.
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Also, the application of the EC scrutiny procedures to CJHA is rendered difficult 
by various facts. Notably, in contrast to Community legislation, not all measures 
will begin with a formal proposal from the Commission which is in the public 
domain. Similarly, not all changed proposals and final texts will automatically 
be published291. Also, parliaments’ rights of access to information and to 
participate in EU decision-making, in many Member States, depend upon the 
legal effect which such acts will supposely have. However, in Chapter 2 it was 
suggested that the legal nature of acts negotiated under the Third Pillar will 
often remain unclear292.
The EP has repeatedly expressed the view that the best way of streng­
thening the democratic legitimacy of CJHA would be to give more power to the 
EP293. This leaves national governments with the dilemma either to accept the 
EP’s claims or to prove that the democratic legitimacy of CJHA can be 
strengthened by "improved" procedures at national level. The British and 
French parliament, in .particular, used this argument in order to strengthen 
their own position when they ratified the Maastricht Treaty29*. However, to 
play national parliaments and the EP off against one another may well be the 
wrong strategy. Instead, the role of these bodies is complementary and should be 
assessed as such. Also, it should be noticed that since the entry into force of the 
TEU rather little progress has been achieved in the fields of justice and home 
affairs. The ability of national parliaments to control their governments in 
CJHA has thus not been fully tested yet. A stronger involvement of the EP will, 
in my view however, become inevitable, if Member States eventually agree to 
hold majority votes under Title VI TEU in order to accelerate decision-making 
and to (finally) achieve more substantial results in CJHA.
It can thus be concluded that Title VI TEU may lead to greater openness 
of CHJA, more parliamentary accountability of the executive, and increased 
possibilities of parliamentary (and public) participation in the fields of justice 
and home affairs. The Maastricht Treaty therefore constitutes a step towards 
more democracy. However, it remains to be seen whether national authorities 
will cooperate on an equal partner basis with parliaments a t national level and
Ml See above p. 56.
See above pp. 41-42.
*** See e.g., .the Resolution of 15 July 1998, OJ No. C 255 of 20.09.1993, p. 168, and above pp. 49-
54.
** In contrast, as shown above, the German Bundestag has always supported the EP’s claims for 
more powers. See above p. 78.
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